Narrative:

We had just departed teterboro, nj, en route to ft lauderdale, fl, via an initial clearance of 'radar vectors to white intersection, J209 salisbury VOR...' ATC told us to intercept the colts neck 350 degree radial to colts neck VOR on course. I was following the teterboro 2 departure (SID), tracking the 350 degree radial to colts neck, then the 204 degree radial from colts neck to the white intersection. In the vicinity of colts neck, I asked the copilot for the course after white. (He had all the en route charts, and our company typically has the copilot verify navigation, set up intercepts, etc). This particular pilot is used to flying captain in this aircraft and relies heavily on the flight management system and autoplt for navigation. His (delayed) response to my question was, 'just keep the airplane on the line,' pointing to the map on the multi functional display. I was hand-flying the airplane using traditional VOR/HSI information at the time, and my scan did not include the mfd/map. Not satisfied with his response, I asked again for the airway/radial to intercept after white. He again responded, 'don't worry about it, just fly the line.' simultaneously, the controller advised us that we missed the turn onto the airway, and to turn to a heading of 240 degrees to reintercept it. There was absolutely no conflict, and no evasive action was required by anyone. I was very frustrated at this point because I had been trying to set up the intercept, and the copilot would not give me the required information. I finally asked to see the chart, set up the airway, intercepted the radial and continued the flight without further incident. In evaluating the situation, I noted several contributing factors: the copilot and I were each using different methods of navigation, with no coordination system for xchking the information. I should have communicated to the copilot that I was going to hand-fly the airplane, using traditional VOR/HSI data, and that I expected him to back me up (i.e. Set up specific radials to intercept, etc). When I realized he was not giving me the information I wanted, I should have been more assertive and specific with my request. I was expecting to be copilot on this leg, and had my charts set up to backup the captain. When asked if I wanted to fly this leg, I should have reviewed the charts more thoroughly and had a chart on my side. I was depending too heavily on the copilot to tell me what to do. Prior to this flight, I had approximately 2 hours as captain in this aircraft which is equipped with EFIS, mfd, GNS X, etc. While the EFIS itself was not a problem, the mfd/map display was not in my scan and certainly not being used as a primary means of navigation as my copilot wanted (and assumed). Again, better crew coordination with new avionics would have helped. As with many sids in the new york area, the workload during the first few mins of this departure is very high, and demands full attention and coordination between crewmembers, especially the turn from white intersection to J209 which is a very short segment to coyle VOR. In light of this situation, I realized just how important it is to have standardization and communication between crewmembers, especially in a situation where we are constantly flying different aircraft with different crewmembers. I plan to encourage this more and more with our new chief pilot. Whether I'm flying captain or copilot, I plan to reveiw each route more thoroughly in the future, even if I have just flown it recently, and, whenever possible, we will have 2 en route charts available -- one for each crewmember. In addition, I will not rely solely on the copilot for en route navigation. When using new avionics, I'll be certain that my copilot and I are more coordinated. I continue to believe in learning the EFIS with the traditional VOR/HSI equipment prior to relying more heavily on the mfd/map displays. When acting as copilot, I will continue to use these traditional means to backup a captain who may prefer the 'less demanding' mfd.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRACK DEV FOR FLC FO ADVTECH LTT CORPORATE ACFT.