Narrative:

I was serving as sic on a flight from san to ipl. Our IFR clearance took us to pogi VOR, direct imperial VORTAC, direct to imperial airport. When we were 20 DME from ipl, I asked the captain if he wanted to cancel IFR and go direct to ipl airport. He said yes, so we proceeded. I obtained unicom information at this time and was advised to use 'right traffic, runway 32.' about 10 mi (RNAV) from the airport, we saw what we thought was imperial. The captain said he was going to make a left base entry as he descended. I corrected him and told him we should over-fly the airport and enter a right downwind. The captain did so at about 3500 ft AGL. Descending on the downwind on find, I noticed military jet traffic landing on a converging runway 26. On about a 1 1/2 mi final, I told the captain to go around because of the traffic on the other runway. The captain ignored me, even after I pointed out the traffic (multiple military jet). I knew something was wrong and we should not land given the circumstances. After stopping the aircraft, I realized we had landed at el centro military base. We filled out the appropriate release papers and waivers and left for our destination of ipl, 4 mi beyond el centro. Factors leading to this most embarrassing event: unfamiliar area and I was very tired, as I had little sleep the previous night. We were looking for a runway 32 with another runway crossing the 'a intersection.' when we saw the 32 at el centro, we thought we saw what we wanted to see -- 32 at ipl. A degree of stress between me and the captain started to build when I corrected his airport pattern entry and continued to a point where he ignored my 'go around' command. We cancelled IFR to an unfamiliar airport when we thought we saw the field. If we completed the IFR procedure to a landing, we would not have made this error. The 4 1/2 mi proximity of the 2 airports with similar runway layouts have fooled lots of pilots as attested by the tower operators at el centro.if we had made a go around, I am convinced that it would have occurred to both of us that we were at the wrong airport! On the way home, the air traffic controller asked if we could give a min of 250 KTS below 10000 ft on our descent to san. I advised that we could not (I was concerned about turbulence) and was assigned a heading to allow faster traffic to pass. The captain said (to me) he could give '250-260 KTS, no problem.' this time I challenged his judgement and insisted he slow and turn to assigned heading. He complied -- more stress! We encountered light chop north our descent. This is not the first time our crew concept has failed. I will decline to fly with this captain again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CHARTER ACFT LANDS AFB INSTEAD OF GA ARPT.

Narrative: I WAS SERVING AS SIC ON A FLT FROM SAN TO IPL. OUR IFR CLRNC TOOK US TO POGI VOR, DIRECT IMPERIAL VORTAC, DIRECT TO IMPERIAL ARPT. WHEN WE WERE 20 DME FROM IPL, I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WANTED TO CANCEL IFR AND GO DIRECT TO IPL ARPT. HE SAID YES, SO WE PROCEEDED. I OBTAINED UNICOM INFO AT THIS TIME AND WAS ADVISED TO USE 'R TFC, RWY 32.' ABOUT 10 MI (RNAV) FROM THE ARPT, WE SAW WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS IMPERIAL. THE CAPT SAID HE WAS GOING TO MAKE A L BASE ENTRY AS HE DSNDED. I CORRECTED HIM AND TOLD HIM WE SHOULD OVER-FLY THE ARPT AND ENTER A R DOWNWIND. THE CAPT DID SO AT ABOUT 3500 FT AGL. DSNDING ON THE DOWNWIND ON FIND, I NOTICED MIL JET TFC LNDG ON A CONVERGING RWY 26. ON ABOUT A 1 1/2 MI FINAL, I TOLD THE CAPT TO GAR BECAUSE OF THE TFC ON THE OTHER RWY. THE CAPT IGNORED ME, EVEN AFTER I POINTED OUT THE TFC (MULTIPLE MIL JET). I KNEW SOMETHING WAS WRONG AND WE SHOULD NOT LAND GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. AFTER STOPPING THE ACFT, I REALIZED WE HAD LANDED AT EL CENTRO MIL BASE. WE FILLED OUT THE APPROPRIATE RELEASE PAPERS AND WAIVERS AND LEFT FOR OUR DEST OF IPL, 4 MI BEYOND EL CENTRO. FACTORS LEADING TO THIS MOST EMBARRASSING EVENT: UNFAMILIAR AREA AND I WAS VERY TIRED, AS I HAD LITTLE SLEEP THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. WE WERE LOOKING FOR A RWY 32 WITH ANOTHER RWY XING THE 'A INTXN.' WHEN WE SAW THE 32 AT EL CENTRO, WE THOUGHT WE SAW WHAT WE WANTED TO SEE -- 32 AT IPL. A DEG OF STRESS BTWN ME AND THE CAPT STARTED TO BUILD WHEN I CORRECTED HIS ARPT PATTERN ENTRY AND CONTINUED TO A POINT WHERE HE IGNORED MY 'GAR' COMMAND. WE CANCELLED IFR TO AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT WHEN WE THOUGHT WE SAW THE FIELD. IF WE COMPLETED THE IFR PROC TO A LNDG, WE WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THIS ERROR. THE 4 1/2 MI PROX OF THE 2 ARPTS WITH SIMILAR RWY LAYOUTS HAVE FOOLED LOTS OF PLTS AS ATTESTED BY THE TWR OPERATORS AT EL CENTRO.IF WE HAD MADE A GAR, I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED TO BOTH OF US THAT WE WERE AT THE WRONG ARPT! ON THE WAY HOME, THE AIR TFC CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD GIVE A MIN OF 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT ON OUR DSCNT TO SAN. I ADVISED THAT WE COULD NOT (I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT TURB) AND WAS ASSIGNED A HDG TO ALLOW FASTER TFC TO PASS. THE CAPT SAID (TO ME) HE COULD GIVE '250-260 KTS, NO PROBLEM.' THIS TIME I CHALLENGED HIS JUDGEMENT AND INSISTED HE SLOW AND TURN TO ASSIGNED HDG. HE COMPLIED -- MORE STRESS! WE ENCOUNTERED LIGHT CHOP N OUR DSCNT. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME OUR CREW CONCEPT HAS FAILED. I WILL DECLINE TO FLY WITH THIS CAPT AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.