Narrative:

This flight was a scheduled nonstop from paris (ory) to dfw using a widebody transport aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of 400000 pounds. The departure plan called for a takeoff weight of 391000 pounds using a min release fuel of 132200 pounds. Preflight, pre-departure cockpit set up and taxi out all normal. The station load close out information was received and the numbers checked against the FMS performance page information showing the correct data was presented and actual takeoff weight was within 1000 pounds of planned weight, approximately 391600 pounds. At this time, totalizer fuel indicated on the fuel gauge and the FMC calculated fuel amount agreed and were slightly above the min release fuel of 132200 pounds. Takeoff was normal with the captain (PF) noting that the nose seemed heavier than normal, requiring excessive back pressure to maintain takeoff attitude. Shortly after takeoff, a fuel quantity error message was generated on the FMC display unit. Indicated fuel quantity was checked and appeared normal, reading slightly less than dispatch fuel. During the climb out and subsequent cruise, proper fuel feed was determined and a fuel log maintained which showed that the engine fuel flows quantity closed matched the expected fuel burn as indicated on the flight plan. The actual fuel amount indicated on the fuel gauge totalizer was decreasing at a much slower amount however. When center tank fuel indicated '0' and proper pump low pressure indications occurred, it was determined that the aircraft had more fuel on board than was indicated on the fuel gauges at departure. After contacting the departure station and the dispatcher, we found that the aircraft had been overfueled at ory, however all gauges indicated the proper amount. Review of the maintenance log also revealed a previous write up of inaccurate fuel quantity indications. I believe this problem occurred due to a malfunctioning fuel quantity gauge combined with the fueler's error of pumping an excessive amount of fuel on board which should have been questioned at that time. Fueling was accomplished using standard company procedures which do not require the flight crew to confirm the actual amount of gallons or liters on board, but rather the fuel gauge totals which were definitely in error on this occasion. It is company policy to supply the flight crew with a fuel slip showing amount pumped. Only when there is a known problem with the fuel quantity gauges, such as one gauge inoperative. I believe one way to possibly prevent this type of incident from occurring again is to bring the flight crew into the loop by supplying with a copy of the fuel slip for each flight. This would enable a comparison of the fuel loaded versus fuel gauges, possibly identing any errors prior to a dangerous situation developing. Supplemental information from acn 204871. Aircraft fueler loaded total amount of fuel required for flight, but didn't consider, fuel remaining in tanks. Fuel gauges read the proper amount per tank. A double, discrepancy. Center tank gauge was not reading properly. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. An FAA maintenance rep was on the jump seat during this incident. The FAA is aware of the problem through his efforts. The reporter intimated that other pilots have had problems with the fuel indicating system on this widebody transport. The air carrier used to provide the flcs with a fuel slip until about 4 yrs ago when the practice was stopped. The phone patch to orly dispatch va HF radio was very difficult. The flight crew was very concerned about whether or not they had sufficient fuel to fly their trip so a lot of effort was spent determining that the #2 tank had more fuel than indicated.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ORY-DFW FLT WAS FUELED WITH 23000 POUNDS TOO MUCH FUEL. ACFT WAS NOSE HVY.

