Narrative:

I am a designated FAA pilot examiner, and while in the process of conducting a private pilot flight test the applicant, on takeoff from runway 15, failed to avoid a cloud (fog) bank that was close in off shore. During flight tests it is a common practice to allow an applicant the opportunity to correct any deviations from normal flight, and to exercise judgement. It was my intention to allow the applicant to taxi into position on the runway and make the decision to abort the takeoff, or delay the flight until the fog moved out, or dissipated. After moving into position the applicant proceeded with the takeoff, not knowing if the applicant had as yet noticed the fog bank and how close in it was, I allowed the takeoff to continue, fully expecting the applicant to take the necessary action to avoid the clouds. If he failed to take corrective action I would then intervene and steer clear of the clouds. After liftoff, the applicant made the comment that the haze was 'pretty thick' and continued straight ahead. At this time I was about to take the aircraft and turn away from the clouds, and as is always a habit of mine, I turned to clear the right side of the aircraft to make the turn. When I turned my attention back to the aircraft and was about to let the applicant know that I was taking over to make the turn, we were in the clouds and the applicant was already in a steep descending turn to the right. At this time I rolled the wings level and instructed the applicant to climb straight ahead. We were out of the clouds in about 5 seconds, and on top of a very thick fog bank lying very close to the end of runway 15. I instructed the applicant to turn downwind and make a full stop landing. I also at this time advised the tower of the fog and clouds and recommended that they change runways. Which they did. Although I failed the applicant, I feel that I failed to react in time to avoid the clouds and the tower failed to advise the applicant that a fog bank existed at the end of the runway. I feel that when hazardous WX conditions exist around an airport, the tower when in a position to observe the WX, should be obligated to advise the pilot. In this case, that a fog bank existed close in to the runway. I am sure that had the applicant been advised of this WX condition, he would have considered the fog bank in his takeoff planning. Also as a pilot examiner I have formed the habit of letting the applicant perform maneuvers and operations to the point that there is no doubt in the applicant's mind that the test is failed. I do this to prevent an argument as to whether the applicant would have taken corrective action or not. I do not allow the operation to go as far as to cause an accident, but in this case I allowed the applicant to continue too far and we failed to maintain VFR. I know that I will never let that happen again, but I wonder how many examiners have allowed this to happen and found themselves in serious trouble. This incident should be brought to the attention of the FAA flight standards field office and the FAA ATC division.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DESIGNATED EXAMINER WITH CANDIDATE ABOARD FLIES INTO FOG BANK.

Narrative: I AM A DESIGNATED FAA PLT EXAMINER, AND WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF CONDUCTING A PRIVATE PLT FLT TEST THE APPLICANT, ON TKOF FROM RWY 15, FAILED TO AVOID A CLOUD (FOG) BANK THAT WAS CLOSE IN OFF SHORE. DURING FLT TESTS IT IS A COMMON PRACTICE TO ALLOW AN APPLICANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT ANY DEVS FROM NORMAL FLT, AND TO EXERCISE JUDGEMENT. IT WAS MY INTENTION TO ALLOW THE APPLICANT TO TAXI INTO POS ON THE RWY AND MAKE THE DECISION TO ABORT THE TKOF, OR DELAY THE FLT UNTIL THE FOG MOVED OUT, OR DISSIPATED. AFTER MOVING INTO POS THE APPLICANT PROCEEDED WITH THE TKOF, NOT KNOWING IF THE APPLICANT HAD AS YET NOTICED THE FOG BANK AND HOW CLOSE IN IT WAS, I ALLOWED THE TKOF TO CONTINUE, FULLY EXPECTING THE APPLICANT TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION TO AVOID THE CLOUDS. IF HE FAILED TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION I WOULD THEN INTERVENE AND STEER CLR OF THE CLOUDS. AFTER LIFTOFF, THE APPLICANT MADE THE COMMENT THAT THE HAZE WAS 'PRETTY THICK' AND CONTINUED STRAIGHT AHEAD. AT THIS TIME I WAS ABOUT TO TAKE THE ACFT AND TURN AWAY FROM THE CLOUDS, AND AS IS ALWAYS A HABIT OF MINE, I TURNED TO CLR THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT TO MAKE THE TURN. WHEN I TURNED MY ATTN BACK TO THE ACFT AND WAS ABOUT TO LET THE APPLICANT KNOW THAT I WAS TAKING OVER TO MAKE THE TURN, WE WERE IN THE CLOUDS AND THE APPLICANT WAS ALREADY IN A STEEP DSNDING TURN TO THE R. AT THIS TIME I ROLLED THE WINGS LEVEL AND INSTRUCTED THE APPLICANT TO CLB STRAIGHT AHEAD. WE WERE OUT OF THE CLOUDS IN ABOUT 5 SECONDS, AND ON TOP OF A VERY THICK FOG BANK LYING VERY CLOSE TO THE END OF RWY 15. I INSTRUCTED THE APPLICANT TO TURN DOWNWIND AND MAKE A FULL STOP LNDG. I ALSO AT THIS TIME ADVISED THE TWR OF THE FOG AND CLOUDS AND RECOMMENDED THAT THEY CHANGE RWYS. WHICH THEY DID. ALTHOUGH I FAILED THE APPLICANT, I FEEL THAT I FAILED TO REACT IN TIME TO AVOID THE CLOUDS AND THE TWR FAILED TO ADVISE THE APPLICANT THAT A FOG BANK EXISTED AT THE END OF THE RWY. I FEEL THAT WHEN HAZARDOUS WX CONDITIONS EXIST AROUND AN ARPT, THE TWR WHEN IN A POS TO OBSERVE THE WX, SHOULD BE OBLIGATED TO ADVISE THE PLT. IN THIS CASE, THAT A FOG BANK EXISTED CLOSE IN TO THE RWY. I AM SURE THAT HAD THE APPLICANT BEEN ADVISED OF THIS WX CONDITION, HE WOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE FOG BANK IN HIS TKOF PLANNING. ALSO AS A PLT EXAMINER I HAVE FORMED THE HABIT OF LETTING THE APPLICANT PERFORM MANEUVERS AND OPS TO THE POINT THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT IN THE APPLICANT'S MIND THAT THE TEST IS FAILED. I DO THIS TO PREVENT AN ARGUMENT AS TO WHETHER THE APPLICANT WOULD HAVE TAKEN CORRECTIVE ACTION OR NOT. I DO NOT ALLOW THE OP TO GO AS FAR AS TO CAUSE AN ACCIDENT, BUT IN THIS CASE I ALLOWED THE APPLICANT TO CONTINUE TOO FAR AND WE FAILED TO MAINTAIN VFR. I KNOW THAT I WILL NEVER LET THAT HAPPEN AGAIN, BUT I WONDER HOW MANY EXAMINERS HAVE ALLOWED THIS TO HAPPEN AND FOUND THEMSELVES IN SERIOUS TROUBLE. THIS INCIDENT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTN OF THE FAA FLT STANDARDS FIELD OFFICE AND THE FAA ATC DIVISION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.