Narrative:

After a 'routine' emergency landing due to a hydraulic failure on climb out, we were advised of 'smoke,' 'increasing smoke' by the tower. A very successful evacuate/evacuation was performed. However successful the evacuate/evacuation, we were not as prepared as we should have been. In an effort to downplay the situation, I failed to properly convey the importance of preparation for a possible evacuate/evacuation. As a result of my brief to the flight attendant in charge, the cabin crew was totally taken by surprise when I ordered the evacuate/evacuation. That I did not anticipate the evacuate/evacuation, in no way should have prevented the preparation for such an eventuality. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the main hydraulic system (1 of 3 system) had failed. Loss of fluid occurred. Return to sfo. Crash fire rescue called out. On final approach the smoke from engine was reported by tower and it increased in intensity after the aircraft's engines were placed into reverse. Reporter stated that the hydraulic fluid was spraying into the engine as the rupture point was near the engine casing. During reverse the fluid was entering into the hot section, thereby increasing the level of smoke. The aircraft on final behind the reporter's aircraft stated that they couldn't see the subject aircraft because of all the smoke. Reporter complained of the lack of a discrete frequency for the fire chief so that he could advise the flight crew of the actual condition of the aircraft and any need for an evacuate/evacuation. Reporter first thought that the smoke was fluid on hot brakes, then backed off from that assumption as he realized it could be something else more serious. Particularly after he saw the crash fire rescue vehicles swerve rapidly towards his aircraft on rollout! Captain restated his failings in not alerting the cabin attendants about the possibility of an evacuate/evacuation. Only 3 minor injuries were experienced in passenger getting off aircraft. No overwing exits were used, although passenger were briefed prior to takeoff. Rapid flow in exit procedure was considered the reason for not using those exits. There were XX7 passenger on board. One older lady passenger deferred to other passenger in using chute and finally left at captain's insistence. Captain checked aircraft prior to evacing himself. The evacuate/evacuation was essentially complete when he came out of the cockpit after doing the checklists. The cabin attendants were 'shocked' when they realized the order for evacuate/evacuation was the real thing, came as a total surprise. Captain praised his simulator training in evacuate/evacuation checklist use as an aid in event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EVACED AFTER TWR RPTS SMOKE INCREASING IN INTENSITY AFTER RETURN LAND WITH ACFT EQUIP PROB MALFUNCTION. EMER DECLARED LNDG.

Narrative: AFTER A 'ROUTINE' EMER LNDG DUE TO A HYD FAILURE ON CLBOUT, WE WERE ADVISED OF 'SMOKE,' 'INCREASING SMOKE' BY THE TWR. A VERY SUCCESSFUL EVAC WAS PERFORMED. HOWEVER SUCCESSFUL THE EVAC, WE WERE NOT AS PREPARED AS WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN. IN AN EFFORT TO DOWNPLAY THE SIT, I FAILED TO PROPERLY CONVEY THE IMPORTANCE OF PREPARATION FOR A POSSIBLE EVAC. AS A RESULT OF MY BRIEF TO THE FLT ATTENDANT IN CHARGE, THE CABIN CREW WAS TOTALLY TAKEN BY SURPRISE WHEN I ORDERED THE EVAC. THAT I DID NOT ANTICIPATE THE EVAC, IN NO WAY SHOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE PREPARATION FOR SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE MAIN HYD SYS (1 OF 3 SYS) HAD FAILED. LOSS OF FLUID OCCURRED. RETURN TO SFO. CRASH FIRE RESCUE CALLED OUT. ON FINAL APCH THE SMOKE FROM ENG WAS RPTED BY TWR AND IT INCREASED IN INTENSITY AFTER THE ACFT'S ENGS WERE PLACED INTO REVERSE. RPTR STATED THAT THE HYD FLUID WAS SPRAYING INTO THE ENG AS THE RUPTURE POINT WAS NEAR THE ENG CASING. DURING REVERSE THE FLUID WAS ENTERING INTO THE HOT SECTION, THEREBY INCREASING THE LEVEL OF SMOKE. THE ACFT ON FINAL BEHIND THE RPTR'S ACFT STATED THAT THEY COULDN'T SEE THE SUBJECT ACFT BECAUSE OF ALL THE SMOKE. RPTR COMPLAINED OF THE LACK OF A DISCRETE FREQ FOR THE FIRE CHIEF SO THAT HE COULD ADVISE THE FLC OF THE ACTUAL CONDITION OF THE ACFT AND ANY NEED FOR AN EVAC. RPTR FIRST THOUGHT THAT THE SMOKE WAS FLUID ON HOT BRAKES, THEN BACKED OFF FROM THAT ASSUMPTION AS HE REALIZED IT COULD BE SOMETHING ELSE MORE SERIOUS. PARTICULARLY AFTER HE SAW THE CRASH FIRE RESCUE VEHICLES SWERVE RAPIDLY TOWARDS HIS ACFT ON ROLLOUT! CAPT RESTATED HIS FAILINGS IN NOT ALERTING THE CABIN ATTENDANTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EVAC. ONLY 3 MINOR INJURIES WERE EXPERIENCED IN PAX GETTING OFF ACFT. NO OVERWING EXITS WERE USED, ALTHOUGH PAX WERE BRIEFED PRIOR TO TKOF. RAPID FLOW IN EXIT PROC WAS CONSIDERED THE REASON FOR NOT USING THOSE EXITS. THERE WERE XX7 PAX ON BOARD. ONE OLDER LADY PAX DEFERRED TO OTHER PAX IN USING CHUTE AND FINALLY LEFT AT CAPT'S INSISTENCE. CAPT CHKED ACFT PRIOR TO EVACING HIMSELF. THE EVAC WAS ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE WHEN HE CAME OUT OF THE COCKPIT AFTER DOING THE CHKLISTS. THE CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE 'SHOCKED' WHEN THEY REALIZED THE ORDER FOR EVAC WAS THE REAL THING, CAME AS A TOTAL SURPRISE. CAPT PRAISED HIS SIMULATOR TRAINING IN EVAC CHKLIST USE AS AN AID IN EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.