Narrative:

Inbound to gtw on ua 1 at FL370 we were cleared to FL290 to expect to cross 40 north mid at FL130. Prior to this we had been vectored off track to allow a widebody transport with fuel temperature problems to descend through our altitude. We were now cleared direct honley. The first officer was flying and our observation of the navigation display showed we had ample distance to get down. We delayed starting our descent as we did the descent checklist and prepared for the arrival. About 120 north mid we started our down. We then were given another vector and further step down altitudes, then asked to expedite our descent by another controller, which we accomplished by increasing to near barber pole. We were then asked to execute a right orbit. London next asked if we had started our turn and I stated we had. Lon then asked if we could tighten up the turn, as we were causing them all kinds of problems. I told them we could tighten up if we could slow down, and they agreed. This was the first indication that we were doing anything but trying to cooperate with ATC. I asked what the problem was and they said we had been cleared to descend to FL290 to expect to cross 40 north mid at FL130, and had done absolutely nothing to accomplish this. The controller seemed quite upset and rather than argue, after a short exchange about the clearance, I attempted to apologize and told him that this was my first trip to lon in some time. We completed our turn and descent, with the first controller back on, without further comment. I think that this was mostly a communications problem. I did not indicate that we would stay at 370 even though it was a short stay, and my perception that we were following the widebody transport and that the 40 north mid was the critical point. The first officer and I at no time felt we could not make the restriction and started our descent at a normal speed and descent rate to accomplish that objective. I feel we erred in not advising that we were not starting right down, even though lon can tell that we did not start our descent immediately. I feel that lon erred in not advising us what they needed until things got tight. In discussing this we cannot figure out what the real problem was, but in any case it could have been avoided with a little communication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OVER WATER FLT APCHING GTW WAS GIVEN A XING RESTRICTION. FLC DELAYED DSNDING FROM FL370 UNTIL APPROPRIATE DISTANCE FROM INTXN FOR NORMAL DSCNT RATE. CTLR GAVE VECTORS AND COMPLAINED REF THE LATE START OF DSCNT.

Narrative: INBOUND TO GTW ON UA 1 AT FL370 WE WERE CLRED TO FL290 TO EXPECT TO CROSS 40 N MID AT FL130. PRIOR TO THIS WE HAD BEEN VECTORED OFF TRACK TO ALLOW A WDB WITH FUEL TEMP PROBS TO DSND THROUGH OUR ALT. WE WERE NOW CLRED DIRECT HONLEY. THE FO WAS FLYING AND OUR OBSERVATION OF THE NAV DISPLAY SHOWED WE HAD AMPLE DISTANCE TO GET DOWN. WE DELAYED STARTING OUR DSCNT AS WE DID THE DSCNT CHKLIST AND PREPARED FOR THE ARR. ABOUT 120 N MID WE STARTED OUR DOWN. WE THEN WERE GIVEN ANOTHER VECTOR AND FURTHER STEP DOWN ALTS, THEN ASKED TO EXPEDITE OUR DSCNT BY ANOTHER CTLR, WHICH WE ACCOMPLISHED BY INCREASING TO NEAR BARBER POLE. WE WERE THEN ASKED TO EXECUTE A R ORBIT. LONDON NEXT ASKED IF WE HAD STARTED OUR TURN AND I STATED WE HAD. LON THEN ASKED IF WE COULD TIGHTEN UP THE TURN, AS WE WERE CAUSING THEM ALL KINDS OF PROBS. I TOLD THEM WE COULD TIGHTEN UP IF WE COULD SLOW DOWN, AND THEY AGREED. THIS WAS THE FIRST INDICATION THAT WE WERE DOING ANYTHING BUT TRYING TO COOPERATE WITH ATC. I ASKED WHAT THE PROB WAS AND THEY SAID WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO DSND TO FL290 TO EXPECT TO CROSS 40 N MID AT FL130, AND HAD DONE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. THE CTLR SEEMED QUITE UPSET AND RATHER THAN ARGUE, AFTER A SHORT EXCHANGE ABOUT THE CLRNC, I ATTEMPTED TO APOLOGIZE AND TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS MY FIRST TRIP TO LON IN SOME TIME. WE COMPLETED OUR TURN AND DSCNT, WITH THE FIRST CTLR BACK ON, WITHOUT FURTHER COMMENT. I THINK THAT THIS WAS MOSTLY A COMS PROB. I DID NOT INDICATE THAT WE WOULD STAY AT 370 EVEN THOUGH IT WAS A SHORT STAY, AND MY PERCEPTION THAT WE WERE FOLLOWING THE WDB AND THAT THE 40 N MID WAS THE CRITICAL POINT. THE FO AND I AT NO TIME FELT WE COULD NOT MAKE THE RESTRICTION AND STARTED OUR DSCNT AT A NORMAL SPD AND DSCNT RATE TO ACCOMPLISH THAT OBJECTIVE. I FEEL WE ERRED IN NOT ADVISING THAT WE WERE NOT STARTING RIGHT DOWN, EVEN THOUGH LON CAN TELL THAT WE DID NOT START OUR DSCNT IMMEDIATELY. I FEEL THAT LON ERRED IN NOT ADVISING US WHAT THEY NEEDED UNTIL THINGS GOT TIGHT. IN DISCUSSING THIS WE CANNOT FIGURE OUT WHAT THE REAL PROB WAS, BUT IN ANY CASE IT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED WITH A LITTLE COM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.