Narrative:

I was working local control at pfn tower. Approach control is provided by pam (tyndall approach, tyndall air force base). Pfn must call for release on all IFR aircraft prior to clearing the aircraft for takeoff. Pfn called for release on nga X, an small transport, off runway 32, followed by atx Y, an light transport, off runway 5. Releases were obtained with the following climb out instructions: nga X turn right heading 360, maintain 5000. Atx Y fly runway heading, maintain 5000. At approximately XX21Z, I cleared nga X for takeoff on runway 32 with instructions to turn right heading 360, maintain 5000. I then switched him to departure. At approximately XX22Z, I cleared atx Y for takeoff on runway 5 with instructions to fly runway heading, maintain 5000. As atx Y departed, tyndall departure apparently gave nga X a right turn on course without coordination with pfn tower. After atx Y became airborne, I began calling traffic on nga X. When atx Y tagged up on the dbrite, nga X was approximately 2 mi northwest of the atx Y's position, 900 ft above him and converging. When atx Y finally got the nga X in sight, nga X was approximately 1 1/2 mi away, converging, and about 700 ft above the nga X. This type of incident occurs frequently with tyndall approach. There appears to be no enforcement of IFR separation standards by the air force or the FAA. I feel that incidents such as this will eventually result in an accident unless the FAA and the air force choose to address the problem. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that he has 4 yrs experience. Have dbrite at facility, but not a limited approach control facility. This type of incident is common. Thinks that military controller experience is main problem. Also thinks that it is difficult for the military to take any action after it is reported. No ucr filed. Reporter blames military controller training as one of the problems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: VFR TWR CTLR COMPLAINS ABOUT SVC BEING PROVIDED BY ADJACENT APCH CTL FACILITY RESULTING IN LTSS BTWN 2 IFR DEPS.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING LCL CTL AT PFN TWR. APCH CTL IS PROVIDED BY PAM (TYNDALL APCH, TYNDALL AIR FORCE BASE). PFN MUST CALL FOR RELEASE ON ALL IFR ACFT PRIOR TO CLRING THE ACFT FOR TKOF. PFN CALLED FOR RELEASE ON NGA X, AN SMT, OFF RWY 32, FOLLOWED BY ATX Y, AN LTT, OFF RWY 5. RELEASES WERE OBTAINED WITH THE FOLLOWING CLBOUT INSTRUCTIONS: NGA X TURN R HDG 360, MAINTAIN 5000. ATX Y FLY RWY HDG, MAINTAIN 5000. AT APPROX XX21Z, I CLRED NGA X FOR TKOF ON RWY 32 WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN R HDG 360, MAINTAIN 5000. I THEN SWITCHED HIM TO DEP. AT APPROX XX22Z, I CLRED ATX Y FOR TKOF ON RWY 5 WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO FLY RWY HDG, MAINTAIN 5000. AS ATX Y DEPARTED, TYNDALL DEP APPARENTLY GAVE NGA X A R TURN ON COURSE WITHOUT COORD WITH PFN TWR. AFTER ATX Y BECAME AIRBORNE, I BEGAN CALLING TFC ON NGA X. WHEN ATX Y TAGGED UP ON THE DBRITE, NGA X WAS APPROX 2 MI NW OF THE ATX Y'S POS, 900 FT ABOVE HIM AND CONVERGING. WHEN ATX Y FINALLY GOT THE NGA X IN SIGHT, NGA X WAS APPROX 1 1/2 MI AWAY, CONVERGING, AND ABOUT 700 FT ABOVE THE NGA X. THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT OCCURS FREQUENTLY WITH TYNDALL APCH. THERE APPEARS TO BE NO ENFORCEMENT OF IFR SEPARATION STANDARDS BY THE AIR FORCE OR THE FAA. I FEEL THAT INCIDENTS SUCH AS THIS WILL EVENTUALLY RESULT IN AN ACCIDENT UNLESS THE FAA AND THE AIR FORCE CHOOSE TO ADDRESS THE PROB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT HE HAS 4 YRS EXPERIENCE. HAVE DBRITE AT FACILITY, BUT NOT A LIMITED APCH CTL FACILITY. THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT IS COMMON. THINKS THAT MIL CTLR EXPERIENCE IS MAIN PROB. ALSO THINKS THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE MIL TO TAKE ANY ACTION AFTER IT IS RPTED. NO UCR FILED. RPTR BLAMES MIL CTLR TRAINING AS ONE OF THE PROBS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.