Narrative:

While making an approach into day on the ILS we had to execute a missed approach. The chain of events are as follows. I was the first officer on a flight from lax to day in an small transport jet. The flight was normal until we started the approach into day. We were shooting the ILS and all was normal until we crossed the OM. The captain was flying and I was calling altitude and position. He was 3 dots left and right of course and was having trouble maintaining the GS as well. When we reached 50 ft above decision ht I called 'runway in sight'. I could see the approach lighting but not the runway. We were a little right of course, the captain said 'I do not have the runway in sight.' again I called runway in sight and called its position and pointed at the runway. He again called runway not in sight! At that time I also lost sight of the runway and called missed approach to the captain. He then said I've got it and rapidly started descending. I still did not have the runway in sight. The captain then said I've lost it. I told him 'let's go missed man!!!' I then called the tower and advised we were missed approach and would need a tight turn back on the marker. The captain said do you want to shoot this approach? I told him yes please. While being vectored for the next approach we were assigned 3000 ft till on the ILS. I lost 300 ft and corrected when tower called for our altitude. The tower advised that they had declared an emergency for us. We told them that that was not necessary. The second approach was normal and the landing was uneventful. After landing we were asked to call the tower. I did and told the tower what had happened. They asked for the reason we needed a tight turn back to the marker and I told them it was for fuel consideration (having enough fuel for our alternate and 45 min thereafter). Human performance. I feel factors affecting this situation were fatigue on the captain's part. The flight started at fty with a fuel stop in tx. We then continued on to lax. We fueled up and departed and stopped in ks for fuel and onto day. The captain had flew the aircraft the entire flight and made all of the takeoffs and lndgs. I asked him if he would like for me to fly so he could rest but he said no. At no time did he use the autoplt during the flight. Flight time was approximately 10 hours.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF SMT PVT JET COULD NOT SEE THE RWY OR THE RWY ENVIRONMENT AFTER DSNDING TO MINIMUMS ON AN ILS INSTRUMENT APCH CAUSED BY ALLOWING THE ACFT TO NOT MAINTAIN THE DESIRED ILS TRACK DURING APCH, AND SUBSEQUENTLY CLBED TO, BUT DID NOT MAINTAIN, THE ASSIGNED MISSED APCH ALT.

Narrative: WHILE MAKING AN APCH INTO DAY ON THE ILS WE HAD TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS. I WAS THE FO ON A FLT FROM LAX TO DAY IN AN SMT JET. THE FLT WAS NORMAL UNTIL WE STARTED THE APCH INTO DAY. WE WERE SHOOTING THE ILS AND ALL WAS NORMAL UNTIL WE CROSSED THE OM. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND I WAS CALLING ALT AND POS. HE WAS 3 DOTS L AND R OF COURSE AND WAS HAVING TROUBLE MAINTAINING THE GS AS WELL. WHEN WE REACHED 50 FT ABOVE DECISION HT I CALLED 'RWY IN SIGHT'. I COULD SEE THE APCH LIGHTING BUT NOT THE RWY. WE WERE A LITTLE R OF COURSE, THE CAPT SAID 'I DO NOT HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT.' AGAIN I CALLED RWY IN SIGHT AND CALLED ITS POS AND POINTED AT THE RWY. HE AGAIN CALLED RWY NOT IN SIGHT! AT THAT TIME I ALSO LOST SIGHT OF THE RWY AND CALLED MISSED APCH TO THE CAPT. HE THEN SAID I'VE GOT IT AND RAPIDLY STARTED DSNDING. I STILL DID NOT HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT. THE CAPT THEN SAID I'VE LOST IT. I TOLD HIM 'LET'S GO MISSED MAN!!!' I THEN CALLED THE TWR AND ADVISED WE WERE MISSED APCH AND WOULD NEED A TIGHT TURN BACK ON THE MARKER. THE CAPT SAID DO YOU WANT TO SHOOT THIS APCH? I TOLD HIM YES PLEASE. WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR THE NEXT APCH WE WERE ASSIGNED 3000 FT TILL ON THE ILS. I LOST 300 FT AND CORRECTED WHEN TWR CALLED FOR OUR ALT. THE TWR ADVISED THAT THEY HAD DECLARED AN EMER FOR US. WE TOLD THEM THAT THAT WAS NOT NECESSARY. THE SECOND APCH WAS NORMAL AND THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER LNDG WE WERE ASKED TO CALL THE TWR. I DID AND TOLD THE TWR WHAT HAD HAPPENED. THEY ASKED FOR THE REASON WE NEEDED A TIGHT TURN BACK TO THE MARKER AND I TOLD THEM IT WAS FOR FUEL CONSIDERATION (HAVING ENOUGH FUEL FOR OUR ALTERNATE AND 45 MIN THEREAFTER). HUMAN PERFORMANCE. I FEEL FACTORS AFFECTING THIS SITUATION WERE FATIGUE ON THE CAPT'S PART. THE FLT STARTED AT FTY WITH A FUEL STOP IN TX. WE THEN CONTINUED ON TO LAX. WE FUELED UP AND DEPARTED AND STOPPED IN KS FOR FUEL AND ONTO DAY. THE CAPT HAD FLEW THE ACFT THE ENTIRE FLT AND MADE ALL OF THE TKOFS AND LNDGS. I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD LIKE FOR ME TO FLY SO HE COULD REST BUT HE SAID NO. AT NO TIME DID HE USE THE AUTOPLT DURING THE FLT. FLT TIME WAS APPROX 10 HRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.