Narrative:

Air carrier X gross weight mandated use of runway 33L for takeoff. Boston tower cleared air carrier X into position on runway 33L as air carrier Y landed on 33L. As we taxied onto the runway, I looked out to see air carrier Z on a 4 mi final for runway 33L. Boston tower then cleared air carrier Z aircraft to circle to land on runway 27. Air carrier Y was still on landing roll ahead of us as we stopped 'in position' for takeoff on runway 33L. I presume that boston tower anticipated that air carrier Y would turn off at one of the high speed taxiways because boston tower stated 'air carrier X, winds...(amount not remembered)...(pause)...disregard.' I noted air carrier Y was not turning and appeared to be going to the runway end. As air carrier Y finally started a left turn off the runway, tower cleared us for takeoff. The first officer made the takeoff. On takeoff roll, after power was set and the captain was calling out power settings, over the radio someone questioned landing clearance. Boston tower confirmed that the aircraft was cleared to land, 'left to right crossing traffic.' at about 90 KTS, there was a radio communication about 'go around' or 'going around' made by tower or an aircraft. The first officer looked out his right side window and had to crane his neck around to look aft towards the approach end of runway 27, looking for possible traffic. The captain could not see anything right and aft of our aircraft. The first officer stated, 'boy! Is that close!' we took no evasive action as we were at the intersection of the runways. We made a normal takeoff. After we were in the air, at a safe altitude, the first officer told me of the close proximity of air carrier Z which was going around over the top and rear of our aircraft. The first officer stated an estimated miss of 50 ft vertical and 75 ft horizontal, and that it was an light transport with red on it. (By telephone boston tower subsequently told me that it was air carrier Z.) the first officer stated that the aircraft was 'going around' from the flare. Since the approach end of 27 is behind of, and to the right of us, we lost sight of the commuter which was circling to runway 27, after we were 'in position' on 33L. After airborne, after the first officer made me aware of the closeness of the near miss, I asked boston tower, 'was that close?' tower responded 'affirmative.' I called operations and requested that the station manager contact the tower and state that 'near miss' paperwork would follow and to 'save the tapes.' tower and air carrier Z had full view of the operation (we did not) and should not have allowed it to continue to the near miss. Supplemental information from acn 188049: after air carrier Y cleared, we were cleared for takeoff, and as I brought up the power and the captain was calling out the power settings, I heard someone question their landing clearance. Boston tower came back with affirmative you will have left to right crossing traffic. I knew this could only be us. With the angle of the runways, it was extremely hard to look back over my shoulder to look for the other aircraft. When I spotted him, he was in his landing flare on 27 and we were just coming up on the intersection of 33 and 27. My decision at this time was to continue because I felt if I would have stopped, we would have hit for certain. At this point in time, I heard the word go around on the radio and the other aircraft initiated a go around. We missed by what I felt was 50-100 ft. The angle of the runways was definitely a contributing factor to our inability to see this aircraft. If I would have seen him earlier, I would never have started the takeoff roll. Since the other pilot questioned his landing clearance and had a better view of us, I feel he should have initiated his go around earlier.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR Z HAD NMAC AND LTSS WITH ACR X. MULTIPLE RWY OP INTERSECTING RWYS.

