Narrative:

The captain was shooting the ILS 23L with the VASI and GS out. He descended too early and at too high of rate. I thought he was low, so I checked my notes that made off the capts approach plate. Flight engineer's don't carry approach plates at air carrier. My notes said that he was low, so I checked the captain's approach plate to make sure that I was right. By this time, the first officer had informed the captain that he was too low. He immediately corrected. The rest of the approach was a bit sloppy. I believe contributing factors were as follows: the WX was much worse than the ATIS had called for. It was changed as soon as we landed. The crew was too concerned about the lower WX and therefore we were looking for the runway when more attention should have been given to flying the airplane. I also believe the ILS 28 should have been in use since it was totally operational. Cleveland did begin using it after we landed. I should have spoken up sooner without looking at the captain's approach plate and trusted my handwritten notes of the approach. I'm not sure, but air carrier's altimeter procedure may have been confusing. (We set the altimeters with the conversion altimeter except for the standby altimeter which is MLS). Supplemental information from acn 226348. 'Pull up' warning from GPWS sounded. GPWS sounded for 2300 FPM descent. Captain descended excessively, resulting in GPWS warning and drifted 1 1/2 to 2 dots left of localizer centerline. The approach brief was short and not very complete owing to the fact that we expected to see the airport much earlier. WX was significantly lower than ATIS reported and, in my opinion, the captain misread the step down fixes because the NDB and OM are not co-located.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN LGT MADE A POOR APCH IN IMC. THE ACTUAL WX WAS MUCH LOWER THAN THE RPTED ATIS WX.

Narrative: THE CAPT WAS SHOOTING THE ILS 23L WITH THE VASI AND GS OUT. HE DSNDED TOO EARLY AND AT TOO HIGH OF RATE. I THOUGHT HE WAS LOW, SO I CHKED MY NOTES THAT MADE OFF THE CAPTS APCH PLATE. FE'S DON'T CARRY APCH PLATES AT ACR. MY NOTES SAID THAT HE WAS LOW, SO I CHKED THE CAPT'S APCH PLATE TO MAKE SURE THAT I WAS RIGHT. BY THIS TIME, THE FO HAD INFORMED THE CAPT THAT HE WAS TOO LOW. HE IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED. THE REST OF THE APCH WAS A BIT SLOPPY. I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE AS FOLLOWS: THE WX WAS MUCH WORSE THAN THE ATIS HAD CALLED FOR. IT WAS CHANGED AS SOON AS WE LANDED. THE CREW WAS TOO CONCERNED ABOUT THE LOWER WX AND THEREFORE WE WERE LOOKING FOR THE RWY WHEN MORE ATTN SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO FLYING THE AIRPLANE. I ALSO BELIEVE THE ILS 28 SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN USE SINCE IT WAS TOTALLY OPERATIONAL. CLEVELAND DID BEGIN USING IT AFTER WE LANDED. I SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP SOONER WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE CAPT'S APCH PLATE AND TRUSTED MY HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF THE APCH. I'M NOT SURE, BUT ACR'S ALTIMETER PROC MAY HAVE BEEN CONFUSING. (WE SET THE ALTIMETERS WITH THE CONVERSION ALTIMETER EXCEPT FOR THE STANDBY ALTIMETER WHICH IS MLS). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 226348. 'PULL UP' WARNING FROM GPWS SOUNDED. GPWS SOUNDED FOR 2300 FPM DSCNT. CAPT DSNDED EXCESSIVELY, RESULTING IN GPWS WARNING AND DRIFTED 1 1/2 TO 2 DOTS L OF LOC CTRLINE. THE APCH BRIEF WAS SHORT AND NOT VERY COMPLETE OWING TO THE FACT THAT WE EXPECTED TO SEE THE ARPT MUCH EARLIER. WX WAS SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN ATIS RPTED AND, IN MY OPINION, THE CAPT MISREAD THE STEP DOWN FIXES BECAUSE THE NDB AND OM ARE NOT CO-LOCATED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.