Narrative:

We were assigned by ATC to cross the krena intersection at 10000 ft, 250 KTS. The intersection was crossed at 11000 ft, 310 KTS. I was the PNF and it looked to me that the PF left his previously assigned altitude of 25000 ft a little late. This was due to not taking into consideration the approximately 60 KT tailwind that we had. I advised him at approximately 15 DME from the fix the exact DME of the fix, which was intended to be a clue. He continued his descent at idle power and 310-320 KTS without extending the speed brakes. At 5 DME from the fix, I stated that we were high and that we were supposed to be at 250 KTS crossing the fix as well. The PF acknowledged with 'I know.' consequently, we missed the restriction by 1000 ft and 60 KTS. Perceptions: it is my belief that at XXX airlines our senior pilots at some point early in their careers were conditioned into believing that using the speed brakes to manage their descent profile is an admission of poor descent planning. This is not the first time I've seen this and I think it should be addressed in our training program.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN LGT FAILED TO MAKE ITS SPD AND ALT RESTRICTIONS IN DSCNT.

Narrative: WE WERE ASSIGNED BY ATC TO CROSS THE KRENA INTXN AT 10000 FT, 250 KTS. THE INTXN WAS CROSSED AT 11000 FT, 310 KTS. I WAS THE PNF AND IT LOOKED TO ME THAT THE PF LEFT HIS PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED ALT OF 25000 FT A LITTLE LATE. THIS WAS DUE TO NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE APPROX 60 KT TAILWIND THAT WE HAD. I ADVISED HIM AT APPROX 15 DME FROM THE FIX THE EXACT DME OF THE FIX, WHICH WAS INTENDED TO BE A CLUE. HE CONTINUED HIS DSCNT AT IDLE PWR AND 310-320 KTS WITHOUT EXTENDING THE SPD BRAKES. AT 5 DME FROM THE FIX, I STATED THAT WE WERE HIGH AND THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 250 KTS XING THE FIX AS WELL. THE PF ACKNOWLEDGED WITH 'I KNOW.' CONSEQUENTLY, WE MISSED THE RESTRICTION BY 1000 FT AND 60 KTS. PERCEPTIONS: IT IS MY BELIEF THAT AT XXX AIRLINES OUR SENIOR PLTS AT SOME POINT EARLY IN THEIR CAREERS WERE CONDITIONED INTO BELIEVING THAT USING THE SPD BRAKES TO MANAGE THEIR DSCNT PROFILE IS AN ADMISSION OF POOR DSCNT PLANNING. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME I'VE SEEN THIS AND I THINK IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN OUR TRAINING PROGRAM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.