Narrative:

I knew I was rusty and needed some dual, so I had arranged to do wings work on the return flight after breakfast at santa rosa. I was also unfamiliar with procedures at rhv, having flown in and out of there only a few times. We had picked up our clearance and were holding short of runway 31R. With much of my flying time at a single runway airport, I expected to takeoff on runway 31R (even though we were turning left after departure). In my hurry to get out I had also neglected to remind the cfii that there are no toe brakes in the right seat -- usually a part of my preflight briefing. Rhv ground cleared us to cross runway 31R, hold short runway 31L. According to the cfii, I read the clearance back correctly. We were also told to contact the tower crossing the runway, and that there was traffic on final for both runways. In my hurry to get out of the way of the runway 31R traffic, as the cfii was switching the radio over, I suddenly though I'd misunderstood the clearance, that it had been position and hold runway 31L. The cfii said something which I thought was to hurry. He explained that he'd wanted me to stop, and that he had also forgotten about the brakes. After taxiing onto the runway, I turned back off as quickly as possible, but not before the tower had to send another aircraft around. In the confusion, we also hadn't finished switching the radio over to tower. We corrected that quickly and took off. I completed the wings training that day, including pattern work at rhv and will study diagrams of unfamiliar airports to prevent recurrences. Supplemental information from acn 251049: afterwards the student explained that she thought that there wasn't enough space between the runways to hold between them, so she thought that the 'hold short' clearance was in error. The primary human performance problem on my part was that I tried to apply toe brakes, even though the aircraft was not so equipped. I have logged over 200 hours in the last 2 yrs in the right front seat of that aircraft, but nonetheless the habit of stopping with toe brakes instead of a hand brake overpwred even that much experience with the aircraft's oddities. Another factor was complacency with the student. I've flown hundreds of hours with her in non instructional sits, since we're airplane partners. In the same situation with a student I did not know so well, I would have been primed to take control of the aircraft. Perhaps I would have even moved my left hand a few inches closer to the hand brake -- an action that would have reminded me during the incident to use the hand brake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA CROSSES HOLD LINE BTWN RWYS. FORCES GAR.

Narrative: I KNEW I WAS RUSTY AND NEEDED SOME DUAL, SO I HAD ARRANGED TO DO WINGS WORK ON THE RETURN FLT AFTER BREAKFAST AT SANTA ROSA. I WAS ALSO UNFAMILIAR WITH PROCS AT RHV, HAVING FLOWN IN AND OUT OF THERE ONLY A FEW TIMES. WE HAD PICKED UP OUR CLRNC AND WERE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 31R. WITH MUCH OF MY FLYING TIME AT A SINGLE RWY ARPT, I EXPECTED TO TKOF ON RWY 31R (EVEN THOUGH WE WERE TURNING L AFTER DEP). IN MY HURRY TO GET OUT I HAD ALSO NEGLECTED TO REMIND THE CFII THAT THERE ARE NO TOE BRAKES IN THE R SEAT -- USUALLY A PART OF MY PREFLT BRIEFING. RHV GND CLRED US TO CROSS RWY 31R, HOLD SHORT RWY 31L. ACCORDING TO THE CFII, I READ THE CLRNC BACK CORRECTLY. WE WERE ALSO TOLD TO CONTACT THE TWR XING THE RWY, AND THAT THERE WAS TFC ON FINAL FOR BOTH RWYS. IN MY HURRY TO GET OUT OF THE WAY OF THE RWY 31R TFC, AS THE CFII WAS SWITCHING THE RADIO OVER, I SUDDENLY THOUGH I'D MISUNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC, THAT IT HAD BEEN POS AND HOLD RWY 31L. THE CFII SAID SOMETHING WHICH I THOUGHT WAS TO HURRY. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE'D WANTED ME TO STOP, AND THAT HE HAD ALSO FORGOTTEN ABOUT THE BRAKES. AFTER TAXIING ONTO THE RWY, I TURNED BACK OFF AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT BEFORE THE TWR HAD TO SEND ANOTHER ACFT AROUND. IN THE CONFUSION, WE ALSO HADN'T FINISHED SWITCHING THE RADIO OVER TO TWR. WE CORRECTED THAT QUICKLY AND TOOK OFF. I COMPLETED THE WINGS TRAINING THAT DAY, INCLUDING PATTERN WORK AT RHV AND WILL STUDY DIAGRAMS OF UNFAMILIAR ARPTS TO PREVENT RECURRENCES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 251049: AFTERWARDS THE STUDENT EXPLAINED THAT SHE THOUGHT THAT THERE WASN'T ENOUGH SPACE BTWN THE RWYS TO HOLD BTWN THEM, SO SHE THOUGHT THAT THE 'HOLD SHORT' CLRNC WAS IN ERROR. THE PRIMARY HUMAN PERFORMANCE PROB ON MY PART WAS THAT I TRIED TO APPLY TOE BRAKES, EVEN THOUGH THE ACFT WAS NOT SO EQUIPPED. I HAVE LOGGED OVER 200 HRS IN THE LAST 2 YRS IN THE R FRONT SEAT OF THAT ACFT, BUT NONETHELESS THE HABIT OF STOPPING WITH TOE BRAKES INSTEAD OF A HAND BRAKE OVERPWRED EVEN THAT MUCH EXPERIENCE WITH THE ACFT'S ODDITIES. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS COMPLACENCY WITH THE STUDENT. I'VE FLOWN HUNDREDS OF HRS WITH HER IN NON INSTRUCTIONAL SITS, SINCE WE'RE AIRPLANE PARTNERS. IN THE SAME SIT WITH A STUDENT I DID NOT KNOW SO WELL, I WOULD HAVE BEEN PRIMED TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT. PERHAPS I WOULD HAVE EVEN MOVED MY L HAND A FEW INCHES CLOSER TO THE HAND BRAKE -- AN ACTION THAT WOULD HAVE REMINDED ME DURING THE INCIDENT TO USE THE HAND BRAKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.