Narrative:

We departed runway 9R at mia for the sort, VFR flight back to fxe. It was the end of a long day and we were looking forward to getting home. We had made this reposition numerous times as we are based at fxe but a majority of our flts go in and out of mia. We departed and were initially cleared to climb to 5000 ft on the runway heading. Upon contacting the mia departure/approach control, we were passing through 3000 ft and were instructed to stop our climb at 3500 ft and proceed with a left turn, northbound on course to fxe. After we made the turn, TRACON issued a traffic to an air carrier flight regarding us. I don't recall the air carrier flight number. ATC 'air carrier Y?, you'll see traffic at your 2 O'clock and 5 mi, northbound, an light transport at 3500.' air carrier: 'we have him on TCASII and we think we see something down there. At this point, both myself and the PF, who was also the PIC since we are both PIC qualified, agreed that we had the traffic in sight. 'At this point, mia approach stated, 'light transport X, traffic for you is 11 O'clock and 4 mi, an large transport on the downwind for 27L at mia.' we responded, 'we have the traffic in sight and can maintain visual.' mia TRACON responded, light transport X, reference that traffic, you are clear to climb and maintain 5000 and proceed direct fxe when you are able.' at this point, the PF proceeded to turn to the northwest, I assumed, to pass behind the large transport. However, he rolled out of his turn right at the other aircraft and proceeded to climb. We were indicating 250 KTS and I am sure the large transport was doing close to that as well. With the closure rate that followed, there was no time for me to react and we passed approximately 400 ft above and slightly behind the tail of the large transport. I could not believe what I had just witnessed and at this point, the large transport flight commented, 'that was real exciting!' I am certain that, given the conflicting flight paths, he was sure to have been given an RA by his TCASII. When I asked the PF if he realized how close that was, he stated that it wasn't that close and that we were VFR and could do as we pleased. He also stated that he did not want to pass 500 ft below a heavy aircraft as our original flight path would have taken us. When I asked him why he didn't keep the turn in until we were clear and then climb, he said he didn't know. I still think that a combination of fatigue and the city lights were contributing factors in that they obscured our perception of distance and closure rate. Also, the PF PIC was a new PIC, having just recently upgraded. This could have caused some complacency on my part because he was a very capable sic and first officer. However, the biggest factor was poor cockpit resource management on our part. If I would have voiced my thoughts about what I would do if I were flying (i.e., turn fully until clear and then climbed) and likewise, if my partner had been more vocal with me regarding his intentions, we would have been better prepared. I, ultimately, could have encouraged this by being more vocal with my own thoughts and perceptions. And, since I was the more experienced pilot, I should have been more assertive. This, however, could have also been a factor as I had recently offended this new PIC by being too assertive. More cockpit resource management training is needed! Supplemental information from acn 250102: I believe the situation could have been avoided if ATC would have cleared us to turn wbound instead of northbound and to continue our climb to 5000 ft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC IN NIGHT OP. SEE AND AVOID CONCEPT MISUSED.