Narrative:

Aircraft was a widebody transport cargo flight from ont to lax and continuing on to jfk. The first leg was a positioning flight only, so the aircraft was empty. Initial clearance had been to turn to a heading of 255 degrees, intercept V-210 to lax and climb to 8000 ft. Since we were empty and the temperature was in the 50's, during departure the aircraft was accelerating and climbing rapidly, even in a 30 degree bank, turn at normal climb thrust, the high performance of the aircraft required me to concentrate on the instruments and flying the aircraft. During the turn, ont tower switched us to ont departure. While the first officer was handling the radios, I was also directing him to retract the flaps, to maintain the flap retraction schedule. Ont departure cleared us direct to smo VOR and I tuned in that VOR and proceeded to track inbound to it. I called for the after takeoff checklist about 4000 ft MSL and about 6500 ft MSL realized that I was going to have to start a level off early to level off at 8000 ft. As we passed through 7000 ft climbing at 1800 FPM, the first officer said we were only cleared to 7000 ft. I immediately pulled the thrust levers to idle, pushed the control wheel forward to stop our climb and directed the first officer to advise ATC that we were returning to our assigned altitude of 7000 ft. The first officer said he did not want to report that information to ATC, that ATC would advise us if they were aware of our altitude overshoot. As I was busy flying the aircraft, I did not respond to his comment, but agreed with his logic that the deed was done. I had screwed up and ATC would probably issue a violation to me anyway. I stopped the climb at 7700 ft MSL and rapidly descended the aircraft back to our assigned altitude of 7000 ft. The remainder of the flight to lax was normal and uneventful and ATC never made any comment about our altitude overshoot. As I reviewed the events of this 20 min flight later, I realized that several factors had contributed to this altitude overshoot. First, I had not slept well the previous night and was tired. I was not at my optimum performance level. Second, this flight is probably the most demanding, in terms of workload, that we do at this company. The flight is short with multiple navaids in a major metropolitan area with a 180 degree turn after takeoff and a 180 degree turn for landing. The crew is very busy flying, running checklists, tuning navaids, talking to ATC and company and listening to ATIS. With an empty airplane high aircraft performance accelerates the pace of these events. Third, normal company procedure is for the PF to repeat the altitude assigned to prevent mistakes with altitude assignments. Our altitude assignment was changed when the first officer contacted ATC during our turn after takeoff. We were both busy with our respective duties and neither of us realized that I had not repeated the new altitude assigned by ATC. Fourth, the first officer forgot to reset the altitude alert to the new assigned altitude. If I had received the 900 ft warning, I should have been able to level off at our assigned altitude with minimal overshoot. We were very fortunate on this flight. Flight conditions were ideal -- the ceiling and visibility were unlimited and no other aircraft were in the area at that time. However, I won't depend on good fortune to bail me out in the future. I will brief the crew on our initial takeoff briefing to challenge the PF to confirm altitude assignments. I will brief the first officer to help me fly the airplane before we 'fly' the radios. I will be especially alert for sits where a high cockpit workload on departure could lead to a missed altitude assignment. And I will verify our altitude assignment after each initial contact with departure control.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CARGO WDB EXCEEDS ASSIGNED ALT.

