Narrative:

The IFR clearance to 3nj6 (rancocas, nj) was: 'ATC clears light transport aircraft to 3nj6, the agc ii departure, via allegheny 069 radial to homee intersection, the johnstown 300 degree radial to johnstown, and the bucks arrival. Departure frequency 125.9, squawk 2512.' the taxi route necessitated crossing runway 31, which was active. Ground control, rather than asking me to hold short, instructed me to increase my taxi speed to clear runway 31 for an aircraft on final. This instruction, given in the midst of what was going on in the cockpit, interrupted the rhythm of our preparation for takeoff. As we were crossing runway 31, we received an amendment to our clearance. 'After takeoff, turn right to a heading of 080 degrees.' arriving at the hold line short of runway 28 we were cleared into position for takeoff. We received takeoff clearance and departed runway 28. At this point I was unsure of the direction of the turn to the heading of 080 and was reluctant to turn either way without clarification. I reduced power to allow more time to resolve the left or right turn question. I climbed to and leveled at 3000 ft MSL. The tower frequency was busy and we were unable to make a transmission to request clarification. Concurrently, we were accomplishing the after takeoff checklist. At this point, we received instruction from the tower to contact departure control. Because of the time and distance that had elapsed, I decided to turn left to 080, reasoning that it was away from the city and the other major airport. As the copilot changed to departure control in the left turn, I noted that we would pass near another aircraft, at that point we received instruction from departure control to climb to 3500 ft. I disengaged the autoplt and made a climb, keeping the other aircraft in sight until it passed beneath us. In retrospect: 1) I should not have accepted ground control instruction to increase my taxi speed but rather should have held short of runway 31 to allow us more time to prepare for the upcoming departure, or held short of runway 28 until departure briefing was clearly understood. 2) I should not have accepted the takeoff clearance without having written down the departure instruction. I acknowledge these errors but believe that the actions of ATC, in hurrying my taxi and giving departure instructions while doing so, set me up to make these mistakes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF CPR LTT ACFT BECAME CONFUSED AFTER TKOF AND DEVIATED FROM DEP CLRNC.

Narrative: THE IFR CLRNC TO 3NJ6 (RANCOCAS, NJ) WAS: 'ATC CLRS LTT ACFT TO 3NJ6, THE AGC II DEP, VIA ALLEGHENY 069 RADIAL TO HOMEE INTXN, THE JOHNSTOWN 300 DEG RADIAL TO JOHNSTOWN, AND THE BUCKS ARR. DEP FREQ 125.9, SQUAWK 2512.' THE TAXI RTE NECESSITATED XING RWY 31, WHICH WAS ACTIVE. GND CTL, RATHER THAN ASKING ME TO HOLD SHORT, INSTRUCTED ME TO INCREASE MY TAXI SPD TO CLR RWY 31 FOR AN ACFT ON FINAL. THIS INSTRUCTION, GIVEN IN THE MIDST OF WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE COCKPIT, INTERRUPTED THE RHYTHM OF OUR PREPARATION FOR TKOF. AS WE WERE XING RWY 31, WE RECEIVED AN AMENDMENT TO OUR CLRNC. 'AFTER TKOF, TURN R TO A HDG OF 080 DEGS.' ARRIVING AT THE HOLD LINE SHORT OF RWY 28 WE WERE CLRED INTO POS FOR TKOF. WE RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC AND DEPARTED RWY 28. AT THIS POINT I WAS UNSURE OF THE DIRECTION OF THE TURN TO THE HDG OF 080 AND WAS RELUCTANT TO TURN EITHER WAY WITHOUT CLARIFICATION. I REDUCED PWR TO ALLOW MORE TIME TO RESOLVE THE L OR R TURN QUESTION. I CLBED TO AND LEVELED AT 3000 FT MSL. THE TWR FREQ WAS BUSY AND WE WERE UNABLE TO MAKE A XMISSION TO REQUEST CLARIFICATION. CONCURRENTLY, WE WERE ACCOMPLISHING THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST. AT THIS POINT, WE RECEIVED INSTRUCTION FROM THE TWR TO CONTACT DEP CTL. BECAUSE OF THE TIME AND DISTANCE THAT HAD ELAPSED, I DECIDED TO TURN L TO 080, REASONING THAT IT WAS AWAY FROM THE CITY AND THE OTHER MAJOR ARPT. AS THE COPLT CHANGED TO DEP CTL IN THE L TURN, I NOTED THAT WE WOULD PASS NEAR ANOTHER ACFT, AT THAT POINT WE RECEIVED INSTRUCTION FROM DEP CTL TO CLB TO 3500 FT. I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND MADE A CLB, KEEPING THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT UNTIL IT PASSED BENEATH US. IN RETROSPECT: 1) I SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED GND CTL INSTRUCTION TO INCREASE MY TAXI SPD BUT RATHER SHOULD HAVE HELD SHORT OF RWY 31 TO ALLOW US MORE TIME TO PREPARE FOR THE UPCOMING DEP, OR HELD SHORT OF RWY 28 UNTIL DEP BRIEFING WAS CLRLY UNDERSTOOD. 2) I SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THE TKOF CLRNC WITHOUT HAVING WRITTEN DOWN THE DEP INSTRUCTION. I ACKNOWLEDGE THESE ERRORS BUT BELIEVE THAT THE ACTIONS OF ATC, IN HURRYING MY TAXI AND GIVING DEP INSTRUCTIONS WHILE DOING SO, SET ME UP TO MAKE THESE MISTAKES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.