|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : iad|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Controlling Facilities||artcc : zid|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||ground : preflight|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
pilot : flight engineer
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 160|
flight time total : 11400
flight time type : 4511
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : commercial|
pilot : instrument
|Anomaly||non adherence : published procedure|
non adherence : far
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||Pilot Deviation|
The flight was flown from iad to msp with 2 flight attendants (flight attendant's) when 3 are required for the airplane. Several factors led to this occurrence. First, the original equipment scheduled for the flight, an medium large transport required only 2 flight attendant's, but when the aircraft arrived, an equipment substitution had been made to an medium large transport B. Originally a 100 seat airplane, it had been reconfigured to hold 112 passengers. We have very few medium large transport B and fly one maybe once every month. The cockpit in this was no different than a and gave little clue that an equipment substitution had been made. Another factor was the company's procedure of providing extra flight attendants on certain flts. A common crew of 2 flight attendants is normal with additional flight attendant's showing up during the day as meal service on aircraft requirements or flight attendant positioning requirements dictate. An extra flight attendant should have been on the aircraft when it arrived. Another factor was the late operation of the flight. A quick turn around of the aircraft kept us all very busy trying to get ready to go, with little time for contemplating the need for an extra flight attendant, or for realizing that an extra had not arrived with the aircraft. (They sometimes disappear for a while to smoke, make phone calls, eat a snack, use restroom, etc). Another factor, and maybe the most important for the cockpit crew, was the msp WX. We were headed back to the worst snow storm in msp history. Having operated through there the previous day (the first day of the storm), I was very much preoccupied with visions of the previous days exciting approach and landing. Our final paperwork showed 3 flight attendant's on board, and the copilot later stated that he thought that we had 3, but that the extra had not had time to make it to the cockpit to say hello. The lead flight attendant of our crew should have protested loud and long about being short crew, but both flight attendant's failed to adjust to the equipment change, and with only 44 passengers on board, no emergency bells were ringing in their heads. Crew scheduling and/or the crew coordinator played their part in not scheduling an extra for us, but again, the storm in msp had time in near panic trying to keep up with no-shows, cancellations, and diversions. The mistake was not caught until we arrived in msp and tried to find out third flight attendant so that we could continue the next leg. Another lesson learned the hard way!
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SHORT 1 CAB DUE TO EQUIP CHANGE.
Narrative: THE FLT WAS FLOWN FROM IAD TO MSP WITH 2 FLT ATTENDANTS (FA'S) WHEN 3 ARE REQUIRED FOR THE AIRPLANE. SEVERAL FACTORS LED TO THIS OCCURRENCE. FIRST, THE ORIGINAL EQUIP SCHEDULED FOR THE FLT, AN MLG REQUIRED ONLY 2 FA'S, BUT WHEN THE ACFT ARRIVED, AN EQUIP SUBSTITUTION HAD BEEN MADE TO AN MLG B. ORIGINALLY A 100 SEAT AIRPLANE, IT HAD BEEN RECONFIGURED TO HOLD 112 PASSENGERS. WE HAVE VERY FEW MLG B AND FLY ONE MAYBE ONCE EVERY MONTH. THE COCKPIT IN THIS WAS NO DIFFERENT THAN A AND GAVE LITTLE CLUE THAT AN EQUIP SUBSTITUTION HAD BEEN MADE. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THE COMPANY'S PROC OF PROVIDING EXTRA FLT ATTENDANTS ON CERTAIN FLTS. A COMMON CREW OF 2 FLT ATTENDANTS IS NORMAL WITH ADDITIONAL FA'S SHOWING UP DURING THE DAY AS MEAL SVC ON ACFT REQUIREMENTS OR FA POSITIONING REQUIREMENTS DICTATE. AN EXTRA FA SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE ACFT WHEN IT ARRIVED. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THE LATE OP OF THE FLT. A QUICK TURN AROUND OF THE ACFT KEPT US ALL VERY BUSY TRYING TO GET READY TO GO, WITH LITTLE TIME FOR CONTEMPLATING THE NEED FOR AN EXTRA FA, OR FOR REALIZING THAT AN EXTRA HAD NOT ARRIVED WITH THE ACFT. (THEY SOMETIMES DISAPPEAR FOR A WHILE TO SMOKE, MAKE PHONE CALLS, EAT A SNACK, USE RESTROOM, ETC). ANOTHER FACTOR, AND MAYBE THE MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE COCKPIT CREW, WAS THE MSP WX. WE WERE HEADED BACK TO THE WORST SNOW STORM IN MSP HISTORY. HAVING OPERATED THROUGH THERE THE PREVIOUS DAY (THE FIRST DAY OF THE STORM), I WAS VERY MUCH PREOCCUPIED WITH VISIONS OF THE PREVIOUS DAYS EXCITING APCH AND LNDG. OUR FINAL PAPERWORK SHOWED 3 FA'S ON BOARD, AND THE COPLT LATER STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WE HAD 3, BUT THAT THE EXTRA HAD NOT HAD TIME TO MAKE IT TO THE COCKPIT TO SAY HELLO. THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT OF OUR CREW SHOULD HAVE PROTESTED LOUD AND LONG ABOUT BEING SHORT CREW, BUT BOTH FA'S FAILED TO ADJUST TO THE EQUIP CHANGE, AND WITH ONLY 44 PASSENGERS ON BOARD, NO EMER BELLS WERE RINGING IN THEIR HEADS. CREW SCHEDULING AND/OR THE CREW COORDINATOR PLAYED THEIR PART IN NOT SCHEDULING AN EXTRA FOR US, BUT AGAIN, THE STORM IN MSP HAD TIME IN NEAR PANIC TRYING TO KEEP UP WITH NO-SHOWS, CANCELLATIONS, AND DIVERSIONS. THE MISTAKE WAS NOT CAUGHT UNTIL WE ARRIVED IN MSP AND TRIED TO FIND OUT THIRD FA SO THAT WE COULD CONTINUE THE NEXT LEG. ANOTHER LESSON LEARNED THE HARD WAY!
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.