Narrative:

While taxiing out for departure the anti-skid illuminated. Upon cycling the anti-skid switch the light extinguished and we proceeded. We arrived at our destination on schedule and proceeded to land. After completing the before landing checklist we once again noted the anti-skid light being illuminated. Again we cycled the switch and the light extinguished only to illuminate again on very short final just as I, the PF, began the flare to land. Since we were landing on a rather short field (6700 ft) and to fully ensure stopping within the distance of the runway, I elected to land with the anti-skid system disengaged. Upon touchdown the aircraft suffered what felt like multiple tire blow-outs on the right main tire side. This caused the aircraft to veer violently right. I immediately applied left rudder to keep the aircraft aligned with the runway centerline. The aircraft slowed rapidly to taxi-speed at which time I exited the runway onto an adjoining runway and stopped the aircraft. Post-flight inspection revealed that all 4 right main tires had blown and #5's tire rim had come apart. As the right main gear belly door was opened it was noted that a tire rim fragment about the size of a large kitchen plate fell to the ground. No other damage was noted. Company dispatched mechanics, brake assemblies, and tires to our location. The anti-skid system was ground-tested and found to be operational. Tires were replaced and both items signed-off properly in the aircraft logbook. Aircraft was released and returned to base with no further incident. Being in a critical position approximately 100 ft above the runway touchdown zone to a 6700 ft runway and the anti-skid light illuminated, I made a split-second decision to disengage the anti-skid system, land, and use manual braking. As it turns out now this action produced an overweight adjustment to that runway's analysis. I based my decision upon a possible malfunctioning anti-skid system therefore selecting manual braking to ensure a safe landing within the total runway distance available to me. After a short discussion with control tower and airport personnel, they fully believed that at no time was safety compromised and documented the incident as an 'airport alert,' end of story. It is now believed that the rim part that fell out of the right main gear belly door may indicate a blown tire just after takeoff. This may have been precipitated by the intermittent anti-skid problem. The same aircraft, as it's logbook will show, has had a history of anti-skid problems which resulted in blown tires, end of story.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BLOWN TIRES ON R TRUCK OF ACR WDB IN LNDG PROC TOUCHDOWN DYNAMICS.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING OUT FOR DEP THE ANTI-SKID ILLUMINATED. UPON CYCLING THE ANTI-SKID SWITCH THE LIGHT EXTINGUISHED AND WE PROCEEDED. WE ARRIVED AT OUR DEST ON SCHEDULE AND PROCEEDED TO LAND. AFTER COMPLETING THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST WE ONCE AGAIN NOTED THE ANTI-SKID LIGHT BEING ILLUMINATED. AGAIN WE CYCLED THE SWITCH AND THE LIGHT EXTINGUISHED ONLY TO ILLUMINATE AGAIN ON VERY SHORT FINAL JUST AS I, THE PF, BEGAN THE FLARE TO LAND. SINCE WE WERE LNDG ON A RATHER SHORT FIELD (6700 FT) AND TO FULLY ENSURE STOPPING WITHIN THE DISTANCE OF THE RWY, I ELECTED TO LAND WITH THE ANTI-SKID SYS DISENGAGED. UPON TOUCHDOWN THE ACFT SUFFERED WHAT FELT LIKE MULTIPLE TIRE BLOW-OUTS ON THE R MAIN TIRE SIDE. THIS CAUSED THE ACFT TO VEER VIOLENTLY R. I IMMEDIATELY APPLIED L RUDDER TO KEEP THE ACFT ALIGNED WITH THE RWY CTRLINE. THE ACFT SLOWED RAPIDLY TO TAXI-SPD AT WHICH TIME I EXITED THE RWY ONTO AN ADJOINING RWY AND STOPPED THE ACFT. POST-FLT INSPECTION REVEALED THAT ALL 4 R MAIN TIRES HAD BLOWN AND #5'S TIRE RIM HAD COME APART. AS THE R MAIN GEAR BELLY DOOR WAS OPENED IT WAS NOTED THAT A TIRE RIM FRAGMENT ABOUT THE SIZE OF A LARGE KITCHEN PLATE FELL TO THE GND. NO OTHER DAMAGE WAS NOTED. COMPANY DISPATCHED MECHS, BRAKE ASSEMBLIES, AND TIRES TO OUR LOCATION. THE ANTI-SKID SYS WAS GND-TESTED AND FOUND TO BE OPERATIONAL. TIRES WERE REPLACED AND BOTH ITEMS SIGNED-OFF PROPERLY IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK. ACFT WAS RELEASED AND RETURNED TO BASE WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. BEING IN A CRITICAL POS APPROX 100 FT ABOVE THE RWY TOUCHDOWN ZONE TO A 6700 FT RWY AND THE ANTI-SKID LIGHT ILLUMINATED, I MADE A SPLIT-SECOND DECISION TO DISENGAGE THE ANTI-SKID SYS, LAND, AND USE MANUAL BRAKING. AS IT TURNS OUT NOW THIS ACTION PRODUCED AN OVERWT ADJUSTMENT TO THAT RWY'S ANALYSIS. I BASED MY DECISION UPON A POSSIBLE MALFUNCTIONING ANTI-SKID SYS THEREFORE SELECTING MANUAL BRAKING TO ENSURE A SAFE LNDG WITHIN THE TOTAL RWY DISTANCE AVAILABLE TO ME. AFTER A SHORT DISCUSSION WITH CTL TWR AND ARPT PERSONNEL, THEY FULLY BELIEVED THAT AT NO TIME WAS SAFETY COMPROMISED AND DOCUMENTED THE INCIDENT AS AN 'ARPT ALERT,' END OF STORY. IT IS NOW BELIEVED THAT THE RIM PART THAT FELL OUT OF THE R MAIN GEAR BELLY DOOR MAY INDICATE A BLOWN TIRE JUST AFTER TKOF. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN PRECIPITATED BY THE INTERMITTENT ANTI-SKID PROBLEM. THE SAME ACFT, AS IT'S LOGBOOK WILL SHOW, HAS HAD A HISTORY OF ANTI-SKID PROBLEMS WHICH RESULTED IN BLOWN TIRES, END OF STORY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.