Narrative:

During a training flight for an MEL certificate aircraft, myself and student, were completing the second of a series of touch-and-go lndgs on runway 32 at srq airport. On landing, I noticed a scraping (metal on runway) sound coming from the left side of the aircraft. The student had been flying until this point and had made a normal touchdown. Recognizing a problem, I immediately took control, and initiated a go around. After reaching pattern altitude, I asked the tower personnel to inspect our landing gear during a low approach. ATC agreed, and instructed us to fly between the runway 32 and the control tower. The gear was described by the controller as being turned 90 degrees and bent aft at a 45 degree angle. I then asked the controller to contact my superior on the ground and requested an area to maneuver while planning my next decision. I decided to circle 5 NM west of srq airport in order to burn a significant amount of fuel before returning for landing. I also reviewed the aircraft checklists for gear problems in effort to find any items which might aid our effort to land safely. The student and I planned our landing sequence and I instructed the student to secure all objects in the airplane. After circling for approximately 2.5 hours, I decided to officially declare an emergency and requested permission to circle above srq airport at 3000 ft. I then continued circling above the airport for approximately 25 mins in effort to burn fuel to a min. I then advised the tower that we were initiating our descent for landing and requested crash fire rescue equipment vehicles/personnel to standby. On downwind the student latched the door 'ajar' and I continued to fly the pattern. On base leg, I extended 10 degrees of flaps. On final, I feathered the left engine and completed the secure checklist in order to minimize damage to the left engine. On short final, I instructed the student to turn off all fuel and ignition system and the aircraft settled slowly on the right gear nose gear, and finally onto the left main which was collapsed against the underside of the wing. In the position previously described. The aircraft is a training aircraft which is routinely used for private, instrument and commercial multieng pilot training. Fatigue and poor strut design contributed to this accident. This is the fourth strut cracked on this aircraft since multieng training has begun at this flight school. Time afforded to the pilot after the go around allowed for an in-depth analysis of the situation and a review of every option which might have been used. Initially, the decision to go around was made instantly and without hesitation. My perception was that the gear was scraping the runway and that I should take the aircraft to altitude before striking the propeller. I believe every option deserved consideration after going around. Following a gear extension procedure. I solicited input from my student who is also a CFI. We elected to review our checklist and make decisions for landing. Feathering the propellers on the left engine minimized the damage to the engine. The gear was left extended because retraction was not an option and this would prevent damage to the right engine. Fuel was burned to significantly reduce the fire hazard on landing. All engines, mixtures, fuel selectors, ignition, electrical system were turned off in accordance with checklists and to prevent a fire hazard. Factor affecting human performance: calmness prevailed, as did the high level of training to which I have learned as a student. Flight experience on the part of both student and instructor contributed to the decisions made during the emergency. Most significantly, time was our biggest asset allowing us to think, review, and safely land our airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CFI AND STUDENT PERFORM A WELL COORDINATED EMER GEAR UP LNDG WHEN L GEAR IS DETERMINED AS DEFECTIVE.

