Narrative:

On jan/sun/93 at hong kong airport we were towed out of bay. After engine start we were cleared to the holding point of runway 13. As we approached the holding point, I pointed out another air carrier widebody transport Y on final approach about 1-2 mi out. As I was looking at the widebody transport the captain continued out onto the active runway. By the time I realized we had passed the holding point (about 50 ft back) the tower told us to vacate the runway, which we did. For safety margin, the tower asked the widebody transport to go around. The captain and I heard the tower ask the widebody transport to slow down some, so the captain thought he heard that we were cleared for an immediate takeoff. I didn't hear it and the tower said they never cleared us for takeoff. It happened so fast I didn't have time to stop the captain. I assumed he knew we were supposed to hold and I pointed out the airplane. Lesson learned. Before you get close to an active runway at which you are to hold xchk with the other guy, to make sure you both agree on the instructions. If in doubt confirm with the controling agency while there is still time. Supplemental information from acn 231320: prior to meeting at the hotel, I was told by the other coplts the captain wanted no assistance or comments from relief coplts. The flying copilot, who appeared to be most concerned about the flight, had stated on the inbound trip there was a navigation discrepancy and when one of the relief coplts attempted to assist or question the aircraft position he was promptly told by the captain to shut up. During pushback I switched headset reception from copilot/observer to copilot because the volume was so low I was unable to understand the taxi clearance. Due to comments before the flight and no questioning by the other 2 coplts I did not question the taxi on to the runway, although the landing traffic was visible and was pointed out to the captain who did or said nothing. Cockpit crew members should utilize all resources at their disposal. If anyone in the cockpit has a question concerning a call or procedure, other crew members can verify what was communicated or accomplished. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: callback to reporter revealed that he would like to approach the professional standards committee of this air carrier but feels that the personality of this captain is so overpwring that he might not be believed as to the circumstances. This reporter was counseled to concert his feelings and actions with other pilots that he mentioned that were suffering through the same quandary in reporting subject captain. Other sits, not germane to this issue were brought up, all indicating some form of aggressive and devious behavioral patterns, even to the extent of personally subduing and inflicting bodily harm to a passenger in-flight, exposing himself to personal injury on an overwater flight. The backgnd of this individual combines a legal mind with the experience of law enforcement officer from the north. Captain is also high in the union ranks and carries a bit of clout with employees. Reporter approached captain in parking lot with a subtle, non-threatening approach and was rebuffed with self denials from PIC and refusal to accept sits as 'only hearsay.' reporter is going to contact other concerned parties and take this to the committee. Situation smacks of the tragic situation at tenerife with a 'non-hearing' captain as PIC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION CREATES NEED FOR ACR WDB ON FINAL TO MAKE MISSED APCH.

Narrative: ON JAN/SUN/93 AT HONG KONG ARPT WE WERE TOWED OUT OF BAY. AFTER ENG START WE WERE CLRED TO THE HOLDING POINT OF RWY 13. AS WE APCHED THE HOLDING POINT, I POINTED OUT ANOTHER ACR WDB Y ON FINAL APCH ABOUT 1-2 MI OUT. AS I WAS LOOKING AT THE WDB THE CAPT CONTINUED OUT ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY. BY THE TIME I REALIZED WE HAD PASSED THE HOLDING POINT (ABOUT 50 FT BACK) THE TWR TOLD US TO VACATE THE RWY, WHICH WE DID. FOR SAFETY MARGIN, THE TWR ASKED THE WDB TO GAR. THE CAPT AND I HEARD THE TWR ASK THE WDB TO SLOW DOWN SOME, SO THE CAPT THOUGHT HE HEARD THAT WE WERE CLRED FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF. I DIDN'T HEAR IT AND THE TWR SAID THEY NEVER CLRED US FOR TKOF. IT HAPPENED SO FAST I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO STOP THE CAPT. I ASSUMED HE KNEW WE WERE SUPPOSED TO HOLD AND I POINTED OUT THE AIRPLANE. LESSON LEARNED. BEFORE YOU GET CLOSE TO AN ACTIVE RWY AT WHICH YOU ARE TO HOLD XCHK WITH THE OTHER GUY, TO MAKE SURE YOU BOTH AGREE ON THE INSTRUCTIONS. IF IN DOUBT CONFIRM WITH THE CTLING AGENCY WHILE THERE IS STILL TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 231320: PRIOR TO MEETING AT THE HOTEL, I WAS TOLD BY THE OTHER COPLTS THE CAPT WANTED NO ASSISTANCE OR COMMENTS FROM RELIEF COPLTS. THE FLYING COPLT, WHO APPEARED TO BE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE FLT, HAD STATED ON THE INBOUND TRIP THERE WAS A NAV DISCREPANCY AND WHEN ONE OF THE RELIEF COPLTS ATTEMPTED TO ASSIST OR QUESTION THE ACFT POS HE WAS PROMPTLY TOLD BY THE CAPT TO SHUT UP. DURING PUSHBACK I SWITCHED HEADSET RECEPTION FROM COPLT/OBSERVER TO COPLT BECAUSE THE VOLUME WAS SO LOW I WAS UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE TAXI CLRNC. DUE TO COMMENTS BEFORE THE FLT AND NO QUESTIONING BY THE OTHER 2 COPLTS I DID NOT QUESTION THE TAXI ON TO THE RWY, ALTHOUGH THE LNDG TFC WAS VISIBLE AND WAS POINTED OUT TO THE CAPT WHO DID OR SAID NOTHING. COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS SHOULD UTILIZE ALL RESOURCES AT THEIR DISPOSAL. IF ANYONE IN THE COCKPIT HAS A QUESTION CONCERNING A CALL OR PROC, OTHER CREW MEMBERS CAN VERIFY WHAT WAS COMMUNICATED OR ACCOMPLISHED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK TO RPTR REVEALED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO APCH THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF THIS ACR BUT FEELS THAT THE PERSONALITY OF THIS CAPT IS SO OVERPWRING THAT HE MIGHT NOT BE BELIEVED AS TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS RPTR WAS COUNSELED TO CONCERT HIS FEELINGS AND ACTIONS WITH OTHER PLTS THAT HE MENTIONED THAT WERE SUFFERING THROUGH THE SAME QUANDARY IN RPTING SUBJECT CAPT. OTHER SITS, NOT GERMANE TO THIS ISSUE WERE BROUGHT UP, ALL INDICATING SOME FORM OF AGGRESSIVE AND DEVIOUS BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS, EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF PERSONALLY SUBDUING AND INFLICTING BODILY HARM TO A PAX INFLT, EXPOSING HIMSELF TO PERSONAL INJURY ON AN OVERWATER FLT. THE BACKGND OF THIS INDIVIDUAL COMBINES A LEGAL MIND WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER FROM THE NORTH. CAPT IS ALSO HIGH IN THE UNION RANKS AND CARRIES A BIT OF CLOUT WITH EMPLOYEES. RPTR APCHED CAPT IN PARKING LOT WITH A SUBTLE, NON-THREATENING APCH AND WAS REBUFFED WITH SELF DENIALS FROM PIC AND REFUSAL TO ACCEPT SITS AS 'ONLY HEARSAY.' RPTR IS GOING TO CONTACT OTHER CONCERNED PARTIES AND TAKE THIS TO THE COMMITTEE. SIT SMACKS OF THE TRAGIC SIT AT TENERIFE WITH A 'NON-HEARING' CAPT AS PIC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.