Narrative:

We received landing clearance for runway 14R at cmi. Another aircraft was cleared to land on runway 22R. Because of this, both my first officer and I were scanning for the other aircraft. The local controller's remarks began to indicate a conflict was in the making. The local controller did not exchange traffic information between aircraft, but the other pilot was told by the controller, he might have to go around. As our aircraft crossed the landing threshold of 14R, my first officer said he had the other aircraft insight. It then appeared to me at approximately 10 O'clock position to us at approximately our altitude. The other pilot asked if he should go around. The local controller issued 'go around' to the other aircraft -- a small aircraft. We touched down in the touchdown zone. I had been utilizing the VASI to the runway. The other aircraft disappeared at or shortly thereafter touchdown at the top of my center windshield, I estimate no higher than 200 ft AGL. As we passed through the intersection of 14R and 22R, I noticed my first officer looking almost straight up through his side du. Window. I assumed to maintain visual contact with the other aircraft. This was an unsafe operation conducted by cmi ATCT. The tower supervisor explained during a phone call shortly thereafter, no separation conflict existed because the local controller issued go around instruction before the other aircraft crossed it's landing threshold. I do not agree with that. The instructions were issued after I first viewed the other aircraft. It was at my 10 O'clock position. The local controller had no plan. A correct plan of action should have been for either or both aircraft to turn away from each other followed by climb instructions, long before they crossed the airport boundary inbound to land. Time and room to maneuver still existed. There was no way out. Had the other aircraft not been able to go around, or we had to go around, we surely would have had a midair collision, or my aircraft might have struck the ground during an evasive maneuver. I understand this is not an uncommon situation at cmi -- the cross runway conflict. Something must be done!!!!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC OF LTT AND SMA ON APCH AND BOTH CLRED TO LAND ON INTERSECTING RWYS.

Narrative: WE RECEIVED LNDG CLRNC FOR RWY 14R AT CMI. ANOTHER ACFT WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 22R. BECAUSE OF THIS, BOTH MY FO AND I WERE SCANNING FOR THE OTHER ACFT. THE LCL CTLR'S REMARKS BEGAN TO INDICATE A CONFLICT WAS IN THE MAKING. THE LCL CTLR DID NOT EXCHANGE TFC INFO BTWN ACFT, BUT THE OTHER PLT WAS TOLD BY THE CTLR, HE MIGHT HAVE TO GAR. AS OUR ACFT CROSSED THE LNDG THRESHOLD OF 14R, MY FO SAID HE HAD THE OTHER ACFT INSIGHT. IT THEN APPEARED TO ME AT APPROX 10 O'CLOCK POS TO US AT APPROX OUR ALT. THE OTHER PLT ASKED IF HE SHOULD GAR. THE LCL CTLR ISSUED 'GAR' TO THE OTHER ACFT -- A SMA. WE TOUCHED DOWN IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. I HAD BEEN UTILIZING THE VASI TO THE RWY. THE OTHER ACFT DISAPPEARED AT OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER TOUCHDOWN AT THE TOP OF MY CTR WINDSHIELD, I ESTIMATE NO HIGHER THAN 200 FT AGL. AS WE PASSED THROUGH THE INTXN OF 14R AND 22R, I NOTICED MY FO LOOKING ALMOST STRAIGHT UP THROUGH HIS SIDE DU. WINDOW. I ASSUMED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE OTHER ACFT. THIS WAS AN UNSAFE OP CONDUCTED BY CMI ATCT. THE TWR SUPVR EXPLAINED DURING A PHONE CALL SHORTLY THEREAFTER, NO SEPARATION CONFLICT EXISTED BECAUSE THE LCL CTLR ISSUED GAR INSTRUCTION BEFORE THE OTHER ACFT CROSSED IT'S LNDG THRESHOLD. I DO NOT AGREE WITH THAT. THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED AFTER I FIRST VIEWED THE OTHER ACFT. IT WAS AT MY 10 O'CLOCK POS. THE LCL CTLR HAD NO PLAN. A CORRECT PLAN OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN FOR EITHER OR BOTH ACFT TO TURN AWAY FROM EACH OTHER FOLLOWED BY CLB INSTRUCTIONS, LONG BEFORE THEY CROSSED THE ARPT BOUNDARY INBOUND TO LAND. TIME AND ROOM TO MANEUVER STILL EXISTED. THERE WAS NO WAY OUT. HAD THE OTHER ACFT NOT BEEN ABLE TO GAR, OR WE HAD TO GAR, WE SURELY WOULD HAVE HAD A MIDAIR COLLISION, OR MY ACFT MIGHT HAVE STRUCK THE GND DURING AN EVASIVE MANEUVER. I UNDERSTAND THIS IS NOT AN UNCOMMON SITUATION AT CMI -- THE CROSS RWY CONFLICT. SOMETHING MUST BE DONE!!!!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.