Narrative:

We departed montego bay, jamaica with our dispatched fuel load. At level off we discovered fuel burn was calculated with zero payload. We had 165 passenger. As flight progressed nwind factor increased above forecasted and fuel burn increased above plan. As we checked our burn at each fix we watched our reserve dwindle to a limit that became alarming. Shortly after passing mcn. We decided the only safe course of action was to divert to mem. This decision should have been made sooner as we landed with less fuel than company policy calls for. Cause: flight plan had been computed with zero payload, min fuel. Both pilots failed to notice error prior to departure and failed to make the divert decision soon enough. Both pilots were new to this aircraft. Recommendation: higher fuel reserves should apply to new crews who have not gained significant operational experience with new equipment. The importance of checking dispatcher's fuel numbers should be stressed more. Supplemental information from acn 203610. I recommend that when a carrier (like ours) has capts, first officer's and dispatchers inexperienced with a new type aircraft, the min reserves for dispatch be raised (from 6000 pounds to 8000 pounds in our case) for a period of 'get acquainted' time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT DEPARTS ORIGINATION ARPT WITH LESS THAN REQUIRED FUEL FOR FLT TO DEST. LANDS SHORT IN DIVERSION TO ALT ARPT.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED MONTEGO BAY, JAMAICA WITH OUR DISPATCHED FUEL LOAD. AT LEVEL OFF WE DISCOVERED FUEL BURN WAS CALCULATED WITH ZERO PAYLOAD. WE HAD 165 PAX. AS FLT PROGRESSED NWIND FACTOR INCREASED ABOVE FORECASTED AND FUEL BURN INCREASED ABOVE PLAN. AS WE CHKED OUR BURN AT EACH FIX WE WATCHED OUR RESERVE DWINDLE TO A LIMIT THAT BECAME ALARMING. SHORTLY AFTER PASSING MCN. WE DECIDED THE ONLY SAFE COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO DIVERT TO MEM. THIS DECISION SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE SOONER AS WE LANDED WITH LESS FUEL THAN COMPANY POLICY CALLS FOR. CAUSE: FLT PLAN HAD BEEN COMPUTED WITH ZERO PAYLOAD, MIN FUEL. BOTH PLTS FAILED TO NOTICE ERROR PRIOR TO DEP AND FAILED TO MAKE THE DIVERT DECISION SOON ENOUGH. BOTH PLTS WERE NEW TO THIS ACFT. RECOMMENDATION: HIGHER FUEL RESERVES SHOULD APPLY TO NEW CREWS WHO HAVE NOT GAINED SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH NEW EQUIP. THE IMPORTANCE OF CHKING DISPATCHER'S FUEL NUMBERS SHOULD BE STRESSED MORE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 203610. I RECOMMEND THAT WHEN A CARRIER (LIKE OURS) HAS CAPTS, FO'S AND DISPATCHERS INEXPERIENCED WITH A NEW TYPE ACFT, THE MIN RESERVES FOR DISPATCH BE RAISED (FROM 6000 POUNDS TO 8000 POUNDS IN OUR CASE) FOR A PERIOD OF 'GET ACQUAINTED' TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.