Narrative:

Prior to departure the aircraft logbook showed that the 'a' fire detection loop on the #2 engine was inoperative, due to a fault on that loop, and MEL'ed accordingly. While en route, the 'B' loop fault light started to come on intermittently. We had a 4-WAY phone patch with: chief pilot, dispatch, maintenance control and ourselves to discuss the situation. It was agreed that it was just an indication problem, and not a 'true' fault. With that in mind, the captain decided to continue the flight to our destination. I told him that I was not comfortable at the times when the light was on, because at those times we did not have fire detection on the #2 engine. But since it was intermittent he was not concerned. The flight manual says that if you get a fault light, and it cannot be extinguished, 'consideration should be given to land as soon as practicable.' it was considered by all proper departments of the company -- and rejected. But in my opinion, for total safety of flight, a landing should have been made sooner than our destination (2 hours later).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB MALFUNCTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH MEL REQUIREMENTS GIVES FLC SOMETHING TO PONDER IN THE WAY OF SAFETY AND LEGALITIES.

Narrative: PRIOR TO DEP THE ACFT LOGBOOK SHOWED THAT THE 'A' FIRE DETECTION LOOP ON THE #2 ENG WAS INOP, DUE TO A FAULT ON THAT LOOP, AND MEL'ED ACCORDINGLY. WHILE ENRTE, THE 'B' LOOP FAULT LIGHT STARTED TO COME ON INTERMITTENTLY. WE HAD A 4-WAY PHONE PATCH WITH: CHIEF PLT, DISPATCH, MAINT CTL AND OURSELVES TO DISCUSS THE SIT. IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS JUST AN INDICATION PROB, AND NOT A 'TRUE' FAULT. WITH THAT IN MIND, THE CAPT DECIDED TO CONTINUE THE FLT TO OUR DEST. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE AT THE TIMES WHEN THE LIGHT WAS ON, BECAUSE AT THOSE TIMES WE DID NOT HAVE FIRE DETECTION ON THE #2 ENG. BUT SINCE IT WAS INTERMITTENT HE WAS NOT CONCERNED. THE FLT MANUAL SAYS THAT IF YOU GET A FAULT LIGHT, AND IT CANNOT BE EXTINGUISHED, 'CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.' IT WAS CONSIDERED BY ALL PROPER DEPTS OF THE COMPANY -- AND REJECTED. BUT IN MY OPINION, FOR TOTAL SAFETY OF FLT, A LNDG SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE SOONER THAN OUR DEST (2 HRS LATER).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.