Narrative:

After takeoff from 7v1 both bleed air hot lights came on and the master caution sounded. I turned both bleed air switches off and made an immediate 180 degree turn back to the airport with the intention of landing. Due to the high density altitude, I was carrying a little extra power during the landing. At the last possible moment, and only after I had reduced the power further, the gear warning sounded alerting me to the fact that I had forgot to put the gear down. I immediately aborted the landing, applied full power and commenced a go around. With the master caution still sounding and the warning lights still on I turned back toward the airport. In the excitement I overbanked the aircraft and ended up loosing some altitude and turning in too close to the field. I ended up making right traffic this time for the runway, and continued to try and gain altitude. During final approach this time the right bleed air hot light went out, and the master caution quit sounding. During the roundout the other light went out, and I elected to abort the landing and continue on to aspen where there would be repair facilities. This entire event could have been avoided if I had not allowed the warning system to affect my judgement. During the excitement of trying to determine the cause of and correct the warning light I allowed myself to concentrate too much on the cockpit and not maintain full control of the aircraft. This nearly ended up in a gear up landing, and caused me to execute improper traffic pattern procedures, poor aircraft control, and improper selection of communication frequencys. Had I simply continued a normal departure and ignored the warning system, the bleed air duct being hot probably would not have caused any problems. I could have avoided this event entirely. The combination of trying to fly the aircraft in a high density altitude situation, while not maintaining proper traffic pattern scan and procedures could very easily have ended up in a disaster.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 ENG SMT JET ON TKOF ILLUMINATED BOTH HOT AIR DUCT LIGHTS. PLT ON SHORT FINAL REALIZED GEAR WAS NOT DOWN, WENT AROUND BUT POOR CTL OF ACFT MANGLED THE TFC PATTERN. LIGHTS WENT OUT. FLT PROCEEDED TO ASPEN.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF FROM 7V1 BOTH BLEED AIR HOT LIGHTS CAME ON AND THE MASTER CAUTION SOUNDED. I TURNED BOTH BLEED AIR SWITCHES OFF AND MADE AN IMMEDIATE 180 DEG TURN BACK TO THE ARPT WITH THE INTENTION OF LNDG. DUE TO THE HIGH DENSITY ALT, I WAS CARRYING A LITTLE EXTRA PWR DURING THE LNDG. AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT, AND ONLY AFTER I HAD REDUCED THE PWR FURTHER, THE GEAR WARNING SOUNDED ALERTING ME TO THE FACT THAT I HAD FORGOT TO PUT THE GEAR DOWN. I IMMEDIATELY ABORTED THE LNDG, APPLIED FULL PWR AND COMMENCED A GAR. WITH THE MASTER CAUTION STILL SOUNDING AND THE WARNING LIGHTS STILL ON I TURNED BACK TOWARD THE ARPT. IN THE EXCITEMENT I OVERBANKED THE ACFT AND ENDED UP LOOSING SOME ALT AND TURNING IN TOO CLOSE TO THE FIELD. I ENDED UP MAKING R TFC THIS TIME FOR THE RWY, AND CONTINUED TO TRY AND GAIN ALT. DURING FINAL APCH THIS TIME THE R BLEED AIR HOT LIGHT WENT OUT, AND THE MASTER CAUTION QUIT SOUNDING. DURING THE ROUNDOUT THE OTHER LIGHT WENT OUT, AND I ELECTED TO ABORT THE LNDG AND CONTINUE ON TO ASPEN WHERE THERE WOULD BE REPAIR FACILITIES. THIS ENTIRE EVENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF I HAD NOT ALLOWED THE WARNING SYS TO AFFECT MY JUDGEMENT. DURING THE EXCITEMENT OF TRYING TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF AND CORRECT THE WARNING LIGHT I ALLOWED MYSELF TO CONCENTRATE TOO MUCH ON THE COCKPIT AND NOT MAINTAIN FULL CTL OF THE ACFT. THIS NEARLY ENDED UP IN A GEAR UP LNDG, AND CAUSED ME TO EXECUTE IMPROPER TFC PATTERN PROCS, POOR ACFT CTL, AND IMPROPER SELECTION OF COM FREQS. HAD I SIMPLY CONTINUED A NORMAL DEP AND IGNORED THE WARNING SYS, THE BLEED AIR DUCT BEING HOT PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE CAUSED ANY PROBLEMS. I COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS EVENT ENTIRELY. THE COMBINATION OF TRYING TO FLY THE ACFT IN A HIGH DENSITY ALT SITUATION, WHILE NOT MAINTAINING PROPER TFC PATTERN SCAN AND PROCS COULD VERY EASILY HAVE ENDED UP IN A DISASTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.