Narrative:

After receiving our IFR clearance to reno from the redmond FSS, I asked for advisories and was told that the winds were 330 at 11, and that runways 28 and 4 were favored. I then announced on the CTAF my intention to taxi to runway 4, which involves crossing runway 10/28. When we arrived at 10/28, I and the 3 of my 4 passengers who had access to windows looked both way for traffic, then proceeded to cross the runway. When we were halfway across, one of my passenger exclaimed something or other, and pointed to our right (toward the approach end of runway 10). Indeed, a small aircraft (white with blue stripes) had just landed and was rolling out in our direction. The small aircraft had, in fact, veered to it's left and missed us by about 500 ft (ie, it wasn't that close, though it was awfully disconcerting). Here are the important safety considerations from my perspective: 1) the small aircraft did not call in his intentions; neither I nor any of my passengers recall hearing any call-in on the CTAF (which we were monitoring from the moment of engine start). Since he landed with an 11 KT tailwind, I assume that he either didn't call for advisories from the aas or he didn't much care. Since it was at least 5 mins from the time I started my engine until the time of the incident, my suspicion is that he never called. As an aside, the pilot is based in redmond, so he knows the airport extremely well. My guess is that well-known, high-time local pilots take an awful lot for granted. 2) although the 'see and avoid' concept is wonderful in the ideal, it doesn't provide nearly the safety factor of 'see and avoid' plus using radios. 4 of us looked in the direction of the landing plane, yet none of us saw him at the time we checked, he was probably just a few ft off the ground -- very difficult to make out against a hazy sky, trees, etc in the backgnd. It is natural to look 'harder' in the direction you are expecting to see something, so I wouldn't rule out the idea that we all looked at runway 28 (ie, the preferred runway) a lot harder than at runway 10. 3) I don't understand why the far's don't require that planes landing at uncontrolled fields use their radios if they have them. Added to the runway behind you, the sky above you, and the fuel left behind (or whatever the 3 most useless things are supposed to be), I would add a fourth: the radio you don't use. There is no question that pilots should use every means at their disposal to enhance the safety of their flight. I can't see any excuse for the other pilot not to have communicated. 4) redmond airport is an accident waiting to happen. Between recreation, business, commercial flts, and forest service operations, redmond is an extremely busy airport. Add to this the fact that there aren't even any taxiways to runway 28, and you've got the potential for disaster. I have heard from many pilots that they consider redmond one of the most dangerous airports in the northwest.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA TAXIING AT UNCTLED ARPT XING RWY TO GET TO FAVORED RWY HAS CONFLICT WITH LNDG ACFT.

Narrative: AFTER RECEIVING OUR IFR CLRNC TO RENO FROM THE REDMOND FSS, I ASKED FOR ADVISORIES AND WAS TOLD THAT THE WINDS WERE 330 AT 11, AND THAT RWYS 28 AND 4 WERE FAVORED. I THEN ANNOUNCED ON THE CTAF MY INTENTION TO TAXI TO RWY 4, WHICH INVOLVES XING RWY 10/28. WHEN WE ARRIVED AT 10/28, I AND THE 3 OF MY 4 PAXS WHO HAD ACCESS TO WINDOWS LOOKED BOTH WAY FOR TFC, THEN PROCEEDED TO CROSS THE RWY. WHEN WE WERE HALFWAY ACROSS, ONE OF MY PAX EXCLAIMED SOMETHING OR OTHER, AND POINTED TO OUR R (TOWARD THE APCH END OF RWY 10). INDEED, A SMA (WHITE WITH BLUE STRIPES) HAD JUST LANDED AND WAS ROLLING OUT IN OUR DIRECTION. THE SMA HAD, IN FACT, VEERED TO IT'S L AND MISSED US BY ABOUT 500 FT (IE, IT WASN'T THAT CLOSE, THOUGH IT WAS AWFULLY DISCONCERTING). HERE ARE THE IMPORTANT SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS FROM MY PERSPECTIVE: 1) THE SMA DID NOT CALL IN HIS INTENTIONS; NEITHER I NOR ANY OF MY PAXS RECALL HEARING ANY CALL-IN ON THE CTAF (WHICH WE WERE MONITORING FROM THE MOMENT OF ENG START). SINCE HE LANDED WITH AN 11 KT TAILWIND, I ASSUME THAT HE EITHER DIDN'T CALL FOR ADVISORIES FROM THE AAS OR HE DIDN'T MUCH CARE. SINCE IT WAS AT LEAST 5 MINS FROM THE TIME I STARTED MY ENG UNTIL THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, MY SUSPICION IS THAT HE NEVER CALLED. AS AN ASIDE, THE PLT IS BASED IN REDMOND, SO HE KNOWS THE ARPT EXTREMELY WELL. MY GUESS IS THAT WELL-KNOWN, HIGH-TIME LCL PLTS TAKE AN AWFUL LOT FOR GRANTED. 2) ALTHOUGH THE 'SEE AND AVOID' CONCEPT IS WONDERFUL IN THE IDEAL, IT DOESN'T PROVIDE NEARLY THE SAFETY FACTOR OF 'SEE AND AVOID' PLUS USING RADIOS. 4 OF US LOOKED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE LNDG PLANE, YET NONE OF US SAW HIM AT THE TIME WE CHKED, HE WAS PROBABLY JUST A FEW FT OFF THE GND -- VERY DIFFICULT TO MAKE OUT AGAINST A HAZY SKY, TREES, ETC IN THE BACKGND. IT IS NATURAL TO LOOK 'HARDER' IN THE DIRECTION YOU ARE EXPECTING TO SEE SOMETHING, SO I WOULDN'T RULE OUT THE IDEA THAT WE ALL LOOKED AT RWY 28 (IE, THE PREFERRED RWY) A LOT HARDER THAN AT RWY 10. 3) I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY THE FAR'S DON'T REQUIRE THAT PLANES LNDG AT UNCTLED FIELDS USE THEIR RADIOS IF THEY HAVE THEM. ADDED TO THE RWY BEHIND YOU, THE SKY ABOVE YOU, AND THE FUEL L BEHIND (OR WHATEVER THE 3 MOST USELESS THINGS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE), I WOULD ADD A FOURTH: THE RADIO YOU DON'T USE. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT PLTS SHOULD USE EVERY MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF THEIR FLT. I CAN'T SEE ANY EXCUSE FOR THE OTHER PLT NOT TO HAVE COMMUNICATED. 4) REDMOND ARPT IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN. BTWN RECREATION, BUSINESS, COMMERCIAL FLTS, AND FOREST SVC OPS, REDMOND IS AN EXTREMELY BUSY ARPT. ADD TO THIS THE FACT THAT THERE AREN'T EVEN ANY TAXIWAYS TO RWY 28, AND YOU'VE GOT THE POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER. I HAVE HEARD FROM MANY PLTS THAT THEY CONSIDER REDMOND ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS ARPTS IN THE NW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.