Narrative:

I was flying back from a west palm beach business trip at 6500 ft. The clouds below me were scattered at takeoff. Upon reaching ocala, I noticed that the clouds below me were becoming broken to overcast. I had flight following during the duration of my flight and heard ZJX give another pilot instructions for an ILS approach to ocala. I called ZJX to ask if gainesville was IFR. He told me to listen to ATIS and find out. ATIS was reporting for gainesville 800 and overcast, visibility 2 mi. I asked the air traffic controller if I could have clearance for a SVFR approach. He told me no problem. Gnv was landing on runway 10 with using the localizer backcourse for navigation. I had been taking IFR lessons and was only 3 lessons short of completion and I had flown that particular approach several times. At this time it was dusk. I began to make heading corrections to join the localizer. At the point when I was about to join the localizer, the air traffic controller (ZJX) told me that he had just talked with the gnv tower and they would not let me land in gainesville. I then asked ZJX where the closest airport that was VFR for me to land. He said jax crg was 1200 broken with rain showers and 3 mi visibility (VFR). I proceeded to crg at 5500 ft. When approaching the airport, the approach controller asked me to descend to 3000 ft at which time I was in clouds and rain. I was then asked to descend to 2000 ft, still in rain and clouds. They had me join the localizer for runway 32 and circle to runway 5. I joined the localizer and was out of the clouds by 1100 ft and made a visual approach on runway 5. In retrospect, I should have turned around or found an airport when reaching ocala and realizing I was approaching IFR conditions and landed at an airport close by under VFR conditions. Although I was never low on fuel or in any significant danger, it was very stressful and potentially dangerous if I had lost my engine or had another problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA FLIES INTO IMC, NOT INST RATED.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING BACK FROM A W PALM BEACH BUSINESS TRIP AT 6500 FT. THE CLOUDS BELOW ME WERE SCATTERED AT TKOF. UPON REACHING OCALA, I NOTICED THAT THE CLOUDS BELOW ME WERE BECOMING BROKEN TO OVCST. I HAD FLT FOLLOWING DURING THE DURATION OF MY FLT AND HEARD ZJX GIVE ANOTHER PLT INSTRUCTIONS FOR AN ILS APCH TO OCALA. I CALLED ZJX TO ASK IF GAINESVILLE WAS IFR. HE TOLD ME TO LISTEN TO ATIS AND FIND OUT. ATIS WAS RPTING FOR GAINESVILLE 800 AND OVCST, VISIBILITY 2 MI. I ASKED THE AIR TFC CTLR IF I COULD HAVE CLRNC FOR A SVFR APCH. HE TOLD ME NO PROBLEM. GNV WAS LNDG ON RWY 10 WITH USING THE LOC BACKCOURSE FOR NAV. I HAD BEEN TAKING IFR LESSONS AND WAS ONLY 3 LESSONS SHORT OF COMPLETION AND I HAD FLOWN THAT PARTICULAR APCH SEVERAL TIMES. AT THIS TIME IT WAS DUSK. I BEGAN TO MAKE HDG CORRECTIONS TO JOIN THE LOC. AT THE POINT WHEN I WAS ABOUT TO JOIN THE LOC, THE AIR TFC CTLR (ZJX) TOLD ME THAT HE HAD JUST TALKED WITH THE GNV TWR AND THEY WOULD NOT LET ME LAND IN GAINESVILLE. I THEN ASKED ZJX WHERE THE CLOSEST ARPT THAT WAS VFR FOR ME TO LAND. HE SAID JAX CRG WAS 1200 BROKEN WITH RAIN SHOWERS AND 3 MI VISIBILITY (VFR). I PROCEEDED TO CRG AT 5500 FT. WHEN APCHING THE ARPT, THE APCH CTLR ASKED ME TO DSND TO 3000 FT AT WHICH TIME I WAS IN CLOUDS AND RAIN. I WAS THEN ASKED TO DSND TO 2000 FT, STILL IN RAIN AND CLOUDS. THEY HAD ME JOIN THE LOC FOR RWY 32 AND CIRCLE TO RWY 5. I JOINED THE LOC AND WAS OUT OF THE CLOUDS BY 1100 FT AND MADE A VISUAL APCH ON RWY 5. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE TURNED AROUND OR FOUND AN ARPT WHEN REACHING OCALA AND REALIZING I WAS APCHING IFR CONDITIONS AND LANDED AT AN ARPT CLOSE BY UNDER VFR CONDITIONS. ALTHOUGH I WAS NEVER LOW ON FUEL OR IN ANY SIGNIFICANT DANGER, IT WAS VERY STRESSFUL AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS IF I HAD LOST MY ENG OR HAD ANOTHER PROBLEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.