Narrative:

Upon arrival to aircraft we found it to be snow covered with propeller ties pitot/static covers, gear pins and engine plugs all in place. The aircraft walk around inspection was completed by both crew members and all preflight cockpit checks were accomplished per the FARS, gom and afm. Once deicing of the aircraft was completed by ground personnel at the mqt station both crew members visually inspected all visible surface and found them to be free and clear of ice and snow with excess deice fluid dripping from all surfaces. It was the first officer's takeoff with icing speeds bugged and flown with level (2) ice equipment on and used. Prior to our decision speed we noted no discernable problems with the flight controls. At our rotation speed (vr) the aircraft pitched up rapidly and we received a momentary aural stall indication which only lasted 1 second or so. The first officer noted to me that the aircraft was requiring an excessive amount of forward elevator pressure and small but constant amounts of nose down trim to maintain a normal climb out pitch. We then completed the climb checks at which time I noted that the pitch trim was maxed out, full nose down. We contacted sawyer approach control and advised them we needed to return to mqi due to a pitch trim problem with the aircraft. We had sawyer approach call out the crash fire rescue equipment equipment at mqt and did not declare an emergency due to the fact that we had the aircraft configured for landing and under control. On a final note, continuous short bursts of nose down trim proved ineffective in minimizing the amount of forward elevator pressure needed to hold the aircraft. In a standard/normal climb out attitude. It took both pilots applying forward control pressure to level the aircraft off at 5000 MSL. We slowed to configure the aircraft for landing which helped to minimize forward control pressure enough for me, the captain, to fly alone while the first officer ran the checklist. The descent and landing proved uneventful and quite normal considering our situation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Post flight inspection and safety meetings with ground people indicated that the deicing fluid had been shot in the air to fall on the stabilizer trim and elevators but no way to inspect the upper surfaces. Procedure has been changed and cherry picker type deicing equipment will be used so that upper surfaces can by viewed and inspected for icing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UPON LIFT OFF AND CLB ACFT WAS NOSE UP DESPITE FULL TRIM DOWN. ACFT DIFFICULT TO CTL LONGITUDINALLY. FLC RETURNED AND LANDED.

Narrative: UPON ARR TO ACFT WE FOUND IT TO BE SNOW COVERED WITH PROP TIES PITOT/STATIC COVERS, GEAR PINS AND ENG PLUGS ALL IN PLACE. THE ACFT WALK AROUND INSPECTION WAS COMPLETED BY BOTH CREW MEMBERS AND ALL PREFLT COCKPIT CHKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED PER THE FARS, GOM AND AFM. ONCE DEICING OF THE ACFT WAS COMPLETED BY GND PERSONNEL AT THE MQT STATION BOTH CREW MEMBERS VISUALLY INSPECTED ALL VISIBLE SURFACE AND FOUND THEM TO BE FREE AND CLR OF ICE AND SNOW WITH EXCESS DEICE FLUID DRIPPING FROM ALL SURFACES. IT WAS THE FO'S TKOF WITH ICING SPDS BUGGED AND FLOWN WITH LEVEL (2) ICE EQUIP ON AND USED. PRIOR TO OUR DECISION SPD WE NOTED NO DISCERNABLE PROBLEMS WITH THE FLT CTLS. AT OUR ROTATION SPD (VR) THE ACFT PITCHED UP RAPIDLY AND WE RECEIVED A MOMENTARY AURAL STALL INDICATION WHICH ONLY LASTED 1 SECOND OR SO. THE FO NOTED TO ME THAT THE ACFT WAS REQUIRING AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF FORWARD ELEVATOR PRESSURE AND SMALL BUT CONSTANT AMOUNTS OF NOSE DOWN TRIM TO MAINTAIN A NORMAL CLBOUT PITCH. WE THEN COMPLETED THE CLB CHKS AT WHICH TIME I NOTED THAT THE PITCH TRIM WAS MAXED OUT, FULL NOSE DOWN. WE CONTACTED SAWYER APCH CTL AND ADVISED THEM WE NEEDED TO RETURN TO MQI DUE TO A PITCH TRIM PROBLEM WITH THE ACFT. WE HAD SAWYER APCH CALL OUT THE CFR EQUIP AT MQT AND DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE HAD THE ACFT CONFIGURED FOR LNDG AND UNDER CTL. ON A FINAL NOTE, CONTINUOUS SHORT BURSTS OF NOSE DOWN TRIM PROVED INEFFECTIVE IN MINIMIZING THE AMOUNT OF FORWARD ELEVATOR PRESSURE NEEDED TO HOLD THE ACFT. IN A STANDARD/NORMAL CLBOUT ATTITUDE. IT TOOK BOTH PLTS APPLYING FORWARD CTL PRESSURE TO LEVEL THE ACFT OFF AT 5000 MSL. WE SLOWED TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR LNDG WHICH HELPED TO MINIMIZE FORWARD CTL PRESSURE ENOUGH FOR ME, THE CAPT, TO FLY ALONE WHILE THE FO RAN THE CHKLIST. THE DSCNT AND LNDG PROVED UNEVENTFUL AND QUITE NORMAL CONSIDERING OUR SITUATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. POST FLT INSPECTION AND SAFETY MEETINGS WITH GND PEOPLE INDICATED THAT THE DEICING FLUID HAD BEEN SHOT IN THE AIR TO FALL ON THE STAB TRIM AND ELEVATORS BUT NO WAY TO INSPECT THE UPPER SURFACES. PROC HAS BEEN CHANGED AND CHERRY PICKER TYPE DEICING EQUIP WILL BE USED SO THAT UPPER SURFACES CAN BY VIEWED AND INSPECTED FOR ICING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.