Narrative:

Myself and oru flight department highest seniority pilot (PF) were crossing north atlantic between iceland and goose bay, canada. On departure from iceland we were given a climb restriction of reaching FL410 before crossing 63n030w. Upon reaching this point we had reached FL404 and could not climb higher because of aircraft weight and temperature conditions. The PF stated to me 'you are going to report FL410 aren't you?' because of cockpit tension as discussed later I followed his request and did not advise iceland control that we had not yet reached FL410. The WX at the time was clear and visibility unlimited. No other traffic had been heard on the frequency. The flight plan listed me as PIC although the captain in the left seat (PF) was a veteran with 30 plus yrs of turbojet experience versus my 2 1/2 yrs, however, I am the newly appointed supervisor of this senior pilot. The senior pilot (PF) and I had several disagreements during the trip regarding operational procedures. The majority of these centered around his perception that I was 'too conservative'...especially in overwater flight planning. He could not understand why I would use stronger than forecast winds and less than maximum cruise airspds in my calculations! My justification was that I looked at worse case situations to ensure adequate fuel reserves. Our last disagreement occurred just before takeoff from iceland when I insisted that we follow published regulations and secure a landing ppr for goose bay canada. The senior pilot resisted this, even after I gave him a copy of the regulation to review. His attitude was 'I haven't requested a ppr from goose bay for 15 yrs, I don't need 1 now!' this attitude of being 'above regulation' prevailed even when not being able to comply with our climb crossing restriction. I should have ignored his request to call FL410 and advised the controller of our situation and requested a block altitude. However, at the time, the strain in the cockpit had clouded my good judgement and I just bit my tongue and concentrated on looking for traffic as we finished our climb. I have learned 2 things from the experience: high time pilots who rely totally on past experience and do not plan for contingencies or keep abreast of current regulations/practices are unsafe. There is no room for conflict in the cockpit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TENSION IN COCKPIT. ALT XING RESTRICTION NOT MET. INACCURATE FLT PLAN FILED.

Narrative: MYSELF AND ORU FLT DEPT HIGHEST SENIORITY PLT (PF) WERE XING N ATLANTIC BTWN ICELAND AND GOOSE BAY, CANADA. ON DEP FROM ICELAND WE WERE GIVEN A CLB RESTRICTION OF REACHING FL410 BEFORE XING 63N030W. UPON REACHING THIS POINT WE HAD REACHED FL404 AND COULD NOT CLB HIGHER BECAUSE OF ACFT WEIGHT AND TEMP CONDITIONS. THE PF STATED TO ME 'YOU ARE GOING TO RPT FL410 AREN'T YOU?' BECAUSE OF COCKPIT TENSION AS DISCUSSED LATER I FOLLOWED HIS REQUEST AND DID NOT ADVISE ICELAND CTL THAT WE HAD NOT YET REACHED FL410. THE WX AT THE TIME WAS CLR AND VISIBILITY UNLIMITED. NO OTHER TFC HAD BEEN HEARD ON THE FREQ. THE FLT PLAN LISTED ME AS PIC ALTHOUGH THE CAPT IN THE L SEAT (PF) WAS A VETERAN WITH 30 PLUS YRS OF TURBOJET EXPERIENCE VERSUS MY 2 1/2 YRS, HOWEVER, I AM THE NEWLY APPOINTED SUPVR OF THIS SENIOR PLT. THE SENIOR PLT (PF) AND I HAD SEVERAL DISAGREEMENTS DURING THE TRIP REGARDING OPERATIONAL PROCS. THE MAJORITY OF THESE CENTERED AROUND HIS PERCEPTION THAT I WAS 'TOO CONSERVATIVE'...ESPECIALLY IN OVERWATER FLT PLANNING. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY I WOULD USE STRONGER THAN FORECAST WINDS AND LESS THAN MAX CRUISE AIRSPDS IN MY CALCULATIONS! MY JUSTIFICATION WAS THAT I LOOKED AT WORSE CASE SITUATIONS TO ENSURE ADEQUATE FUEL RESERVES. OUR LAST DISAGREEMENT OCCURRED JUST BEFORE TKOF FROM ICELAND WHEN I INSISTED THAT WE FOLLOW PUBLISHED REGULATIONS AND SECURE A LNDG PPR FOR GOOSE BAY CANADA. THE SENIOR PLT RESISTED THIS, EVEN AFTER I GAVE HIM A COPY OF THE REGULATION TO REVIEW. HIS ATTITUDE WAS 'I HAVEN'T REQUESTED A PPR FROM GOOSE BAY FOR 15 YRS, I DON'T NEED 1 NOW!' THIS ATTITUDE OF BEING 'ABOVE REGULATION' PREVAILED EVEN WHEN NOT BEING ABLE TO COMPLY WITH OUR CLB XING RESTRICTION. I SHOULD HAVE IGNORED HIS REQUEST TO CALL FL410 AND ADVISED THE CTLR OF OUR SITUATION AND REQUESTED A BLOCK ALT. HOWEVER, AT THE TIME, THE STRAIN IN THE COCKPIT HAD CLOUDED MY GOOD JUDGEMENT AND I JUST BIT MY TONGUE AND CONCENTRATED ON LOOKING FOR TFC AS WE FINISHED OUR CLB. I HAVE LEARNED 2 THINGS FROM THE EXPERIENCE: HIGH TIME PLTS WHO RELY TOTALLY ON PAST EXPERIENCE AND DO NOT PLAN FOR CONTINGENCIES OR KEEP ABREAST OF CURRENT REGULATIONS/PRACTICES ARE UNSAFE. THERE IS NO ROOM FOR CONFLICT IN THE COCKPIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.