Narrative:

I was working an afternoon dispatch shift, the 'C' desk, for air carrier X airlines on sep/mon/93. At approximately XA30 PDT, an area of unforecasted, intense thunderstorms began to develop in southeast oregon/northwest nevada. I was first aware of this significant WX when I received, via teletype, a SIGMET. I don't remember the exact designator, however, tops were forecast to FL400 and actually built to FL450. I had numerous aircraft under my jurisdiction, and the affected area straddled the primary jet rtes between the pacific northwest and southern california. I was able to amend the dispatch releases and adequately brief those flcs of aircraft not yet departed and advised them of the en route WX and suggested alternative rtes. However, I was unable to contact en route aircraft because of workload and time constraints. These aircraft were basically left to fend for themselves. I was preoccupied with a 'creeping' mechanical delay on flight (number) in ontario, ca, which consumed some of the available time. I feel I inadvertently violated a dispatching far that requires the dispatcher to advise en route aircraft of conditions along the planned route that could adversely affect the safety of flight. I feel that air carrier X needs to develop criteria on how many flts can be safely administered by 1 dispatcher, and to develop better procedures and training to help dispatchers perform safety/WX advisories.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISPATCHER FOR A MAJOR AIRLINE WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT WX CHANGE INFO TO ENRTE ACFT DUE TO WORKLOAD DEMANDS.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING AN AFTERNOON DISPATCH SHIFT, THE 'C' DESK, FOR ACR X AIRLINES ON SEP/MON/93. AT APPROX XA30 PDT, AN AREA OF UNFORECASTED, INTENSE TSTMS BEGAN TO DEVELOP IN SE OREGON/NW NEVADA. I WAS FIRST AWARE OF THIS SIGNIFICANT WX WHEN I RECEIVED, VIA TELETYPE, A SIGMET. I DON'T REMEMBER THE EXACT DESIGNATOR, HOWEVER, TOPS WERE FORECAST TO FL400 AND ACTUALLY BUILT TO FL450. I HAD NUMEROUS ACFT UNDER MY JURISDICTION, AND THE AFFECTED AREA STRADDLED THE PRIMARY JET RTES BTWN THE PACIFIC NW AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. I WAS ABLE TO AMEND THE DISPATCH RELEASES AND ADEQUATELY BRIEF THOSE FLCS OF ACFT NOT YET DEPARTED AND ADVISED THEM OF THE ENRTE WX AND SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE RTES. HOWEVER, I WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT ENRTE ACFT BECAUSE OF WORKLOAD AND TIME CONSTRAINTS. THESE ACFT WERE BASICALLY LEFT TO FEND FOR THEMSELVES. I WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH A 'CREEPING' MECHANICAL DELAY ON FLT (NUMBER) IN ONTARIO, CA, WHICH CONSUMED SOME OF THE AVAILABLE TIME. I FEEL I INADVERTENTLY VIOLATED A DISPATCHING FAR THAT REQUIRES THE DISPATCHER TO ADVISE ENRTE ACFT OF CONDITIONS ALONG THE PLANNED RTE THAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SAFETY OF FLT. I FEEL THAT ACR X NEEDS TO DEVELOP CRITERIA ON HOW MANY FLTS CAN BE SAFELY ADMINISTERED BY 1 DISPATCHER, AND TO DEVELOP BETTER PROCS AND TRAINING TO HELP DISPATCHERS PERFORM SAFETY/WX ADVISORIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.