Narrative:

Approximately 2 yrs ago, albuquerque city officials began an ambitious project to improve/expand the albuquerque international airport. A consequence of this project is that runway 17/35 is often our primary runway, because our main runway, 8/26 is closed for months at a time. But even before this project had begun, our new control tower was built just north of our existing tower. This tower lies directly between the old tower and the numbers of runway 17, and any aircraft smaller than an medium large transport cannot be seen from the (old) tower when in position. This situation is compounded by various factors: the construction period will extend for about 2-3 more yrs, forcing extensive use of runway 17. Contract problems have set back our moving into the new tower countless times. The current date to move in is sometime in 1995, but based on past experience with these dates, we expect to be in much later than that. Our use of runway 35 is minimized because of noise and safety concerns of departing aircraft over the densely populated areas north of the airport. 'Rolling takeoffs' are not allowed on runway 17, because of a busy city street just north of the runway. There is a blast fence behind the runway, but it does not protect from the blast of aircraft turning onto the runway. A motorcyclist was almost killed a few yrs ago on this street by the jet blast of an aircraft doing a rolling takeoff. Because of the runway layout, abq uses the same runway for landing and departing aircraft. Often, the only way to get a departure out is to put a departure in position as soon as an arrival touches down, and then get him out before the next arrival. This is a common technique at airports without parallel runways, but most towers get to see their runway. These factors add up to an unsafe situation at albuquerque, and one that is scheduled to continue for yrs, and the results could be tragic. For example, we cannot tell if an aircraft waiting to depart from the end of runway 17 is holding short of the runway. With professional pilots this is not a problem, but novice/student pilots often get confused, especially at airports under construction. The even more tragic possibility exists that a controller could forgot about an aircraft in position. The safety and visibility problems on runway 17 would be resolved if abq controllers were working from the new tower, instead of working around it. Apparently, much of the delay is because of contract problems with our icss communication system, however, I believe that if the FAA were motivated by these safety factors brought to light, that many further delays could be avoided. As an air traffic controller at abq, I see the results of this problem on a daily basis, and will submit further NASA forms for specific unsafe occurrences as I witness/experience them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR COMPLAINS ABOUT EXTENSIVE RWY CLOSURES OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AND THE HARDSHIPS OF CTLING TFC AROUND THESE CLOSURES.

Narrative: APPROX 2 YRS AGO, ALBUQUERQUE CITY OFFICIALS BEGAN AN AMBITIOUS PROJECT TO IMPROVE/EXPAND THE ALBUQUERQUE INTL ARPT. A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS PROJECT IS THAT RWY 17/35 IS OFTEN OUR PRIMARY RWY, BECAUSE OUR MAIN RWY, 8/26 IS CLOSED FOR MONTHS AT A TIME. BUT EVEN BEFORE THIS PROJECT HAD BEGUN, OUR NEW CTL TWR WAS BUILT JUST N OF OUR EXISTING TWR. THIS TWR LIES DIRECTLY BTWN THE OLD TWR AND THE NUMBERS OF RWY 17, AND ANY ACFT SMALLER THAN AN MLG CANNOT BE SEEN FROM THE (OLD) TWR WHEN IN POS. THIS SIT IS COMPOUNDED BY VARIOUS FACTORS: THE CONSTRUCTION PERIOD WILL EXTEND FOR ABOUT 2-3 MORE YRS, FORCING EXTENSIVE USE OF RWY 17. CONTRACT PROBS HAVE SET BACK OUR MOVING INTO THE NEW TWR COUNTLESS TIMES. THE CURRENT DATE TO MOVE IN IS SOMETIME IN 1995, BUT BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE WITH THESE DATES, WE EXPECT TO BE IN MUCH LATER THAN THAT. OUR USE OF RWY 35 IS MINIMIZED BECAUSE OF NOISE AND SAFETY CONCERNS OF DEPARTING ACFT OVER THE DENSELY POPULATED AREAS N OF THE ARPT. 'ROLLING TKOFS' ARE NOT ALLOWED ON RWY 17, BECAUSE OF A BUSY CITY STREET JUST N OF THE RWY. THERE IS A BLAST FENCE BEHIND THE RWY, BUT IT DOES NOT PROTECT FROM THE BLAST OF ACFT TURNING ONTO THE RWY. A MOTORCYCLIST WAS ALMOST KILLED A FEW YRS AGO ON THIS STREET BY THE JET BLAST OF AN ACFT DOING A ROLLING TKOF. BECAUSE OF THE RWY LAYOUT, ABQ USES THE SAME RWY FOR LNDG AND DEPARTING ACFT. OFTEN, THE ONLY WAY TO GET A DEP OUT IS TO PUT A DEP IN POS AS SOON AS AN ARR TOUCHES DOWN, AND THEN GET HIM OUT BEFORE THE NEXT ARR. THIS IS A COMMON TECHNIQUE AT ARPTS WITHOUT PARALLEL RWYS, BUT MOST TWRS GET TO SEE THEIR RWY. THESE FACTORS ADD UP TO AN UNSAFE SIT AT ALBUQUERQUE, AND ONE THAT IS SCHEDULED TO CONTINUE FOR YRS, AND THE RESULTS COULD BE TRAGIC. FOR EXAMPLE, WE CANNOT TELL IF AN ACFT WAITING TO DEPART FROM THE END OF RWY 17 IS HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY. WITH PROFESSIONAL PLTS THIS IS NOT A PROB, BUT NOVICE/STUDENT PLTS OFTEN GET CONFUSED, ESPECIALLY AT ARPTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THE EVEN MORE TRAGIC POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT A CTLR COULD FORGOT ABOUT AN ACFT IN POS. THE SAFETY AND VISIBILITY PROBS ON RWY 17 WOULD BE RESOLVED IF ABQ CTLRS WERE WORKING FROM THE NEW TWR, INSTEAD OF WORKING AROUND IT. APPARENTLY, MUCH OF THE DELAY IS BECAUSE OF CONTRACT PROBS WITH OUR ICSS COM SYS, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT IF THE FAA WERE MOTIVATED BY THESE SAFETY FACTORS BROUGHT TO LIGHT, THAT MANY FURTHER DELAYS COULD BE AVOIDED. AS AN AIR TFC CTLR AT ABQ, I SEE THE RESULTS OF THIS PROB ON A DAILY BASIS, AND WILL SUBMIT FURTHER NASA FORMS FOR SPECIFIC UNSAFE OCCURRENCES AS I WITNESS/EXPERIENCE THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.