Narrative:

PF, first officer, continued descent through clearance altitude. Captain engaged in reassuring passenger of anticipated passage through turbulent area. Once clear of storm cell, I, as captain, looked at altitude set on control panel to be 8000 ft. About to ask PF if we had new clearance beyond 10000 ft while I was on PA. At same time. Radar control asked to confirm altitude as just below 10000. We were between 9800 and 9700. Controller advised clearance to maintain 10000 and that there was no traffic in area. He added that he was checking his mode C radar. PF corrected immediately. Altitude selector on 8000 ft. Once again the altitude selection system is subject to being inadvertently moved, creating a subtle trap for the pilot. It is dangerous and should be modified -- there are too many instances of this occurrence on the widebody transport.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC WAS DSNDING ACFT TO ALT SET IN ALT REMINDER WINDOW WHICH SHOWED 8000. SHOULD HAVE BEEN AND WAS EXPECTED BY FLC TO BE AT 10000.

Narrative: PF, FO, CONTINUED DSCNT THROUGH CLRNC ALT. CAPT ENGAGED IN REASSURING PAX OF ANTICIPATED PASSAGE THROUGH TURBULENT AREA. ONCE CLR OF STORM CELL, I, AS CAPT, LOOKED AT ALT SET ON CTL PANEL TO BE 8000 FT. ABOUT TO ASK PF IF WE HAD NEW CLRNC BEYOND 10000 FT WHILE I WAS ON PA. AT SAME TIME. RADAR CTL ASKED TO CONFIRM ALT AS JUST BELOW 10000. WE WERE BTWN 9800 AND 9700. CTLR ADVISED CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 10000 AND THAT THERE WAS NO TFC IN AREA. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS CHKING HIS MODE C RADAR. PF CORRECTED IMMEDIATELY. ALT SELECTOR ON 8000 FT. ONCE AGAIN THE ALT SELECTION SYS IS SUBJECT TO BEING INADVERTENTLY MOVED, CREATING A SUBTLE TRAP FOR THE PLT. IT IS DANGEROUS AND SHOULD BE MODIFIED -- THERE ARE TOO MANY INSTANCES OF THIS OCCURRENCE ON THE WDB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.