Narrative:

Scheduled flight ord-dca with marginal conditions existing at dca. Arrived dca with vectoring for an lda DME 18 approach. ATIS reporting 15 overcast and 2 1/2 rain/fog. Concluded approach with a missed approach due to WX being actually lower than reported. Published miss procedure followed with vectors for another approach to the ILS 36 at dca. Flew vectors for the ILS where turbulence, wind shear, heavy rain was encountered. Runway was wet with a 90 degree crosswind blowing at 15 KTS gusting to 31 KTS. ATC was extremely busy with other aircraft and of little help for proper vectors onto the final. With 400 ft remaining to touchdown, I decided to go around with the missed approach procedure followed. Considering the present WX, the near term outlook for WX improvement being 20-40 mins, saturation of traffic, an election was made to proceed to dulles airport. An attempt was made to contact the dispatcher with partial success. The so, who was in contact with the dispatch by radio, reported to me that he received a partial and unclr communication about the possibility of holding. I asked him to ask the dispatch for more clarification about WX phenomenon and the holding time they desired, but further communication was not possible by radio transmission. No response was received by dispatch after 2-3 attempts to reach them by radio. Although iad (dulles) was not our listed alternate, and since we were now without communication to dispatch to change our flight release for a dulles airport alternate, I was convinced that proceeding with our plan to land at dulles, where WX conditions were more favorable, was the most prudent action. After landing, I contacted the dispatcher by telephone, and was told I would be reported (violated?) for not having a joint concurrence with the dispatcher for diverting to a non- named alternate airport. Thus, this report. In the future, I will probably be more hesitant to proceed with a deemed safer course of action, to meet the far 121 requirement, since this joint responsibility must be met, very little time was on hand, I felt, to discuss the situation by radio, and I used my experience level to make a decision based on safety. The cockpit crew all agree we may have technically not followed the letter of the law, but feel we made the right decision to land and have the aircraft on the ground where better thinking strategy could be done.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER 2 MISSED APCHS, FLC DECIDES TO DIVERT. DISPATCH THREATENS TO RPT CREW AS THEY DID NOT HAVE A JOINT CONCURRENCE BEFORE DIVERTING.

Narrative: SCHEDULED FLT ORD-DCA WITH MARGINAL CONDITIONS EXISTING AT DCA. ARRIVED DCA WITH VECTORING FOR AN LDA DME 18 APCH. ATIS RPTING 15 OVCST AND 2 1/2 RAIN/FOG. CONCLUDED APCH WITH A MISSED APCH DUE TO WX BEING ACTUALLY LOWER THAN RPTED. PUBLISHED MISS PROC FOLLOWED WITH VECTORS FOR ANOTHER APCH TO THE ILS 36 AT DCA. FLEW VECTORS FOR THE ILS WHERE TURB, WIND SHEAR, HVY RAIN WAS ENCOUNTERED. RWY WAS WET WITH A 90 DEG XWIND BLOWING AT 15 KTS GUSTING TO 31 KTS. ATC WAS EXTREMELY BUSY WITH OTHER ACFT AND OF LITTLE HELP FOR PROPER VECTORS ONTO THE FINAL. WITH 400 FT REMAINING TO TOUCHDOWN, I DECIDED TO GAR WITH THE MISSED APCH PROC FOLLOWED. CONSIDERING THE PRESENT WX, THE NEAR TERM OUTLOOK FOR WX IMPROVEMENT BEING 20-40 MINS, SATURATION OF TFC, AN ELECTION WAS MADE TO PROCEED TO DULLES ARPT. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO CONTACT THE DISPATCHER WITH PARTIAL SUCCESS. THE SO, WHO WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE DISPATCH BY RADIO, RPTED TO ME THAT HE RECEIVED A PARTIAL AND UNCLR COM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING. I ASKED HIM TO ASK THE DISPATCH FOR MORE CLARIFICATION ABOUT WX PHENOMENON AND THE HOLDING TIME THEY DESIRED, BUT FURTHER COM WAS NOT POSSIBLE BY RADIO XMISSION. NO RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED BY DISPATCH AFTER 2-3 ATTEMPTS TO REACH THEM BY RADIO. ALTHOUGH IAD (DULLES) WAS NOT OUR LISTED ALTERNATE, AND SINCE WE WERE NOW WITHOUT COM TO DISPATCH TO CHANGE OUR FLT RELEASE FOR A DULLES ARPT ALTERNATE, I WAS CONVINCED THAT PROCEEDING WITH OUR PLAN TO LAND AT DULLES, WHERE WX CONDITIONS WERE MORE FAVORABLE, WAS THE MOST PRUDENT ACTION. AFTER LNDG, I CONTACTED THE DISPATCHER BY TELEPHONE, AND WAS TOLD I WOULD BE RPTED (VIOLATED?) FOR NOT HAVING A JOINT CONCURRENCE WITH THE DISPATCHER FOR DIVERTING TO A NON- NAMED ALTERNATE ARPT. THUS, THIS RPT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL PROBABLY BE MORE HESITANT TO PROCEED WITH A DEEMED SAFER COURSE OF ACTION, TO MEET THE FAR 121 REQUIREMENT, SINCE THIS JOINT RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE MET, VERY LITTLE TIME WAS ON HAND, I FELT, TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION BY RADIO, AND I USED MY EXPERIENCE LEVEL TO MAKE A DECISION BASED ON SAFETY. THE COCKPIT CREW ALL AGREE WE MAY HAVE TECHNICALLY NOT FOLLOWED THE LETTER OF THE LAW, BUT FEEL WE MADE THE RIGHT DECISION TO LAND AND HAVE THE ACFT ON THE GND WHERE BETTER THINKING STRATEGY COULD BE DONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.