Narrative:

Aircraft was cleared for landing on abe runway 6 while inbound on the ILS runway 6 approach. Braking action was reported good with patches of ice on runway. Runway 6 was treated with sand and chemicals. Upon touchdown on runway 6, flight crew noticed a snow removal vehicle drive on to the runway left to right at or near the departure end of the runway. It was determined that stopping the aircraft was the safest course of action. The captain subsequently commanded the first officer to stop the aircraft. Simultaneously the tower made a transmission, warning the flight crew of the truck. The aircraft was stopped in minimal distance using autobrakes (medium selected) and reverse thrust. Autobrakes were deselected at approximately 80 to 90 KTS and manual braking was used to bring the aircraft to taxi speed. The aircraft made an uneventful exit off at taxiway echo. The aircraft was never in danger of impacting the vehicle. No extreme braking was required. The captain did not feel it necessary to assume control of the aircraft. Subsequent xmissions with the tower revealed that the snow removal vehicle in question did not have a means of monitoring or communicating with tower frequency. A command vehicle who was in communication with tower was supposed to coordination the movements of all snow removal equipment. Air crew comments: luckily, due to the relatively light aircraft weight, the departure end position of the vehicle in question, the good braking conditions on runway 6, a collision with the snow removal vehicle was not a real danger. However had the vehicle entered the runway in the first half of runway 6, or had braking conditions and aircraft weight contributed to a longer roll out, certainly a collision may not have been avoided. Abe snow removal crews need further training and at least a means of monitoring tower frequency in every vehicle.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG ON LNDG ROLL OUT SIGHTS SNOW REMOVAL EQUIPMENT ON END OF RWY.

Narrative: ACFT WAS CLRED FOR LNDG ON ABE RWY 6 WHILE INBOUND ON THE ILS RWY 6 APCH. BRAKING ACTION WAS RPTED GOOD WITH PATCHES OF ICE ON RWY. RWY 6 WAS TREATED WITH SAND AND CHEMICALS. UPON TOUCHDOWN ON RWY 6, FLC NOTICED A SNOW REMOVAL VEHICLE DRIVE ON TO THE RWY L TO R AT OR NEAR THE DEP END OF THE RWY. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT STOPPING THE ACFT WAS THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. THE CAPT SUBSEQUENTLY COMMANDED THE FO TO STOP THE ACFT. SIMULTANEOUSLY THE TWR MADE A XMISSION, WARNING THE FLC OF THE TRUCK. THE ACFT WAS STOPPED IN MINIMAL DISTANCE USING AUTOBRAKES (MEDIUM SELECTED) AND REVERSE THRUST. AUTOBRAKES WERE DESELECTED AT APPROX 80 TO 90 KTS AND MANUAL BRAKING WAS USED TO BRING THE ACFT TO TAXI SPD. THE ACFT MADE AN UNEVENTFUL EXIT OFF AT TXWY ECHO. THE ACFT WAS NEVER IN DANGER OF IMPACTING THE VEHICLE. NO EXTREME BRAKING WAS REQUIRED. THE CAPT DID NOT FEEL IT NECESSARY TO ASSUME CTL OF THE ACFT. SUBSEQUENT XMISSIONS WITH THE TWR REVEALED THAT THE SNOW REMOVAL VEHICLE IN QUESTION DID NOT HAVE A MEANS OF MONITORING OR COMMUNICATING WITH TWR FREQ. A COMMAND VEHICLE WHO WAS IN COM WITH TWR WAS SUPPOSED TO COORD THE MOVEMENTS OF ALL SNOW REMOVAL EQUIPMENT. AIR CREW COMMENTS: LUCKILY, DUE TO THE RELATIVELY LIGHT ACFT WT, THE DEP END POS OF THE VEHICLE IN QUESTION, THE GOOD BRAKING CONDITIONS ON RWY 6, A COLLISION WITH THE SNOW REMOVAL VEHICLE WAS NOT A REAL DANGER. HOWEVER HAD THE VEHICLE ENTERED THE RWY IN THE FIRST HALF OF RWY 6, OR HAD BRAKING CONDITIONS AND ACFT WT CONTRIBUTED TO A LONGER ROLL OUT, CERTAINLY A COLLISION MAY NOT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. ABE SNOW REMOVAL CREWS NEED FURTHER TRAINING AND AT LEAST A MEANS OF MONITORING TWR FREQ IN EVERY VEHICLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.