Narrative:

The problem arose on 1-WED-92 around XY00 CST (near sunset) after I departed the perry, ia (pro) airport bound for the des moines, ia (dsm) airport on a part 135 single engine air taxi flight for an air taxi service in ames, ia. Immediately prior to departing pro, I checked the current WX conditions with fort dodge FSS. Dsm was reporting 1100 overcast with better than 3 mi visibility. I fully expected to get into dsm under VFR conditions, as it was to be only a 12 min flight. It became apparent, however, as I approached the dsm area, that the ceiling was rapidly decreasing, a fact soon confirmed by the dsm it is and approach control. The impending darkness, in addition to my unfamiliarity with the terrain, led me to choose what I believed to be the safest option for my passenger and myself. I called dsm approach and asked for and was granted, a clearance for an ILS approach to runway 30R. I flew the approach procedure (in violation of the far's) and safely landed. I dropped off my passenger and returned to my home base of ames, in under point 91 regulations. I feel that this is a situation in which the more legal option I had (to scud-run into dsm) would have been more hazardous to myself and my passenger. I regret the fact that this decision had to be made at all but feel that the purpose of safety was better served. I have learned a valuable lesson from this and plan in the future to cancel any VFR air taxi flight which will have to be flown in marginal VFR conditions. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: call back to reporter revealed that he was concerned about the safety of the flight and while realizing that he had not performed a pilot proficiency check as required by far 135.297, it was safer to request an IFR clearance and perform the ILS. This he did. He feels that someone associated with the departure airport, 1 with political motives, was the 1 that 'did him in'. The FAA letter was received by the air taxi service and he was fired 3 days later, although his employer knew of the action of the reporter upon his return. When asked why he hadn't received the required flight check he stated it was because his 'boss' was too cheap to lay out the money for the plane/aircraft maneuvers time, even though his initial VFR check was done the previous july when he was hired. His 'boss' couldn't give him the check, the local FSDO did, as the employer was in disfavor with the FAA and had lost his airman certificate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAR AND AS THEY PERTAINED TO THE OP OF RPTR'S REVENUE FLT.

Narrative: THE PROBLEM AROSE ON 1-WED-92 AROUND XY00 CST (NEAR SUNSET) AFTER I DEPARTED THE PERRY, IA (PRO) ARPT BOUND FOR THE DES MOINES, IA (DSM) ARPT ON A PART 135 SINGLE ENG AIR TAXI FLT FOR AN AIR TAXI SVC IN AMES, IA. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO DEPARTING PRO, I CHKED THE CURRENT WX CONDITIONS WITH FORT DODGE FSS. DSM WAS RPTING 1100 OVCST WITH BETTER THAN 3 MI VISIBILITY. I FULLY EXPECTED TO GET INTO DSM UNDER VFR CONDITIONS, AS IT WAS TO BE ONLY A 12 MIN FLT. IT BECAME APPARENT, HOWEVER, AS I APCHED THE DSM AREA, THAT THE CEILING WAS RAPIDLY DECREASING, A FACT SOON CONFIRMED BY THE DSM IT IS AND APCH CTL. THE IMPENDING DARKNESS, IN ADDITION TO MY UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE TERRAIN, LED ME TO CHOOSE WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE THE SAFEST OPTION FOR MY PAX AND MYSELF. I CALLED DSM APCH AND ASKED FOR AND WAS GRANTED, A CLRNC FOR AN ILS APCH TO RWY 30R. I FLEW THE APCH PROC (IN VIOLATION OF THE FAR'S) AND SAFELY LANDED. I DROPPED OFF MY PAX AND RETURNED TO MY HOME BASE OF AMES, IN UNDER POINT 91 REGS. I FEEL THAT THIS IS A SITUATION IN WHICH THE MORE LEGAL OPTION I HAD (TO SCUD-RUN INTO DSM) WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE HAZARDOUS TO MYSELF AND MY PAX. I REGRET THE FACT THAT THIS DECISION HAD TO BE MADE AT ALL BUT FEEL THAT THE PURPOSE OF SAFETY WAS BETTER SERVED. I HAVE LEARNED A VALUABLE LESSON FROM THIS AND PLAN IN THE FUTURE TO CANCEL ANY VFR AIR TAXI FLT WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE FLOWN IN MARGINAL VFR CONDITIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALL BACK TO RPTR REVEALED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE FLT AND WHILE REALIZING THAT HE HAD NOT PERFORMED A PLT PROFICIENCY CHK AS REQUIRED BY FAR 135.297, IT WAS SAFER TO REQUEST AN IFR CLRNC AND PERFORM THE ILS. THIS HE DID. HE FEELS THAT SOMEONE ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEP ARPT, 1 WITH POLITICAL MOTIVES, WAS THE 1 THAT 'DID HIM IN'. THE FAA LETTER WAS RECEIVED BY THE AIR TAXI SVC AND HE WAS FIRED 3 DAYS LATER, ALTHOUGH HIS EMPLOYER KNEW OF THE ACTION OF THE RPTR UPON HIS RETURN. WHEN ASKED WHY HE HADN'T RECEIVED THE REQUIRED FLT CHK HE STATED IT WAS BECAUSE HIS 'BOSS' WAS TOO CHEAP TO LAY OUT THE MONEY FOR THE PLANE/ACFT MANEUVERS TIME, EVEN THOUGH HIS INITIAL VFR CHK WAS DONE THE PREVIOUS JULY WHEN HE WAS HIRED. HIS 'BOSS' COULDN'T GIVE HIM THE CHK, THE LCL FSDO DID, AS THE EMPLOYER WAS IN DISFAVOR WITH THE FAA AND HAD LOST HIS AIRMAN CERTIFICATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.