|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : cma|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Operator||general aviation : instructional|
|Make Model Name||Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 2 Eng, Retractable Gear|
|Flight Phase||descent : approach|
|Function||instruction : instructor|
|Qualification||pilot : cfi|
pilot : commercial
pilot : instrument
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 60|
flight time total : 1200
flight time type : 60
|Function||flight crew : single pilot|
|Qualification||pilot : private|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : unable|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
After doing some single engine work in an small aircraft twin we proceeded back to the airport for a few touch-and-goes. (I am a multi-engine instructor flying with a relatively low time private pilot.) we entered the pattern without incident and on our turn from base to final I asked the private pilot to turn on the boost pumps. However, instead of turning on the pumps, he turned off all the magneto switches for both engines. Because of the fact that we were slightly high and fast the throttles were already at idle so I could not tell that the magnetos were off. When we landed I went forward with the throttles to commence a touch-and-go. When the plane hesitated I searched for the problem and found the switches to be off. Verbalizing the problem to the student was mistaken for a command to turn the magnetos back on. Instantly, the right engine came to life with a vengeance, the differential power started us off the runway towards the infield. I chopped the throttles, but because of our remaining speed and the surge to the left, we proceeded towards the infield and that is where the plane came to a rest. In my estimation, I believe the contributing factors were: 1) low time student pilot. 2) landing slightly left of centerline, reducing time to react to the problem. 3) poor marking of switches, location (all look the same on the far left panel). 4) misinterp of a verbalized problem. 5) not being able to tell magnetos were off because throttles were at idle on final. 6) not immediately cutting throttles when I saw the magnetos off. 7) not doublechking the students action's every time. Some positive points: 1) keeping the weight off the gear by keeping the yoke back. Reducing the possibilities of snapping the gear off in the soft dirt. 2) immediately cutting throttles after power surge. 3) most of all, not flipping the plane over. 4) the plane passenger coming out of the whole 'east' ticket ride unharmed.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SMA TWIN WITH INSTRUCTOR AND PVT STUDENT HAS RWY EXCURSION INTO INFIELD AREA.
Narrative: AFTER DOING SOME SINGLE ENG WORK IN AN SMA TWIN WE PROCEEDED BACK TO THE ARPT FOR A FEW TOUCH-AND-GOES. (I AM A MULTI-ENG INSTRUCTOR FLYING WITH A RELATIVELY LOW TIME PRIVATE PLT.) WE ENTERED THE PATTERN WITHOUT INCIDENT AND ON OUR TURN FROM BASE TO FINAL I ASKED THE PRIVATE PLT TO TURN ON THE BOOST PUMPS. HOWEVER, INSTEAD OF TURNING ON THE PUMPS, HE TURNED OFF ALL THE MAGNETO SWITCHES FOR BOTH ENGS. BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT WE WERE SLIGHTLY HIGH AND FAST THE THROTTLES WERE ALREADY AT IDLE SO I COULD NOT TELL THAT THE MAGNETOS WERE OFF. WHEN WE LANDED I WENT FORWARD WITH THE THROTTLES TO COMMENCE A TOUCH-AND-GO. WHEN THE PLANE HESITATED I SEARCHED FOR THE PROB AND FOUND THE SWITCHES TO BE OFF. VERBALIZING THE PROB TO THE STUDENT WAS MISTAKEN FOR A COMMAND TO TURN THE MAGNETOS BACK ON. INSTANTLY, THE R ENG CAME TO LIFE WITH A VENGEANCE, THE DIFFERENTIAL PWR STARTED US OFF THE RWY TOWARDS THE INFIELD. I CHOPPED THE THROTTLES, BUT BECAUSE OF OUR REMAINING SPD AND THE SURGE TO THE L, WE PROCEEDED TOWARDS THE INFIELD AND THAT IS WHERE THE PLANE CAME TO A REST. IN MY ESTIMATION, I BELIEVE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: 1) LOW TIME STUDENT PLT. 2) LNDG SLIGHTLY L OF CTRLINE, REDUCING TIME TO REACT TO THE PROB. 3) POOR MARKING OF SWITCHES, LOCATION (ALL LOOK THE SAME ON THE FAR L PANEL). 4) MISINTERP OF A VERBALIZED PROB. 5) NOT BEING ABLE TO TELL MAGNETOS WERE OFF BECAUSE THROTTLES WERE AT IDLE ON FINAL. 6) NOT IMMEDIATELY CUTTING THROTTLES WHEN I SAW THE MAGNETOS OFF. 7) NOT DOUBLECHKING THE STUDENTS ACTION'S EVERY TIME. SOME POSITIVE POINTS: 1) KEEPING THE WT OFF THE GEAR BY KEEPING THE YOKE BACK. REDUCING THE POSSIBILITIES OF SNAPPING THE GEAR OFF IN THE SOFT DIRT. 2) IMMEDIATELY CUTTING THROTTLES AFTER PWR SURGE. 3) MOST OF ALL, NOT FLIPPING THE PLANE OVER. 4) THE PLANE PAX COMING OUT OF THE WHOLE 'E' TICKET RIDE UNHARMED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.