Narrative:

It was an early morning departure from sts. We were the first flight of the day and had already taken 1 delay due to an accumulator that had not been properly svced. Dispatch was able to give us a release such that we could depart with the accumulator low (we were told to run the engines and ensure that the accumulator would hold its charge). Upon entering the aircraft, we noticed that the generator warning light for the right generator was inoperative and we wrote it up in accordance with our maintenance procedures. We were informed by maintenance that they were going to defer the warning light and that it was ok to go. This warning light is on the forward warning panel, is bright red and only illuminates to warn the pilots of a failure of the generator system. I discussed with the captain that I did not think that it was a legal deferral. The captain felt that we could simply monitor the voltmeter and ammeter which are located on the overhead. I attempted to point out that I did not believe that any red cwp's could be deferred and that they were there to call attention of the crew to problems that would require them to focus elsewhere (e.g., the overhead). It was severe IFR (the first major rain in northern ca). We were able to determine that the generator was operative but that it was only the generator failure warning system that was inoperative. By the way, none of these items were contained in the MEL or cdl. Maintenance control informed us that the maintenance controller for the day and the chief pilot had approved them deferring this light as a 'non airworthiness item' and that we should depart immediately to sfo. I believe that this was an incorrect decision by the crew (including me) for the following reasons: 1) the captain had recently been reprimanded by the company and was facing a disciplinary hearing. He was extremely anxious to cooperate and not cause problems. He felt that by getting the aircraft to sfo, it would be considered a favor by the company and that this would weigh in favor at the hearing. 2) the company is known by all to be in extreme financial condition and we had passenger already boarded (and delayed). It was clear that the company did not want to lose the revenue and additionally they did not have mechanics available to fly to sts to repair problem on site. This meant that the aircraft would have been OTS for the day. 3) me not standing my ground and lack of cockpit resource management training at our company. I should have said no and refused the trip. I have been told by several check airmen that what we did was incorrect. I knew my captain was worried about his job (he is very senior) and in spite of my protests, I could not get the captain to seriously consider what I was saying. When I contacted maintenance control, I was told that the chief pilot had already approved the departure and that I should just stop causing additional delays with my questions. We went to sfo and the airplane was grounded for 7 hours while the mechanics worked on a fix.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WARNING LIGHT INOP AS CREW PREPARES FOR DEP. TOLD BY MAINT DEFERABLE. FLC THINKS NOT. CHIEF PLT APPROVED DEP WITH ITEMS DEFERRED.

Narrative: IT WAS AN EARLY MORNING DEP FROM STS. WE WERE THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY AND HAD ALREADY TAKEN 1 DELAY DUE TO AN ACCUMULATOR THAT HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY SVCED. DISPATCH WAS ABLE TO GIVE US A RELEASE SUCH THAT WE COULD DEPART WITH THE ACCUMULATOR LOW (WE WERE TOLD TO RUN THE ENGS AND ENSURE THAT THE ACCUMULATOR WOULD HOLD ITS CHARGE). UPON ENTERING THE ACFT, WE NOTICED THAT THE GENERATOR WARNING LIGHT FOR THE R GENERATOR WAS INOP AND WE WROTE IT UP IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR MAINT PROCS. WE WERE INFORMED BY MAINT THAT THEY WERE GOING TO DEFER THE WARNING LIGHT AND THAT IT WAS OK TO GO. THIS WARNING LIGHT IS ON THE FORWARD WARNING PANEL, IS BRIGHT RED AND ONLY ILLUMINATES TO WARN THE PLTS OF A FAILURE OF THE GENERATOR SYS. I DISCUSSED WITH THE CAPT THAT I DID NOT THINK THAT IT WAS A LEGAL DEFERRAL. THE CAPT FELT THAT WE COULD SIMPLY MONITOR THE VOLTMETER AND AMMETER WHICH ARE LOCATED ON THE OVERHEAD. I ATTEMPTED TO POINT OUT THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY RED CWP'S COULD BE DEFERRED AND THAT THEY WERE THERE TO CALL ATTN OF THE CREW TO PROBLEMS THAT WOULD REQUIRE THEM TO FOCUS ELSEWHERE (E.G., THE OVERHEAD). IT WAS SEVERE IFR (THE FIRST MAJOR RAIN IN NORTHERN CA). WE WERE ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THE GENERATOR WAS OPERATIVE BUT THAT IT WAS ONLY THE GENERATOR FAILURE WARNING SYS THAT WAS INOP. BY THE WAY, NONE OF THESE ITEMS WERE CONTAINED IN THE MEL OR CDL. MAINT CTL INFORMED US THAT THE MAINT CTLR FOR THE DAY AND THE CHIEF PLT HAD APPROVED THEM DEFERRING THIS LIGHT AS A 'NON AIRWORTHINESS ITEM' AND THAT WE SHOULD DEPART IMMEDIATELY TO SFO. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS AN INCORRECT DECISION BY THE CREW (INCLUDING ME) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) THE CAPT HAD RECENTLY BEEN REPRIMANDED BY THE COMPANY AND WAS FACING A DISCIPLINARY HEARING. HE WAS EXTREMELY ANXIOUS TO COOPERATE AND NOT CAUSE PROBLEMS. HE FELT THAT BY GETTING THE ACFT TO SFO, IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED A FAVOR BY THE COMPANY AND THAT THIS WOULD WEIGH IN FAVOR AT THE HEARING. 2) THE COMPANY IS KNOWN BY ALL TO BE IN EXTREME FINANCIAL CONDITION AND WE HAD PAX ALREADY BOARDED (AND DELAYED). IT WAS CLR THAT THE COMPANY DID NOT WANT TO LOSE THE REVENUE AND ADDITIONALLY THEY DID NOT HAVE MECHS AVAILABLE TO FLY TO STS TO REPAIR PROBLEM ON SITE. THIS MEANT THAT THE ACFT WOULD HAVE BEEN OTS FOR THE DAY. 3) ME NOT STANDING MY GND AND LACK OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING AT OUR COMPANY. I SHOULD HAVE SAID NO AND REFUSED THE TRIP. I HAVE BEEN TOLD BY SEVERAL CHK AIRMEN THAT WHAT WE DID WAS INCORRECT. I KNEW MY CAPT WAS WORRIED ABOUT HIS JOB (HE IS VERY SENIOR) AND IN SPITE OF MY PROTESTS, I COULD NOT GET THE CAPT TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER WHAT I WAS SAYING. WHEN I CONTACTED MAINT CTL, I WAS TOLD THAT THE CHIEF PLT HAD ALREADY APPROVED THE DEP AND THAT I SHOULD JUST STOP CAUSING ADDITIONAL DELAYS WITH MY QUESTIONS. WE WENT TO SFO AND THE AIRPLANE WAS GNDED FOR 7 HRS WHILE THE MECHS WORKED ON A FIX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.