Narrative:

Approaching providence on ralf arrival to boston we were given holding instruction (as published, 10 mi legs) with an efc approximately 10 mins later. First officer was flying aircraft. I looked at the plate and briefed the inbound and outbound course. I stated that it would require a direct entry and asked the first officer if he concurred. I began calling the company (our company is adamant that we keep dispatch informed) and briefing the passenger of the delay. Upon entering holding we were a little fast. Our speed coupled with the offset direct entry with a very strong tailwind took us very wide on the first turn so that as we went through our outbound heading we were already more than 10 mi from the fix. We therefore kept the turn in and simply flew back to the VOR. At this point I felt we were established in holding and I let my attention become too focused on other things (company communications, etc). The first officer had apparently become confused about the holding pattern. As we crossed the VOR we were in a right turn but he began to roll out. I commented that we needed to keep the turn in and he reestablished a shallow bank. Apparently he thought we were still inbound to the station and in the confusion we traveled nearly 14 DME northeast (non holding side) of the VOR. When I instructed him to turn to the outbound course he did so. The moral here I believe is that those who would like to know but don't need to know immediately should be put on hold until business (flying the airplane) is taken care of.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PROBLEM ENTERING HOLDING PATTERN, DEV TO NON HOLDING SIDE. LEGS FURTHER THAN ASSIGNED.

Narrative: APCHING PROVIDENCE ON RALF ARR TO BOSTON WE WERE GIVEN HOLDING INSTRUCTION (AS PUBLISHED, 10 MI LEGS) WITH AN EFC APPROX 10 MINS LATER. FO WAS FLYING ACFT. I LOOKED AT THE PLATE AND BRIEFED THE INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COURSE. I STATED THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE A DIRECT ENTRY AND ASKED THE FO IF HE CONCURRED. I BEGAN CALLING THE COMPANY (OUR COMPANY IS ADAMANT THAT WE KEEP DISPATCH INFORMED) AND BRIEFING THE PAX OF THE DELAY. UPON ENTERING HOLDING WE WERE A LITTLE FAST. OUR SPD COUPLED WITH THE OFFSET DIRECT ENTRY WITH A VERY STRONG TAILWIND TOOK US VERY WIDE ON THE FIRST TURN SO THAT AS WE WENT THROUGH OUR OUTBOUND HDG WE WERE ALREADY MORE THAN 10 MI FROM THE FIX. WE THEREFORE KEPT THE TURN IN AND SIMPLY FLEW BACK TO THE VOR. AT THIS POINT I FELT WE WERE ESTABLISHED IN HOLDING AND I LET MY ATTN BECOME TOO FOCUSED ON OTHER THINGS (COMPANY COMS, ETC). THE FO HAD APPARENTLY BECOME CONFUSED ABOUT THE HOLDING PATTERN. AS WE CROSSED THE VOR WE WERE IN A R TURN BUT HE BEGAN TO ROLL OUT. I COMMENTED THAT WE NEEDED TO KEEP THE TURN IN AND HE REESTABLISHED A SHALLOW BANK. APPARENTLY HE THOUGHT WE WERE STILL INBOUND TO THE STATION AND IN THE CONFUSION WE TRAVELED NEARLY 14 DME NE (NON HOLDING SIDE) OF THE VOR. WHEN I INSTRUCTED HIM TO TURN TO THE OUTBOUND COURSE HE DID SO. THE MORAL HERE I BELIEVE IS THAT THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO KNOW BUT DON'T NEED TO KNOW IMMEDIATELY SHOULD BE PUT ON HOLD UNTIL BUSINESS (FLYING THE AIRPLANE) IS TAKEN CARE OF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.