 |
37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Training flight forced to go around due military helicopter diversion from clearance.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 193988 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199111 |
| Day | Sun |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : sat |
| State Reference | TX |
| Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 200 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tower : sat |
| Operator | general aviation : instructional |
| Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear |
| Flight Phase | descent : approach |
| Route In Use | enroute : on vectors |
| Flight Plan | None |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Operator | other |
| Make Model Name | Helicopter |
| Flight Phase | ground other : taxi other |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | Other |
| Function | observation : passenger |
| Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 46 flight time total : 255 flight time type : 33 |
| ASRS Report | 193988 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | Other |
| Function | flight crew : single pilot |
| Qualification | pilot : private |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe incursion : runway non adherence : clearance other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | other other : unspecified cockpit |
| Resolutory Action | other |
| Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
I was a passenger sitting in the front right seat on a training flight from sat to one of the local practice areas to do some maneuvers. We then proceeded to a local airport to do some practice lndgs. We then departed this airport to return to the airport where the flight originated. We were climbing up to 2500 ft MSL and contacted the approach controller. The controller acknowledged us, gave us a heading of 300 degrees and to maintain 2500 ft. While we were proceeding as instructed, I noticed that the controller was having trouble with an aircraft that was too high for the turn to final, and then the controller advised him to begin a descent. The controller then told us that we were to be #2 for landing behind the aircraft that was high on final. We acknowledged the call and called the traffic in sight. The controller then told us to turn to a heading of 360 degrees for spacing, and advised us to keep best forward speed to the airport because of jet traffic to follow. Again, we acknowledged and complied. We were then handed off to tower for final clearance to land. As soon as we selected the proper frequency, we heard the tower controller giving directions to 3 military helicopters that had landed on the north side of the airport and were hover taxiing to the south side to park. We called the tower and advised them that we were inbound for runway 3. The tower acknowledged us, but did not give us clearance to land. All the while, we were maintaining out last heading right toward the approach end of runway 3, and our best forward speed. As we got closer to the runway, we finally called to make sure that we were cleared to land. The controller gave us clearance to land on runway 3, and then returned to giving 'left turn, right turn' directions to the 3 helicopters. The pilot began to slow the aircraft to approach speed and configured it with gear and flaps down. By this time, the 3 helicopters were parallel to runway 3, and were hover taxiing above a taxiway. While we were on short final, I heard the controller tell the helicopter pilot to make sure and stay on the north side of runway 3 because of landing traffic. While the controller was giving these instructions, I witnessed the helicopter turn 90 degrees and began to slowly move toward runway 3. I told the PF to watch the helicopter in case he crossed the runway, in which case we'd have to go around. The controller then repeated his prior instruction to the helicopter. By that time the helicopter rotor blades had crossed the runway plane. The helicopter then began an abrupt and immediate reversal to get away from the runway. The helicopter's fuselage never crossed onto the runway, the rotor blades had clearly done so. The PF then notified the tower that 'we have a problem here', the tower then gave us a go around instruction and a heading to turn to be resequenced. At no time did I feel that we were in danger or were about to hit the helicopter, but the helicopter's rotor did cross the runway and caused us enough concern to decide that we were not going to land. Once we had landed, we were told to call the tower once we shut down. We called, and the controller asked us if we had seen the helicopter cross onto the runway. The controller had already talked to the helicopter pilot, and he said that he had not crossed onto the runway. We told him what we saw, and told him that we were planning to go around just before he instructed us to do so. I believe that it was a combination of being brought in too closely by the approach controller, and the tower controller being distracted by having to verbally direct the army helicopters. There was almost no time for the tower controller to properly space us to land because of being brought in so close. I think that the tower controller had us farther out than we actually were. I also felt that the helicopter pilot should have been more aware of where he was and been more attentive to the tower's instructions. I felt that I could have been more assertive in getting clearance and letting the tower controller know that we were flying a little tighter than normal. This was a simple case of a controller being overloaded with too many distrs. Luckily, the controller caught it before anything serious happened, and nobody got hurt. I've chalked this up as a learning experience.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: TRAINING FLT FORCED TO GAR DUE MIL HELI DIVERSION FROM CLRNC.
