Narrative:

During a visual approach to runway 28L at boise, identification, we experienced a near midair collision with an fgt Y. When we were approximately 5 mi from the runway, we received a TA from TCASII, indicating an aircraft at plus 4, quickly followed by an RA directing us to climb in excess of 2000 FPM. Because we were on short final, fully configured for landing, and in what we thought was protected airspace, this advisory was not followed. In addition, the RA showed the conflicting aircraft to be 200 ft above us. Very shortly thereafter, the RA reversed, now directing us to 'monitor vertical speed' and descend at a rate of at least 1000 FPM. Almost immediately after this advisory, the fgt appeared directly overhead, passing us at a high rate of speed over our flight path. The entire sequence took less than 10 seconds. We were given no advisories by ATC regarding this traffic. The approach controller seemed to have difficulty handling the traffic in his area, though it was not extremely busy; he simply seemed inexperienced. During taxi-in, I obtained the phone number of boise approach. After arrival, I spoke with the supervisor. He stated that he had observed the incident and considered the distance between the aircraft to be adequate at all times. He apologized for our not having been issued an advisory on the fgt but denied that there was any possibility of a collision. He said that the fgt was moving so fast that by the time we had reacted and begun our climb, he would have been past us. He also said that the fgt pilot had us in sight, had been cleared for an overhead visual approach and therefore could 'do whatever he wanted.' I suggested that he contact the air national guard, and inform them that TCASII had commanded us into what could easily have been a collision; the pilot could not have kept us in sight when flying directly overhead. In my opinion, the fgt pilot flew carelessly and recklessly, approaching us far too closely in the pattern, and causing a potential mid-air collision. The pilot probably was pretending to shoot us down, and so flew up behind us at an excessive rate of speed, and with insufficient vertical clearance. If TCASII read a descent rate on the conflicting traffic, that could very well account for the direction to climb out of the way. Then, when the fgt leveled off, it commanded us to descend. I think it is unconscionable for these pilots to behave in a threatening manner toward other aircraft not involved in their training maneuvers. This problem should be addressed at boise specifically and at any national guard station where pilots are behaving in a reckless manner.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR HAS NMAC ON FINAL APCH WITH AN FGT ACFT.

Narrative: DURING A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28L AT BOISE, ID, WE EXPERIENCED A NMAC WITH AN FGT Y. WHEN WE WERE APPROX 5 MI FROM THE RWY, WE RECEIVED A TA FROM TCASII, INDICATING AN ACFT AT PLUS 4, QUICKLY FOLLOWED BY AN RA DIRECTING US TO CLB IN EXCESS OF 2000 FPM. BECAUSE WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL, FULLY CONFIGURED FOR LNDG, AND IN WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS PROTECTED AIRSPACE, THIS ADVISORY WAS NOT FOLLOWED. IN ADDITION, THE RA SHOWED THE CONFLICTING ACFT TO BE 200 FT ABOVE US. VERY SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE RA REVERSED, NOW DIRECTING US TO 'MONITOR VERT SPD' AND DSND AT A RATE OF AT LEAST 1000 FPM. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS ADVISORY, THE FGT APPEARED DIRECTLY OVERHEAD, PASSING US AT A HIGH RATE OF SPD OVER OUR FLT PATH. THE ENTIRE SEQUENCE TOOK LESS THAN 10 SECONDS. WE WERE GIVEN NO ADVISORIES BY ATC REGARDING THIS TFC. THE APCH CTLR SEEMED TO HAVE DIFFICULTY HANDLING THE TFC IN HIS AREA, THOUGH IT WAS NOT EXTREMELY BUSY; HE SIMPLY SEEMED INEXPERIENCED. DURING TAXI-IN, I OBTAINED THE PHONE NUMBER OF BOISE APCH. AFTER ARR, I SPOKE WITH THE SUPVR. HE STATED THAT HE HAD OBSERVED THE INCIDENT AND CONSIDERED THE DISTANCE BTWN THE ACFT TO BE ADEQUATE AT ALL TIMES. HE APOLOGIZED FOR OUR NOT HAVING BEEN ISSUED AN ADVISORY ON THE FGT BUT DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY OF A COLLISION. HE SAID THAT THE FGT WAS MOVING SO FAST THAT BY THE TIME WE HAD REACTED AND BEGUN OUR CLB, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN PAST US. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE FGT PLT HAD US IN SIGHT, HAD BEEN CLRED FOR AN OVERHEAD VISUAL APCH AND THEREFORE COULD 'DO WHATEVER HE WANTED.' I SUGGESTED THAT HE CONTACT THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD, AND INFORM THEM THAT TCASII HAD COMMANDED US INTO WHAT COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN A COLLISION; THE PLT COULD NOT HAVE KEPT US IN SIGHT WHEN FLYING DIRECTLY OVERHEAD. IN MY OPINION, THE FGT PLT FLEW CARELESSLY AND RECKLESSLY, APCHING US FAR TOO CLOSELY IN THE PATTERN, AND CAUSING A POTENTIAL MID-AIR COLLISION. THE PLT PROBABLY WAS PRETENDING TO SHOOT US DOWN, AND SO FLEW UP BEHIND US AT AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPD, AND WITH INSUFFICIENT VERT CLRNC. IF TCASII READ A DSCNT RATE ON THE CONFLICTING TFC, THAT COULD VERY WELL ACCOUNT FOR THE DIRECTION TO CLB OUT OF THE WAY. THEN, WHEN THE FGT LEVELED OFF, IT COMMANDED US TO DSND. I THINK IT IS UNCONSCIONABLE FOR THESE PLTS TO BEHAVE IN A THREATENING MANNER TOWARD OTHER ACFT NOT INVOLVED IN THEIR TRAINING MANEUVERS. THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AT BOISE SPECIFICALLY AND AT ANY NATIONAL GUARD STATION WHERE PLTS ARE BEHAVING IN A RECKLESS MANNER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.