Narrative:

I was working local control at klamath falls tower. About 10 mins prior to this incident, small aircraft Y called for flight following. Since he was well outside and above the air traffic area (15-20 mi, 10500 MSL) and our facility has no radar, I sent him to seattle center. We have a LOA with seattle center regarding simulated flameout procedures used by the local military fgt's. When a pilot requests an sfo we check with seattle for potential traffic on their radar (which has excellent coverage here). Fgt X began doing sfos. We called center prior to the first sfo and were advised that there was no traffic. I approved 2 sfos. During the pilot's descent out of high key, he advised me that he'd seen small aircraft Y at 10500 and had to take evasive action. I advised him that seattle had told us he had no traffic. Upon checking with seattle, we learned they had stopped watching after the first sfo and missed seeing the confliction. Solution suggestions -- better training for center controllers regarding sfos and their responsibility.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FGT X RPTED NMAC WITH SMA Y. EVASIVE ACTION TAKEN. SEE AND AVOID CONCEPT.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING LCL CTL AT KLAMATH FALLS TWR. ABOUT 10 MINS PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT, SMA Y CALLED FOR FLT FOLLOWING. SINCE HE WAS WELL OUTSIDE AND ABOVE THE ATA (15-20 MI, 10500 MSL) AND OUR FACILITY HAS NO RADAR, I SENT HIM TO SEATTLE CTR. WE HAVE A LOA WITH SEATTLE CTR REGARDING SIMULATED FLAMEOUT PROCS USED BY THE LCL MIL FGT'S. WHEN A PLT REQUESTS AN SFO WE CHK WITH SEATTLE FOR POTENTIAL TFC ON THEIR RADAR (WHICH HAS EXCELLENT COVERAGE HERE). FGT X BEGAN DOING SFOS. WE CALLED CTR PRIOR TO THE FIRST SFO AND WERE ADVISED THAT THERE WAS NO TFC. I APPROVED 2 SFOS. DURING THE PLT'S DSCNT OUT OF HIGH KEY, HE ADVISED ME THAT HE'D SEEN SMA Y AT 10500 AND HAD TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION. I ADVISED HIM THAT SEATTLE HAD TOLD US HE HAD NO TFC. UPON CHKING WITH SEATTLE, WE LEARNED THEY HAD STOPPED WATCHING AFTER THE FIRST SFO AND MISSED SEEING THE CONFLICTION. SOLUTION SUGGESTIONS -- BETTER TRAINING FOR CTR CTLRS REGARDING SFOS AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.