Narrative:

During engine start of the #1 engine it was noticed that the start switch would not engage. The start valve circuit breaker was popped. It was reset and a start attempt was again tried. Company mechanic was called. They called a contract mechanic person. The captain then troubleshot the problem with instructions from company mechanic. We discovered that the start switch in the cockpit was the problem. When the contract mechanic person arrived he talked to our company mechanic and then we started the engine by manually opening the start valve. We called for and received a new release time from company dispatcher. Neither we, nor the dispatcher thought to consult the MEL at that time. The contract mechanic person signed off the write-up and we flew to a station with the part to be fixed. We consulted the MEL the next morning and discovered the switch would be required to aid an in-flight restart in a number of cases. The captain talked with mechanic at least 3 times, I talked to dispatch for a new release time with no mention at any time about the MEL. We had kept the passengers and company informed and had completed the required maintenance, but forgot inadvertently to consult the MEL. I will always remember to consult it now. Supplemental information from acn 183963. In looking back there were several contributing factors: I did not take advantage of the experience available to me in my well qualified first officer, poor cockpit resource management. Assuming maintenance control was keeping dispatch informed of the problem. If they were I would never have been issued a new release time since dispatch was impossible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WITH START SWITCH PROBLEM, AN MEL ITEM, DEPARTS USING TEMPORARY FIX.

Narrative: DURING ENG START OF THE #1 ENG IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE START SWITCH WOULD NOT ENGAGE. THE START VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS POPPED. IT WAS RESET AND A START ATTEMPT WAS AGAIN TRIED. COMPANY MECH WAS CALLED. THEY CALLED A CONTRACT MECH PERSON. THE CAPT THEN TROUBLESHOT THE PROBLEM WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM COMPANY MECH. WE DISCOVERED THAT THE START SWITCH IN THE COCKPIT WAS THE PROBLEM. WHEN THE CONTRACT MECH PERSON ARRIVED HE TALKED TO OUR COMPANY MECH AND THEN WE STARTED THE ENG BY MANUALLY OPENING THE START VALVE. WE CALLED FOR AND RECEIVED A NEW RELEASE TIME FROM COMPANY DISPATCHER. NEITHER WE, NOR THE DISPATCHER THOUGHT TO CONSULT THE MEL AT THAT TIME. THE CONTRACT MECH PERSON SIGNED OFF THE WRITE-UP AND WE FLEW TO A STATION WITH THE PART TO BE FIXED. WE CONSULTED THE MEL THE NEXT MORNING AND DISCOVERED THE SWITCH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO AID AN INFLT RESTART IN A NUMBER OF CASES. THE CAPT TALKED WITH MECH AT LEAST 3 TIMES, I TALKED TO DISPATCH FOR A NEW RELEASE TIME WITH NO MENTION AT ANY TIME ABOUT THE MEL. WE HAD KEPT THE PAXS AND COMPANY INFORMED AND HAD COMPLETED THE REQUIRED MAINT, BUT FORGOT INADVERTENTLY TO CONSULT THE MEL. I WILL ALWAYS REMEMBER TO CONSULT IT NOW. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 183963. IN LOOKING BACK THERE WERE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: I DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXPERIENCE AVAILABLE TO ME IN MY WELL QUALIFIED FO, POOR COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT. ASSUMING MAINT CTL WAS KEEPING DISPATCH INFORMED OF THE PROBLEM. IF THEY WERE I WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ISSUED A NEW RELEASE TIME SINCE DISPATCH WAS IMPOSSIBLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.