Narrative: I WAS A PAX SITTING IN THE FRONT R SEAT ON A TRAINING FLT FROM SAT TO ONE OF THE LCL PRACTICE AREAS TO DO SOME MANEUVERS. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO A LCL ARPT TO DO SOME PRACTICE LNDGS. WE THEN DEPARTED THIS ARPT TO RETURN TO THE ARPT WHERE THE FLT ORIGINATED. WE WERE CLBING UP TO 2500 FT MSL AND CONTACTED THE APCH CTLR. THE CTLR ACKNOWLEDGED US, GAVE US A HDG OF 300 DEGS AND TO MAINTAIN 2500 FT. WHILE WE WERE PROCEEDING AS INSTRUCTED, I NOTICED THAT THE CTLR WAS HAVING TROUBLE WITH AN ACFT THAT WAS TOO HIGH FOR THE TURN TO FINAL, AND THEN THE CTLR ADVISED HIM TO BEGIN A DSCNT. THE CTLR THEN TOLD US THAT WE WERE TO BE #2 FOR LNDG BEHIND THE ACFT THAT WAS HIGH ON FINAL. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CALL AND CALLED THE TFC IN SIGHT. THE CTLR THEN TOLD US TO TURN TO A HDG OF 360 DEGS FOR SPACING, AND ADVISED US TO KEEP BEST FORWARD SPD TO THE ARPT BECAUSE OF JET TFC TO FOLLOW. AGAIN, WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND COMPLIED. WE WERE THEN HANDED OFF TO TWR FOR FINAL CLRNC TO LAND. AS SOON AS WE SELECTED THE PROPER FREQ, WE HEARD THE TWR CTLR GIVING DIRECTIONS TO 3 MIL HELIS THAT HAD LANDED ON THE N SIDE OF THE ARPT AND WERE HOVER TAXIING TO THE S SIDE TO PARK. WE CALLED THE TWR AND ADVISED THEM THAT WE WERE INBOUND FOR RWY 3. THE TWR ACKNOWLEDGED US, BUT DID NOT GIVE US CLRNC TO LAND. ALL THE WHILE, WE WERE MAINTAINING OUT LAST HDG RIGHT TOWARD THE APCH END OF RWY 3, AND OUR BEST FORWARD SPD. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO THE RWY, WE FINALLY CALLED TO MAKE SURE THAT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. THE CTLR GAVE US CLRNC TO LAND ON RWY 3, AND THEN RETURNED TO GIVING 'L TURN, R TURN' DIRECTIONS TO THE 3 HELIS. THE PLT BEGAN TO SLOW THE ACFT TO APCH SPD AND CONFIGURED IT WITH GEAR AND FLAPS DOWN. BY THIS TIME, THE 3 HELIS WERE PARALLEL TO RWY 3, AND WERE HOVER TAXIING ABOVE A TAXIWAY. WHILE WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL, I HEARD THE CTLR TELL THE HELI PLT TO MAKE SURE AND STAY ON THE N SIDE OF RWY 3 BECAUSE OF LNDG TFC. WHILE THE CTLR WAS GIVING THESE INSTRUCTIONS, I WITNESSED THE HELI TURN 90 DEGS AND BEGAN TO SLOWLY MOVE TOWARD RWY 3. I TOLD THE PF TO WATCH THE HELI IN CASE HE CROSSED THE RWY, IN WHICH CASE WE'D HAVE TO GAR. THE CTLR THEN REPEATED HIS PRIOR INSTRUCTION TO THE HELI. BY THAT TIME THE HELI ROTOR BLADES HAD CROSSED THE RWY PLANE. THE HELI THEN BEGAN AN ABRUPT AND IMMEDIATE REVERSAL TO GET AWAY FROM THE RWY. THE HELI'S FUSELAGE NEVER CROSSED ONTO THE RWY, THE ROTOR BLADES HAD CLRLY DONE SO. THE PF THEN NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT 'WE HAVE A PROBLEM HERE', THE TWR THEN GAVE US A GAR INSTRUCTION AND A HDG TO TURN TO BE RESEQUENCED. AT NO TIME DID I FEEL THAT WE WERE IN DANGER OR WERE ABOUT TO HIT THE HELI, BUT THE HELI'S ROTOR DID CROSS THE RWY AND CAUSED US ENOUGH CONCERN TO DECIDE THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO LAND. ONCE WE HAD LANDED, WE WERE TOLD TO CALL THE TWR ONCE WE SHUT DOWN. WE CALLED, AND THE CTLR ASKED US IF WE HAD SEEN THE HELI CROSS ONTO THE RWY. THE CTLR HAD ALREADY TALKED TO THE HELI PLT, AND HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT CROSSED ONTO THE RWY. WE TOLD HIM WHAT WE SAW, AND TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE PLANNING TO GAR JUST BEFORE HE INSTRUCTED US TO DO SO. I BELIEVE THAT IT WAS A COMBINATION OF BEING BROUGHT IN TOO CLOSELY BY THE APCH CTLR, AND THE TWR CTLR BEING DISTRACTED BY HAVING TO VERBALLY DIRECT THE ARMY HELIS. THERE WAS ALMOST NO TIME FOR THE TWR CTLR TO PROPERLY SPACE US TO LAND BECAUSE OF BEING BROUGHT IN SO CLOSE. I THINK THAT THE TWR CTLR HAD US FARTHER OUT THAN WE ACTUALLY WERE. I ALSO FELT THAT THE HELI PLT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AWARE OF WHERE HE WAS AND BEEN MORE ATTENTIVE TO THE TWR'S INSTRUCTIONS. I FELT THAT I COULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE IN GETTING CLRNC AND LETTING THE TWR CTLR KNOW THAT WE WERE FLYING A LITTLE TIGHTER THAN NORMAL. THIS WAS A SIMPLE CASE OF A CTLR BEING OVERLOADED WITH TOO MANY DISTRS. LUCKILY, THE CTLR CAUGHT IT BEFORE ANYTHING SERIOUS HAPPENED, AND NOBODY GOT HURT. I'VE CHALKED THIS UP AS A LEARNING EXPERIENCE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.