Narrative: ACFT WAS A WDB CARGO FLT FROM ONT TO LAX AND CONTINUING ON TO JFK. THE FIRST LEG WAS A POSITIONING FLT ONLY, SO THE ACFT WAS EMPTY. INITIAL CLRNC HAD BEEN TO TURN TO A HDG OF 255 DEGS, INTERCEPT V-210 TO LAX AND CLB TO 8000 FT. SINCE WE WERE EMPTY AND THE TEMP WAS IN THE 50'S, DURING DEP THE ACFT WAS ACCELERATING AND CLBING RAPIDLY, EVEN IN A 30 DEG BANK, TURN AT NORMAL CLB THRUST, THE HIGH PERFORMANCE OF THE ACFT REQUIRED ME TO CONCENTRATE ON THE INSTS AND FLYING THE ACFT. DURING THE TURN, ONT TWR SWITCHED US TO ONT DEP. WHILE THE FO WAS HANDLING THE RADIOS, I WAS ALSO DIRECTING HIM TO RETRACT THE FLAPS, TO MAINTAIN THE FLAP RETRACTION SCHEDULE. ONT DEP CLRED US DIRECT TO SMO VOR AND I TUNED IN THAT VOR AND PROCEEDED TO TRACK INBOUND TO IT. I CALLED FOR THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST ABOUT 4000 FT MSL AND ABOUT 6500 FT MSL REALIZED THAT I WAS GOING TO HAVE TO START A LEVEL OFF EARLY TO LEVEL OFF AT 8000 FT. AS WE PASSED THROUGH 7000 FT CLBING AT 1800 FPM, THE FO SAID WE WERE ONLY CLRED TO 7000 FT. I IMMEDIATELY PULLED THE THRUST LEVERS TO IDLE, PUSHED THE CTL WHEEL FORWARD TO STOP OUR CLB AND DIRECTED THE FO TO ADVISE ATC THAT WE WERE RETURNING TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 7000 FT. THE FO SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO RPT THAT INFO TO ATC, THAT ATC WOULD ADVISE US IF THEY WERE AWARE OF OUR ALT OVERSHOOT. AS I WAS BUSY FLYING THE ACFT, I DID NOT RESPOND TO HIS COMMENT, BUT AGREED WITH HIS LOGIC THAT THE DEED WAS DONE. I HAD SCREWED UP AND ATC WOULD PROBABLY ISSUE A VIOLATION TO ME ANYWAY. I STOPPED THE CLB AT 7700 FT MSL AND RAPIDLY DSNDED THE ACFT BACK TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 7000 FT. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT TO LAX WAS NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL AND ATC NEVER MADE ANY COMMENT ABOUT OUR ALT OVERSHOOT. AS I REVIEWED THE EVENTS OF THIS 20 MIN FLT LATER, I REALIZED THAT SEVERAL FACTORS HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ALT OVERSHOOT. FIRST, I HAD NOT SLEPT WELL THE PREVIOUS NIGHT AND WAS TIRED. I WAS NOT AT MY OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE LEVEL. SECOND, THIS FLT IS PROBABLY THE MOST DEMANDING, IN TERMS OF WORKLOAD, THAT WE DO AT THIS COMPANY. THE FLT IS SHORT WITH MULTIPLE NAVAIDS IN A MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREA WITH A 180 DEG TURN AFTER TKOF AND A 180 DEG TURN FOR LNDG. THE CREW IS VERY BUSY FLYING, RUNNING CHKLISTS, TUNING NAVAIDS, TALKING TO ATC AND COMPANY AND LISTENING TO ATIS. WITH AN EMPTY AIRPLANE HIGH ACFT PERFORMANCE ACCELERATES THE PACE OF THESE EVENTS. THIRD, NORMAL COMPANY PROC IS FOR THE PF TO REPEAT THE ALT ASSIGNED TO PREVENT MISTAKES WITH ALT ASSIGNMENTS. OUR ALT ASSIGNMENT WAS CHANGED WHEN THE FO CONTACTED ATC DURING OUR TURN AFTER TKOF. WE WERE BOTH BUSY WITH OUR RESPECTIVE DUTIES AND NEITHER OF US REALIZED THAT I HAD NOT REPEATED THE NEW ALT ASSIGNED BY ATC. FOURTH, THE FO FORGOT TO RESET THE ALT ALERT TO THE NEW ASSIGNED ALT. IF I HAD RECEIVED THE 900 FT WARNING, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LEVEL OFF AT OUR ASSIGNED ALT WITH MINIMAL OVERSHOOT. WE WERE VERY FORTUNATE ON THIS FLT. FLT CONDITIONS WERE IDEAL -- THE CEILING AND VISIBILITY WERE UNLIMITED AND NO OTHER ACFT WERE IN THE AREA AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, I WON'T DEPEND ON GOOD FORTUNE TO BAIL ME OUT IN THE FUTURE. I WILL BRIEF THE CREW ON OUR INITIAL TKOF BRIEFING TO CHALLENGE THE PF TO CONFIRM ALT ASSIGNMENTS. I WILL BRIEF THE FO TO HELP ME FLY THE AIRPLANE BEFORE WE 'FLY' THE RADIOS. I WILL BE ESPECIALLY ALERT FOR SITS WHERE A HIGH COCKPIT WORKLOAD ON DEP COULD LEAD TO A MISSED ALT ASSIGNMENT. AND I WILL VERIFY OUR ALT ASSIGNMENT AFTER EACH INITIAL CONTACT WITH DEP CTL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.