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST DEPARTED TETERBORO, NJ, ENRTE TO FT LAUDERDALE, FL, VIA AN INITIAL CLRNC OF 'RADAR VECTORS TO WHITE INTXN, J209 SALISBURY VOR...' ATC TOLD US TO INTERCEPT THE COLTS NECK 350 DEG RADIAL TO COLTS NECK VOR ON COURSE. I WAS FOLLOWING THE TETERBORO 2 DEP (SID), TRACKING THE 350 DEG RADIAL TO COLTS NECK, THEN THE 204 DEG RADIAL FROM COLTS NECK TO THE WHITE INTXN. IN THE VICINITY OF COLTS NECK, I ASKED THE COPLT FOR THE COURSE AFTER WHITE. (HE HAD ALL THE ENRTE CHARTS, AND OUR COMPANY TYPICALLY HAS THE COPLT VERIFY NAV, SET UP INTERCEPTS, ETC). THIS PARTICULAR PLT IS USED TO FLYING CAPT IN THIS ACFT AND RELIES HEAVILY ON THE FLT MGMNT SYS AND AUTOPLT FOR NAV. HIS (DELAYED) RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION WAS, 'JUST KEEP THE AIRPLANE ON THE LINE,' POINTING TO THE MAP ON THE MULTI FUNCTIONAL DISPLAY. I WAS HAND-FLYING THE AIRPLANE USING TRADITIONAL VOR/HSI INFO AT THE TIME, AND MY SCAN DID NOT INCLUDE THE MFD/MAP. NOT SATISFIED WITH HIS RESPONSE, I ASKED AGAIN FOR THE AIRWAY/RADIAL TO INTERCEPT AFTER WHITE. HE AGAIN RESPONDED, 'DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT, JUST FLY THE LINE.' SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE CTLR ADVISED US THAT WE MISSED THE TURN ONTO THE AIRWAY, AND TO TURN TO A HDG OF 240 DEGS TO REINTERCEPT IT. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO CONFLICT, AND NO EVASIVE ACTION WAS REQUIRED BY ANYONE. I WAS VERY FRUSTRATED AT THIS POINT BECAUSE I HAD BEEN TRYING TO SET UP THE INTERCEPT, AND THE COPLT WOULD NOT GIVE ME THE REQUIRED INFO. I FINALLY ASKED TO SEE THE CHART, SET UP THE AIRWAY, INTERCEPTED THE RADIAL AND CONTINUED THE FLT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. IN EVALUATING THE SITUATION, I NOTED SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE COPLT AND I WERE EACH USING DIFFERENT METHODS OF NAV, WITH NO COORD SYS FOR XCHKING THE INFO. I SHOULD HAVE COMMUNICATED TO THE COPLT THAT I WAS GOING TO HAND-FLY THE AIRPLANE, USING TRADITIONAL VOR/HSI DATA, AND THAT I EXPECTED HIM TO BACK ME UP (I.E. SET UP SPECIFIC RADIALS TO INTERCEPT, ETC). WHEN I REALIZED HE WAS NOT GIVING ME THE INFO I WANTED, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE AND SPECIFIC WITH MY REQUEST. I WAS EXPECTING TO BE COPLT ON THIS LEG, AND HAD MY CHARTS SET UP TO BACKUP THE CAPT. WHEN ASKED IF I WANTED TO FLY THIS LEG, I SHOULD HAVE REVIEWED THE CHARTS MORE THOROUGHLY AND HAD A CHART ON MY SIDE. I WAS DEPENDING TOO HEAVILY ON THE COPLT TO TELL ME WHAT TO DO. PRIOR TO THIS FLT, I HAD APPROX 2 HRS AS CAPT IN THIS ACFT WHICH IS EQUIPPED WITH EFIS, MFD, GNS X, ETC. WHILE THE EFIS ITSELF WAS NOT A PROBLEM, THE MFD/MAP DISPLAY WAS NOT IN MY SCAN AND CERTAINLY NOT BEING USED AS A PRIMARY MEANS OF NAV AS MY COPLT WANTED (AND ASSUMED). AGAIN, BETTER CREW COORD WITH NEW AVIONICS WOULD HAVE HELPED. AS WITH MANY SIDS IN THE NEW YORK AREA, THE WORKLOAD DURING THE FIRST FEW MINS OF THIS DEP IS VERY HIGH, AND DEMANDS FULL ATTN AND COORD BTWN CREWMEMBERS, ESPECIALLY THE TURN FROM WHITE INTXN TO J209 WHICH IS A VERY SHORT SEGMENT TO COYLE VOR. IN LIGHT OF THIS SITUATION, I REALIZED JUST HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO HAVE STANDARDIZATION AND COM BTWN CREWMEMBERS, ESPECIALLY IN A SITUATION WHERE WE ARE CONSTANTLY FLYING DIFFERENT ACFT WITH DIFFERENT CREWMEMBERS. I PLAN TO ENCOURAGE THIS MORE AND MORE WITH OUR NEW CHIEF PLT. WHETHER I'M FLYING CAPT OR COPLT, I PLAN TO REVEIW EACH RTE MORE THOROUGHLY IN THE FUTURE, EVEN IF I HAVE JUST FLOWN IT RECENTLY, AND, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, WE WILL HAVE 2 ENRTE CHARTS AVAILABLE -- ONE FOR EACH CREWMEMBER. IN ADDITION, I WILL NOT RELY SOLELY ON THE COPLT FOR ENRTE NAV. WHEN USING NEW AVIONICS, I'LL BE CERTAIN THAT MY COPLT AND I ARE MORE COORDINATED. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IN LEARNING THE EFIS WITH THE TRADITIONAL VOR/HSI EQUIP PRIOR TO RELYING MORE HEAVILY ON THE MFD/MAP DISPLAYS. WHEN ACTING AS COPLT, I WILL CONTINUE TO USE THESE TRADITIONAL MEANS TO BACKUP A CAPT WHO MAY PREFER THE 'LESS DEMANDING' MFD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.