Narrative:

Engine start, taxi, and before takeoff items had been completed in a slow thorough manner because of the short taxi to runway 24L and the need for a complete passenger briefing using the video system on the aircraft. All aircraft systems and engine instruments were normal during engine start and taxi. First officer was flying this leg. I gave the aircraft to him on the runway. He had advanced the throttles, 'togaed' and called for balanced thrust, which I checked at about 89.X% as requested and displayed on the FMC for reduced power. Just as I was calling 'power set' (approximately 70-80 KTS) we heard a loud explosion, felt the entire airframe shudder and begin veering to the right. With my hands on the throttles, I immediately called 'reject,' initiated the reject procedure and put the aircraft back on centerline. My eyes were just leaving the center instrument panel when the explosion occurred so I was able to detect the right engine instruments deviating from normal and the egt overtemp light illuminate. During the reject I did glance at the engine instruments again and noted the egt at 1100 degree. As I was completing the reject procedure first officer was calling the tower and asking for the emergency equipment. The controllers had seen the explosion and rogered. When the aircraft came to a stop I had completed the engine failure checklist. I initiated a fire warning test and expelled the left bottle into the right engine as a precaution. First officer and I had completed the steps for emergency evacuate/evacuation. However, I advised the flight attendants and passengers to remain seated with a very brief explanation. I saw no reason to evacuate/evacuation at that point in time without secondary indications of further aircraft damage. The flight attendants reported that conditions aft were normal except for very light air conditioning haze. First officer and I completed the engine failure checklist and called lax operations to advise them. The aircraft remained surrounded by emergency equipment on 24L with approximately 7500 ft remaining until maintenance inspected the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ENG EXPLODES AT 70-80 KTS, TKOF ABORTED.

Narrative: ENG START, TAXI, AND BEFORE TKOF ITEMS HAD BEEN COMPLETED IN A SLOW THOROUGH MANNER BECAUSE OF THE SHORT TAXI TO RWY 24L AND THE NEED FOR A COMPLETE PAX BRIEFING USING THE VIDEO SYS ON THE ACFT. ALL ACFT SYSTEMS AND ENG INSTS WERE NORMAL DURING ENG START AND TAXI. FO WAS FLYING THIS LEG. I GAVE THE ACFT TO HIM ON THE RWY. HE HAD ADVANCED THE THROTTLES, 'TOGAED' AND CALLED FOR BALANCED THRUST, WHICH I CHKED AT ABOUT 89.X% AS REQUESTED AND DISPLAYED ON THE FMC FOR REDUCED PWR. JUST AS I WAS CALLING 'PWR SET' (APPROX 70-80 KTS) WE HEARD A LOUD EXPLOSION, FELT THE ENTIRE AIRFRAME SHUDDER AND BEGIN VEERING TO THE R. WITH MY HANDS ON THE THROTTLES, I IMMEDIATELY CALLED 'REJECT,' INITIATED THE REJECT PROC AND PUT THE ACFT BACK ON CTRLINE. MY EYES WERE JUST LEAVING THE CTR INST PANEL WHEN THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED SO I WAS ABLE TO DETECT THE R ENG INSTS DEVIATING FROM NORMAL AND THE EGT OVERTEMP LIGHT ILLUMINATE. DURING THE REJECT I DID GLANCE AT THE ENG INSTS AGAIN AND NOTED THE EGT AT 1100 DEG. AS I WAS COMPLETING THE REJECT PROC FO WAS CALLING THE TWR AND ASKING FOR THE EMER EQUIP. THE CTLRS HAD SEEN THE EXPLOSION AND ROGERED. WHEN THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP I HAD COMPLETED THE ENG FAILURE CHKLIST. I INITIATED A FIRE WARNING TEST AND EXPELLED THE L BOTTLE INTO THE R ENG AS A PRECAUTION. FO AND I HAD COMPLETED THE STEPS FOR EMER EVAC. HOWEVER, I ADVISED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAXS TO REMAIN SEATED WITH A VERY BRIEF EXPLANATION. I SAW NO REASON TO EVAC AT THAT POINT IN TIME WITHOUT SECONDARY INDICATIONS OF FURTHER ACFT DAMAGE. THE FLT ATTENDANTS RPTED THAT CONDITIONS AFT WERE NORMAL EXCEPT FOR VERY LIGHT AIR CONDITIONING HAZE. FO AND I COMPLETED THE ENG FAILURE CHKLIST AND CALLED LAX OPS TO ADVISE THEM. THE ACFT REMAINED SURROUNDED BY EMER EQUIP ON 24L WITH APPROX 7500 FT REMAINING UNTIL MAINT INSPECTED THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.