Narrative: ACR X GROSS WT MANDATED USE OF RWY 33L FOR TKOF. BOSTON TWR CLRED ACR X INTO POS ON RWY 33L AS ACR Y LANDED ON 33L. AS WE TAXIED ONTO THE RWY, I LOOKED OUT TO SEE ACR Z ON A 4 MI FINAL FOR RWY 33L. BOSTON TWR THEN CLRED ACR Z ACFT TO CIRCLE TO LAND ON RWY 27. ACR Y WAS STILL ON LNDG ROLL AHEAD OF US AS WE STOPPED 'IN POS' FOR TKOF ON RWY 33L. I PRESUME THAT BOSTON TWR ANTICIPATED THAT ACR Y WOULD TURN OFF AT ONE OF THE HIGH SPD TAXIWAYS BECAUSE BOSTON TWR STATED 'ACR X, WINDS...(AMOUNT NOT REMEMBERED)...(PAUSE)...DISREGARD.' I NOTED ACR Y WAS NOT TURNING AND APPEARED TO BE GOING TO THE RWY END. AS ACR Y FINALLY STARTED A L TURN OFF THE RWY, TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF. THE FO MADE THE TKOF. ON TKOF ROLL, AFTER PWR WAS SET AND THE CAPT WAS CALLING OUT PWR SETTINGS, OVER THE RADIO SOMEONE QUESTIONED LNDG CLRNC. BOSTON TWR CONFIRMED THAT THE ACFT WAS CLRED TO LAND, 'L TO R XING TFC.' AT ABOUT 90 KTS, THERE WAS A RADIO COM ABOUT 'GAR' OR 'GOING AROUND' MADE BY TWR OR AN ACFT. THE FO LOOKED OUT HIS R SIDE WINDOW AND HAD TO CRANE HIS NECK AROUND TO LOOK AFT TOWARDS THE APCH END OF RWY 27, LOOKING FOR POSSIBLE TFC. THE CAPT COULD NOT SEE ANYTHING R AND AFT OF OUR ACFT. THE FO STATED, 'BOY! IS THAT CLOSE!' WE TOOK NO EVASIVE ACTION AS WE WERE AT THE INTXN OF THE RWYS. WE MADE A NORMAL TKOF. AFTER WE WERE IN THE AIR, AT A SAFE ALT, THE FO TOLD ME OF THE CLOSE PROX OF ACR Z WHICH WAS GOING AROUND OVER THE TOP AND REAR OF OUR ACFT. THE FO STATED AN ESTIMATED MISS OF 50 FT VERT AND 75 FT HORIZ, AND THAT IT WAS AN LTT WITH RED ON IT. (BY TELEPHONE BOSTON TWR SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT IT WAS ACR Z.) THE FO STATED THAT THE ACFT WAS 'GOING AROUND' FROM THE FLARE. SINCE THE APCH END OF 27 IS BEHIND OF, AND TO THE R OF US, WE LOST SIGHT OF THE COMMUTER WHICH WAS CIRCLING TO RWY 27, AFTER WE WERE 'IN POS' ON 33L. AFTER AIRBORNE, AFTER THE FO MADE ME AWARE OF THE CLOSENESS OF THE NEAR MISS, I ASKED BOSTON TWR, 'WAS THAT CLOSE?' TWR RESPONDED 'AFFIRMATIVE.' I CALLED OPS AND REQUESTED THAT THE STATION MGR CONTACT THE TWR AND STATE THAT 'NEAR MISS' PAPERWORK WOULD FOLLOW AND TO 'SAVE THE TAPES.' TWR AND ACR Z HAD FULL VIEW OF THE OP (WE DID NOT) AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED IT TO CONTINUE TO THE NEAR MISS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 188049: AFTER ACR Y CLRED, WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, AND AS I BROUGHT UP THE PWR AND THE CAPT WAS CALLING OUT THE PWR SETTINGS, I HEARD SOMEONE QUESTION THEIR LNDG CLRNC. BOSTON TWR CAME BACK WITH AFFIRMATIVE YOU WILL HAVE L TO R XING TFC. I KNEW THIS COULD ONLY BE US. WITH THE ANGLE OF THE RWYS, IT WAS EXTREMELY HARD TO LOOK BACK OVER MY SHOULDER TO LOOK FOR THE OTHER ACFT. WHEN I SPOTTED HIM, HE WAS IN HIS LNDG FLARE ON 27 AND WE WERE JUST COMING UP ON THE INTXN OF 33 AND 27. MY DECISION AT THIS TIME WAS TO CONTINUE BECAUSE I FELT IF I WOULD HAVE STOPPED, WE WOULD HAVE HIT FOR CERTAIN. AT THIS POINT IN TIME, I HEARD THE WORD GAR ON THE RADIO AND THE OTHER ACFT INITIATED A GAR. WE MISSED BY WHAT I FELT WAS 50-100 FT. THE ANGLE OF THE RWYS WAS DEFINITELY A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO OUR INABILITY TO SEE THIS ACFT. IF I WOULD HAVE SEEN HIM EARLIER, I WOULD NEVER HAVE STARTED THE TKOF ROLL. SINCE THE OTHER PLT QUESTIONED HIS LNDG CLRNC AND HAD A BETTER VIEW OF US, I FEEL HE SHOULD HAVE INITIATED HIS GAR EARLIER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.