Narrative: THIS FLT WAS A SCHEDULED NONSTOP FROM PARIS (ORY) TO DFW USING A WDB ACFT WITH A MAX TKOF WT OF 400000 POUNDS. THE DEP PLAN CALLED FOR A TKOF WT OF 391000 POUNDS USING A MIN RELEASE FUEL OF 132200 POUNDS. PREFLT, PRE-DEP COCKPIT SET UP AND TAXI OUT ALL NORMAL. THE STATION LOAD CLOSE OUT INFO WAS RECEIVED AND THE NUMBERS CHKED AGAINST THE FMS PERFORMANCE PAGE INFO SHOWING THE CORRECT DATA WAS PRESENTED AND ACTUAL TKOF WT WAS WITHIN 1000 POUNDS OF PLANNED WT, APPROX 391600 POUNDS. AT THIS TIME, TOTALIZER FUEL INDICATED ON THE FUEL GAUGE AND THE FMC CALCULATED FUEL AMOUNT AGREED AND WERE SLIGHTLY ABOVE THE MIN RELEASE FUEL OF 132200 POUNDS. TKOF WAS NORMAL WITH THE CAPT (PF) NOTING THAT THE NOSE SEEMED HEAVIER THAN NORMAL, REQUIRING EXCESSIVE BACK PRESSURE TO MAINTAIN TKOF ATTITUDE. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, A FUEL QUANTITY ERROR MESSAGE WAS GENERATED ON THE FMC DISPLAY UNIT. INDICATED FUEL QUANTITY WAS CHKED AND APPEARED NORMAL, READING SLIGHTLY LESS THAN DISPATCH FUEL. DURING THE CLBOUT AND SUBSEQUENT CRUISE, PROPER FUEL FEED WAS DETERMINED AND A FUEL LOG MAINTAINED WHICH SHOWED THAT THE ENG FUEL FLOWS QUANTITY CLOSED MATCHED THE EXPECTED FUEL BURN AS INDICATED ON THE FLT PLAN. THE ACTUAL FUEL AMOUNT INDICATED ON THE FUEL GAUGE TOTALIZER WAS DECREASING AT A MUCH SLOWER AMOUNT HOWEVER. WHEN CTR TANK FUEL INDICATED '0' AND PROPER PUMP LOW PRESSURE INDICATIONS OCCURRED, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ACFT HAD MORE FUEL ON BOARD THAN WAS INDICATED ON THE FUEL GAUGES AT DEP. AFTER CONTACTING THE DEP STATION AND THE DISPATCHER, WE FOUND THAT THE ACFT HAD BEEN OVERFUELED AT ORY, HOWEVER ALL GAUGES INDICATED THE PROPER AMOUNT. REVIEW OF THE MAINT LOG ALSO REVEALED A PREVIOUS WRITE UP OF INACCURATE FUEL QUANTITY INDICATIONS. I BELIEVE THIS PROBLEM OCCURRED DUE TO A MALFUNCTIONING FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE COMBINED WITH THE FUELER'S ERROR OF PUMPING AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF FUEL ON BOARD WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED AT THAT TIME. FUELING WAS ACCOMPLISHED USING STANDARD COMPANY PROCS WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE THE FLC TO CONFIRM THE ACTUAL AMOUNT OF GALLONS OR LITERS ON BOARD, BUT RATHER THE FUEL GAUGE TOTALS WHICH WERE DEFINITELY IN ERROR ON THIS OCCASION. IT IS COMPANY POLICY TO SUPPLY THE FLC WITH A FUEL SLIP SHOWING AMOUNT PUMPED. ONLY WHEN THERE IS A KNOWN PROBLEM WITH THE FUEL QUANTITY GAUGES, SUCH AS ONE GAUGE INOP. I BELIEVE ONE WAY TO POSSIBLY PREVENT THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT FROM OCCURRING AGAIN IS TO BRING THE FLC INTO THE LOOP BY SUPPLYING WITH A COPY OF THE FUEL SLIP FOR EACH FLT. THIS WOULD ENABLE A COMPARISON OF THE FUEL LOADED VERSUS FUEL GAUGES, POSSIBLY IDENTING ANY ERRORS PRIOR TO A DANGEROUS SITUATION DEVELOPING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 204871. ACFT FUELER LOADED TOTAL AMOUNT OF FUEL REQUIRED FOR FLT, BUT DIDN'T CONSIDER, FUEL REMAINING IN TANKS. FUEL GAUGES READ THE PROPER AMOUNT PER TANK. A DOUBLE, DISCREPANCY. CTR TANK GAUGE WAS NOT READING PROPERLY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. AN FAA MAINT REP WAS ON THE JUMP SEAT DURING THIS INCIDENT. THE FAA IS AWARE OF THE PROBLEM THROUGH HIS EFFORTS. THE RPTR INTIMATED THAT OTHER PLTS HAVE HAD PROBLEMS WITH THE FUEL INDICATING SYS ON THIS WDB. THE ACR USED TO PROVIDE THE FLCS WITH A FUEL SLIP UNTIL ABOUT 4 YRS AGO WHEN THE PRACTICE WAS STOPPED. THE PHONE PATCH TO ORLY DISPATCH VA HF RADIO WAS VERY DIFFICULT. THE FLC WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD SUFFICIENT FUEL TO FLY THEIR TRIP SO A LOT OF EFFORT WAS SPENT DETERMINING THAT THE #2 TANK HAD MORE FUEL THAN INDICATED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.