Narrative:

Hub airport departure complex. Cleared for takeoff behind medium large transport to 'maintain visual separation with departing aircraft.' takeoff clearance given before other aircraft had rotated. At V1 just as nose was lifted off runway #1 fire warning and bell sounded. Takeoff aborted as aircraft weight was well below runway limited weight. Aircraft was stopped well short of runway end. Performed engine fire checklist and after no fire had been confirmed we returned to the gate. Maintenance inspection revealed that fire warning had been caused by rupture in 8TH stage bleed air duct. No other damage done to aircraft. No personal injuries. (Side note: the aircraft behind us had been cleared for takeoff before we became airborne and tower had to cancel its takeoff clearance when we aborted.) when the nose gear lifted off the ACARS reported the aircraft 'off' and flight department supervisors subsequently accused me of taking off and then aborting the takeoff in violation of company policy. Company training treats V1 as a 'go/no go' speed assuming that all takeoffs are exact balanced field length. In reality, most flts may be operated as done above in which V1 was a decision speed (min critical engine failure speed) while a higher refusal speed (maximum ground speed in which the aircraft can still be stopped on the runway) was appropriate. Supplemental information from acn 201026: crash truck scanned engine and reported to fire. Maintenance found ruptured 8TH stage bleed duct.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR HAS ENG FIRE WARNING AT V1. ABORTS TKOF.

Narrative: HUB ARPT DEP COMPLEX. CLRED FOR TKOF BEHIND MLG TO 'MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH DEPARTING ACFT.' TKOF CLRNC GIVEN BEFORE OTHER ACFT HAD ROTATED. AT V1 JUST AS NOSE WAS LIFTED OFF RWY #1 FIRE WARNING AND BELL SOUNDED. TKOF ABORTED AS ACFT WT WAS WELL BELOW RWY LIMITED WT. ACFT WAS STOPPED WELL SHORT OF RWY END. PERFORMED ENG FIRE CHKLIST AND AFTER NO FIRE HAD BEEN CONFIRMED WE RETURNED TO THE GATE. MAINT INSPECTION REVEALED THAT FIRE WARNING HAD BEEN CAUSED BY RUPTURE IN 8TH STAGE BLEED AIR DUCT. NO OTHER DAMAGE DONE TO ACFT. NO PERSONAL INJURIES. (SIDE NOTE: THE ACFT BEHIND US HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF BEFORE WE BECAME AIRBORNE AND TWR HAD TO CANCEL ITS TKOF CLRNC WHEN WE ABORTED.) WHEN THE NOSE GEAR LIFTED OFF THE ACARS RPTED THE ACFT 'OFF' AND FLT DEPT SUPVRS SUBSEQUENTLY ACCUSED ME OF TAKING OFF AND THEN ABORTING THE TKOF IN VIOLATION OF COMPANY POLICY. COMPANY TRAINING TREATS V1 AS A 'GO/NO GO' SPD ASSUMING THAT ALL TKOFS ARE EXACT BALANCED FIELD LENGTH. IN REALITY, MOST FLTS MAY BE OPERATED AS DONE ABOVE IN WHICH V1 WAS A DECISION SPD (MIN CRITICAL ENG FAILURE SPD) WHILE A HIGHER REFUSAL SPD (MAX GND SPD IN WHICH THE ACFT CAN STILL BE STOPPED ON THE RWY) WAS APPROPRIATE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 201026: CRASH TRUCK SCANNED ENG AND RPTED TO FIRE. MAINT FOUND RUPTURED 8TH STAGE BLEED DUCT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.