Narrative: DURING A TRAINING FLT FOR AN MEL CERTIFICATE ACFT, MYSELF AND STUDENT, WERE COMPLETING THE SECOND OF A SERIES OF TOUCH-AND-GO LNDGS ON RWY 32 AT SRQ ARPT. ON LNDG, I NOTICED A SCRAPING (METAL ON RWY) SOUND COMING FROM THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT. THE STUDENT HAD BEEN FLYING UNTIL THIS POINT AND HAD MADE A NORMAL TOUCHDOWN. RECOGNIZING A PROBLEM, I IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL, AND INITIATED A GAR. AFTER REACHING PATTERN ALT, I ASKED THE TWR PERSONNEL TO INSPECT OUR LNDG GEAR DURING A LOW APCH. ATC AGREED, AND INSTRUCTED US TO FLY BTWN THE RWY 32 AND THE CTL TWR. THE GEAR WAS DESCRIBED BY THE CTLR AS BEING TURNED 90 DEGS AND BENT AFT AT A 45 DEG ANGLE. I THEN ASKED THE CTLR TO CONTACT MY SUPERIOR ON THE GND AND REQUESTED AN AREA TO MANEUVER WHILE PLANNING MY NEXT DECISION. I DECIDED TO CIRCLE 5 NM W OF SRQ ARPT IN ORDER TO BURN A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF FUEL BEFORE RETURNING FOR LNDG. I ALSO REVIEWED THE ACFT CHKLISTS FOR GEAR PROBLEMS IN EFFORT TO FIND ANY ITEMS WHICH MIGHT AID OUR EFFORT TO LAND SAFELY. THE STUDENT AND I PLANNED OUR LNDG SEQUENCE AND I INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO SECURE ALL OBJECTS IN THE AIRPLANE. AFTER CIRCLING FOR APPROX 2.5 HRS, I DECIDED TO OFFICIALLY DECLARE AN EMER AND REQUESTED PERMISSION TO CIRCLE ABOVE SRQ ARPT AT 3000 FT. I THEN CONTINUED CIRCLING ABOVE THE ARPT FOR APPROX 25 MINS IN EFFORT TO BURN FUEL TO A MIN. I THEN ADVISED THE TWR THAT WE WERE INITIATING OUR DSCNT FOR LNDG AND REQUESTED CFR VEHICLES/PERSONNEL TO STANDBY. ON DOWNWIND THE STUDENT LATCHED THE DOOR 'AJAR' AND I CONTINUED TO FLY THE PATTERN. ON BASE LEG, I EXTENDED 10 DEGS OF FLAPS. ON FINAL, I FEATHERED THE L ENG AND COMPLETED THE SECURE CHKLIST IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO THE L ENG. ON SHORT FINAL, I INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO TURN OFF ALL FUEL AND IGNITION SYS AND THE ACFT SETTLED SLOWLY ON THE R GEAR NOSE GEAR, AND FINALLY ONTO THE L MAIN WHICH WAS COLLAPSED AGAINST THE UNDERSIDE OF THE WING. IN THE POS PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED. THE ACFT IS A TRAINING ACFT WHICH IS ROUTINELY USED FOR PRIVATE, INST AND COMMERCIAL MULTIENG PLT TRAINING. FATIGUE AND POOR STRUT DESIGN CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ACCIDENT. THIS IS THE FOURTH STRUT CRACKED ON THIS ACFT SINCE MULTIENG TRAINING HAS BEGUN AT THIS FLT SCHOOL. TIME AFFORDED TO THE PLT AFTER THE GAR ALLOWED FOR AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AND A REVIEW OF EVERY OPTION WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN USED. INITIALLY, THE DECISION TO GAR WAS MADE INSTANTLY AND WITHOUT HESITATION. MY PERCEPTION WAS THAT THE GEAR WAS SCRAPING THE RWY AND THAT I SHOULD TAKE THE ACFT TO ALT BEFORE STRIKING THE PROP. I BELIEVE EVERY OPTION DESERVED CONSIDERATION AFTER GOING AROUND. FOLLOWING A GEAR EXTENSION PROC. I SOLICITED INPUT FROM MY STUDENT WHO IS ALSO A CFI. WE ELECTED TO REVIEW OUR CHKLIST AND MAKE DECISIONS FOR LNDG. FEATHERING THE PROPS ON THE L ENG MINIMIZED THE DAMAGE TO THE ENG. THE GEAR WAS LEFT EXTENDED BECAUSE RETRACTION WAS NOT AN OPTION AND THIS WOULD PREVENT DAMAGE TO THE R ENG. FUEL WAS BURNED TO SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE FIRE HAZARD ON LNDG. ALL ENGS, MIXTURES, FUEL SELECTORS, IGNITION, ELECTRICAL SYS WERE TURNED OFF IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHKLISTS AND TO PREVENT A FIRE HAZARD. FACTOR AFFECTING HUMAN PERFORMANCE: CALMNESS PREVAILED, AS DID THE HIGH LEVEL OF TRAINING TO WHICH I HAVE LEARNED AS A STUDENT. FLT EXPERIENCE ON THE PART OF BOTH STUDENT AND INSTRUCTOR CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECISIONS MADE DURING THE EMER. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, TIME WAS OUR BIGGEST ASSET ALLOWING US TO THINK, REVIEW, AND SAFELY LAND OUR AIRPLANE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.