Narrative:

It was a cold clear morning on the second day after the big storm of 1993 on the east coast. There was no snow or rain in the past 36 hours. The day before was clear. As I approached our departing gate from inside the passenger terminal, I looked at our aircraft through the terminal windows as I often do. All activity around the aircraft, fueling, baggage loading, etc, was either complete or nearly complete. My aircraft along with the other aircraft on the ramp looked clean. No deicing activity was taking place on the ramp. After boarding and meeting the crew, I settled in the captain's seat and performed my required cockpit checks. The engineer briefed me that he and a mechanic had inspected the aircraft and both agreed no deicing was required. We pushed back, started engines, taxied, and departed. Everything was normal until 300 ft. There was a muffled, short lived rumble from the rear. A glance out the engine instruments showed no signs of trouble. At 600 ft recurred, this time the engineer saw #1 fuel flow drop to 0 with an immediate return to climb burn. I slowly retarded #1 throttle and the #1 engine immediately flamed out. We performed all required checklist and returned on 2 engines. During their visual inspection of the #1 intake, the mechanics found all visible turbine blades damaged. Also, while up on the ladder looking back on the wing, there was a strip of ice approximately 6 inches wide by 10 inches long where the wing root meets the fuselage and partially invisible to the engineer and mechanic during their walk around inspection unless they stepped back from the aircraft. We suspected this to be the culprit that caused our problem. Looking back at my actions, decisions, and judgement prior to #1 engine failure due to ice ingestion, there is nothing that I would have done differently. It was the 'perception' -- calm winds, clear skies, no rain or snow, no deicing taking place, engineer and mechanic confirming a clear aircraft, which led me to believe we had a good aircraft. However, it was cold, temperatures the night before were in the teens. Temperatures prior to push were around 20 degrees F. I did not consider whether or not this aircraft had flown since the big storm. Looking ahead, next time I will ask: has this aircraft been deiced and flown since the passage of a storm, though it may have been several days ago? Also, I will suspect ice if the temperatures remained below freezing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE ICE DURING TKOF DAMAGES #1 ENG CAUSING IT TO FLAME OUT.

Narrative: IT WAS A COLD CLR MORNING ON THE SECOND DAY AFTER THE BIG STORM OF 1993 ON THE E COAST. THERE WAS NO SNOW OR RAIN IN THE PAST 36 HRS. THE DAY BEFORE WAS CLR. AS I APCHED OUR DEPARTING GATE FROM INSIDE THE PAX TERMINAL, I LOOKED AT OUR ACFT THROUGH THE TERMINAL WINDOWS AS I OFTEN DO. ALL ACTIVITY AROUND THE ACFT, FUELING, BAGGAGE LOADING, ETC, WAS EITHER COMPLETE OR NEARLY COMPLETE. MY ACFT ALONG WITH THE OTHER ACFT ON THE RAMP LOOKED CLEAN. NO DEICING ACTIVITY WAS TAKING PLACE ON THE RAMP. AFTER BOARDING AND MEETING THE CREW, I SETTLED IN THE CAPT'S SEAT AND PERFORMED MY REQUIRED COCKPIT CHKS. THE ENGINEER BRIEFED ME THAT HE AND A MECH HAD INSPECTED THE ACFT AND BOTH AGREED NO DEICING WAS REQUIRED. WE PUSHED BACK, STARTED ENGS, TAXIED, AND DEPARTED. EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL UNTIL 300 FT. THERE WAS A MUFFLED, SHORT LIVED RUMBLE FROM THE REAR. A GLANCE OUT THE ENG INSTS SHOWED NO SIGNS OF TROUBLE. AT 600 FT RECURRED, THIS TIME THE ENGINEER SAW #1 FUEL FLOW DROP TO 0 WITH AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO CLB BURN. I SLOWLY RETARDED #1 THROTTLE AND THE #1 ENG IMMEDIATELY FLAMED OUT. WE PERFORMED ALL REQUIRED CHKLIST AND RETURNED ON 2 ENGS. DURING THEIR VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE #1 INTAKE, THE MECHS FOUND ALL VISIBLE TURBINE BLADES DAMAGED. ALSO, WHILE UP ON THE LADDER LOOKING BACK ON THE WING, THERE WAS A STRIP OF ICE APPROX 6 INCHES WIDE BY 10 INCHES LONG WHERE THE WING ROOT MEETS THE FUSELAGE AND PARTIALLY INVISIBLE TO THE ENGINEER AND MECH DURING THEIR WALK AROUND INSPECTION UNLESS THEY STEPPED BACK FROM THE ACFT. WE SUSPECTED THIS TO BE THE CULPRIT THAT CAUSED OUR PROB. LOOKING BACK AT MY ACTIONS, DECISIONS, AND JUDGEMENT PRIOR TO #1 ENG FAILURE DUE TO ICE INGESTION, THERE IS NOTHING THAT I WOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY. IT WAS THE 'PERCEPTION' -- CALM WINDS, CLR SKIES, NO RAIN OR SNOW, NO DEICING TAKING PLACE, ENGINEER AND MECH CONFIRMING A CLR ACFT, WHICH LED ME TO BELIEVE WE HAD A GOOD ACFT. HOWEVER, IT WAS COLD, TEMPS THE NIGHT BEFORE WERE IN THE TEENS. TEMPS PRIOR TO PUSH WERE AROUND 20 DEGS F. I DID NOT CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT THIS ACFT HAD FLOWN SINCE THE BIG STORM. LOOKING AHEAD, NEXT TIME I WILL ASK: HAS THIS ACFT BEEN DEICED AND FLOWN SINCE THE PASSAGE OF A STORM, THOUGH IT MAY HAVE BEEN SEVERAL DAYS AGO? ALSO, I WILL SUSPECT ICE IF THE TEMPS REMAINED BELOW FREEZING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.