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED RWY 9R AT MIA FOR THE SORT, VFR FLT BACK TO FXE. IT WAS THE END OF A LONG DAY AND WE WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO GETTING HOME. WE HAD MADE THIS REPOSITION NUMEROUS TIMES AS WE ARE BASED AT FXE BUT A MAJORITY OF OUR FLTS GO IN AND OUT OF MIA. WE DEPARTED AND WERE INITIALLY CLRED TO CLB TO 5000 FT ON THE RWY HDG. UPON CONTACTING THE MIA DEP/APCH CTL, WE WERE PASSING THROUGH 3000 FT AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO STOP OUR CLB AT 3500 FT AND PROCEED WITH A L TURN, NBOUND ON COURSE TO FXE. AFTER WE MADE THE TURN, TRACON ISSUED A TFC TO AN ACR FLT REGARDING US. I DON'T RECALL THE ACR FLT NUMBER. ATC 'ACR Y?, YOU'LL SEE TFC AT YOUR 2 O'CLOCK AND 5 MI, NBOUND, AN LTT AT 3500.' ACR: 'WE HAVE HIM ON TCASII AND WE THINK WE SEE SOMETHING DOWN THERE. AT THIS POINT, BOTH MYSELF AND THE PF, WHO WAS ALSO THE PIC SINCE WE ARE BOTH PIC QUALIFIED, AGREED THAT WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT. 'AT THIS POINT, MIA APCH STATED, 'LTT X, TFC FOR YOU IS 11 O'CLOCK AND 4 MI, AN LGT ON THE DOWNWIND FOR 27L AT MIA.' WE RESPONDED, 'WE HAVE THE TFC IN SIGHT AND CAN MAINTAIN VISUAL.' MIA TRACON RESPONDED, LTT X, REF THAT TFC, YOU ARE CLR TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 5000 AND PROCEED DIRECT FXE WHEN YOU ARE ABLE.' AT THIS POINT, THE PF PROCEEDED TO TURN TO THE NW, I ASSUMED, TO PASS BEHIND THE LGT. HOWEVER, HE ROLLED OUT OF HIS TURN RIGHT AT THE OTHER ACFT AND PROCEEDED TO CLB. WE WERE INDICATING 250 KTS AND I AM SURE THE LGT WAS DOING CLOSE TO THAT AS WELL. WITH THE CLOSURE RATE THAT FOLLOWED, THERE WAS NO TIME FOR ME TO REACT AND WE PASSED APPROX 400 FT ABOVE AND SLIGHTLY BEHIND THE TAIL OF THE LGT. I COULD NOT BELIEVE WHAT I HAD JUST WITNESSED AND AT THIS POINT, THE LGT FLT COMMENTED, 'THAT WAS REAL EXCITING!' I AM CERTAIN THAT, GIVEN THE CONFLICTING FLT PATHS, HE WAS SURE TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN RA BY HIS TCASII. WHEN I ASKED THE PF IF HE REALIZED HOW CLOSE THAT WAS, HE STATED THAT IT WASN'T THAT CLOSE AND THAT WE WERE VFR AND COULD DO AS WE PLEASED. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO PASS 500 FT BELOW A HVY ACFT AS OUR ORIGINAL FLT PATH WOULD HAVE TAKEN US. WHEN I ASKED HIM WHY HE DIDN'T KEEP THE TURN IN UNTIL WE WERE CLR AND THEN CLB, HE SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW. I STILL THINK THAT A COMBINATION OF FATIGUE AND THE CITY LIGHTS WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THAT THEY OBSCURED OUR PERCEPTION OF DISTANCE AND CLOSURE RATE. ALSO, THE PF PIC WAS A NEW PIC, HAVING JUST RECENTLY UPGRADED. THIS COULD HAVE CAUSED SOME COMPLACENCY ON MY PART BECAUSE HE WAS A VERY CAPABLE SIC AND FO. HOWEVER, THE BIGGEST FACTOR WAS POOR COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT ON OUR PART. IF I WOULD HAVE VOICED MY THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT I WOULD DO IF I WERE FLYING (I.E., TURN FULLY UNTIL CLR AND THEN CLBED) AND LIKEWISE, IF MY PARTNER HAD BEEN MORE VOCAL WITH ME REGARDING HIS INTENTIONS, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER PREPARED. I, ULTIMATELY, COULD HAVE ENCOURAGED THIS BY BEING MORE VOCAL WITH MY OWN THOUGHTS AND PERCEPTIONS. AND, SINCE I WAS THE MORE EXPERIENCED PLT, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE. THIS, HOWEVER, COULD HAVE ALSO BEEN A FACTOR AS I HAD RECENTLY OFFENDED THIS NEW PIC BY BEING TOO ASSERTIVE. MORE COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING IS NEEDED! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 250102: I BELIEVE THE SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF ATC WOULD HAVE CLRED US TO TURN WBOUND INSTEAD OF NBOUND AND TO CONTINUE OUR CLB TO 5000 FT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.