Narrative:

Confusion created by not selecting the correct transponder code, created a chain of events that led to the conflict. I could even see how these events were unfolding and was telling myself to break the chain, undertake the task at hand, and get back in the groove. But things were happening fast, and the distraction of trying to focus on the unfolding scenario simply led to more confusion. So here's the story... In my zest to become more knowledgeable about duties that may become bestowed upon me one day when I upgrade to captain, I am undertaking responsibilities not assigned a first officer by company policy. This compromises my responsibilities which the captain may or may not assist me in. In this case I was allowed to work out a manifest. I hastily received the clearance, but did not select the new transponder code: I returned to checking the manifest for errors which the captain checked (and found a couple misakes) and signed. We left the gate, and performed the checklist. A thorough briefing of the SID may have led to a controller inquiry (by us), which may have avoided the conflict. After departure, the approach controller told us he had radar contact and to identify. He then informed us of the correct squawk and to set it, and to climb to 6000. The captain acknowledged, then left the frequency to call company to give off times for flight locating purposes. We were now on the '175 degree heading for radar vectors to musel intersection,'...portion of the SID. However we received no radar vectors. Since we got the wrong squawk, I was a little concerned, I didn't want to screw up any more. We were not approaching the '...thence via transition'...(seal beach transition) portion of the SID which required a 155 degree turn to join R-150 from sli. I didn't want to turn too early and roll out was early; I didn't want to screw up. So using DME information from sli I started the turn at 18 DME, the intersection being at 19 DME. I figured that was a pretty good compromise. But I wasn't thinking about the '... For radar vectors...' portion of the SID. To the best of my recollection I had not received a radar vector and really did not expect one. So I began the turn to sli to intercept the radial. About 100 degrees into the turn the controller asked our heading. The captain (now back on frequency) responded, '...turning through 290 degrees.' I told the captain I was intercepting the transition. Controller responded something about not assigning that heading and to turn left to 190 degree, which I immediately began to do. About halfway through that turn controller called out company at 4 O'clock 5000 ft, and sure enough there they were, about 2000 ft away, and they passed behind us. A few turns later, a clearance to filed altitude, and a missed frequency change, we were on our way, the rest of the trip being uneventful. I can't sign off without saying that fatigue may have contributed to this. I had house guests who stayed up late and were noisy the night before. I tried to turn in early, but anxiety about not getting enough sleep probably compounded my sleeplessness. I find that fatigue compromises my ability to act as a crew member very noticeably, both subjectively and objectively.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POTENTIAL CONFLICT LTSS.

Narrative: CONFUSION CREATED BY NOT SELECTING THE CORRECT XPONDER CODE, CREATED A CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE CONFLICT. I COULD EVEN SEE HOW THESE EVENTS WERE UNFOLDING AND WAS TELLING MYSELF TO BREAK THE CHAIN, UNDERTAKE THE TASK AT HAND, AND GET BACK IN THE GROOVE. BUT THINGS WERE HAPPENING FAST, AND THE DISTR OF TRYING TO FOCUS ON THE UNFOLDING SCENARIO SIMPLY LED TO MORE CONFUSION. SO HERE'S THE STORY... IN MY ZEST TO BECOME MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT DUTIES THAT MAY BECOME BESTOWED UPON ME ONE DAY WHEN I UPGRADE TO CAPT, I AM UNDERTAKING RESPONSIBILITIES NOT ASSIGNED A FO BY COMPANY POLICY. THIS COMPROMISES MY RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH THE CAPT MAY OR MAY NOT ASSIST ME IN. IN THIS CASE I WAS ALLOWED TO WORK OUT A MANIFEST. I HASTILY RECEIVED THE CLRNC, BUT DID NOT SELECT THE NEW XPONDER CODE: I RETURNED TO CHKING THE MANIFEST FOR ERRORS WHICH THE CAPT CHKED (AND FOUND A COUPLE MISAKES) AND SIGNED. WE LEFT THE GATE, AND PERFORMED THE CHKLIST. A THOROUGH BRIEFING OF THE SID MAY HAVE LED TO A CTLR INQUIRY (BY US), WHICH MAY HAVE AVOIDED THE CONFLICT. AFTER DEP, THE APCH CTLR TOLD US HE HAD RADAR CONTACT AND TO IDENT. HE THEN INFORMED US OF THE CORRECT SQUAWK AND TO SET IT, AND TO CLB TO 6000. THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED, THEN L THE FREQ TO CALL COMPANY TO GIVE OFF TIMES FOR FLT LOCATING PURPOSES. WE WERE NOW ON THE '175 DEG HDG FOR RADAR VECTORS TO MUSEL INTXN,'...PORTION OF THE SID. HOWEVER WE RECEIVED NO RADAR VECTORS. SINCE WE GOT THE WRONG SQUAWK, I WAS A LITTLE CONCERNED, I DIDN'T WANT TO SCREW UP ANY MORE. WE WERE NOT APCHING THE '...THENCE VIA TRANSITION'...(SEAL BEACH TRANSITION) PORTION OF THE SID WHICH REQUIRED A 155 DEG TURN TO JOIN R-150 FROM SLI. I DIDN'T WANT TO TURN TOO EARLY AND ROLL OUT WAS EARLY; I DIDN'T WANT TO SCREW UP. SO USING DME INFO FROM SLI I STARTED THE TURN AT 18 DME, THE INTXN BEING AT 19 DME. I FIGURED THAT WAS A PRETTY GOOD COMPROMISE. BUT I WASN'T THINKING ABOUT THE '... FOR RADAR VECTORS...' PORTION OF THE SID. TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION I HAD NOT RECEIVED A RADAR VECTOR AND REALLY DID NOT EXPECT ONE. SO I BEGAN THE TURN TO SLI TO INTERCEPT THE RADIAL. ABOUT 100 DEGS INTO THE TURN THE CTLR ASKED OUR HDG. THE CAPT (NOW BACK ON FREQ) RESPONDED, '...TURNING THROUGH 290 DEGS.' I TOLD THE CAPT I WAS INTERCEPTING THE TRANSITION. CTLR RESPONDED SOMETHING ABOUT NOT ASSIGNING THAT HDG AND TO TURN L TO 190 DEG, WHICH I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO DO. ABOUT HALFWAY THROUGH THAT TURN CTLR CALLED OUT COMPANY AT 4 O'CLOCK 5000 FT, AND SURE ENOUGH THERE THEY WERE, ABOUT 2000 FT AWAY, AND THEY PASSED BEHIND US. A FEW TURNS LATER, A CLRNC TO FILED ALT, AND A MISSED FREQ CHANGE, WE WERE ON OUR WAY, THE REST OF THE TRIP BEING UNEVENTFUL. I CAN'T SIGN OFF WITHOUT SAYING THAT FATIGUE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS. I HAD HOUSE GUESTS WHO STAYED UP LATE AND WERE NOISY THE NIGHT BEFORE. I TRIED TO TURN IN EARLY, BUT ANXIETY ABOUT NOT GETTING ENOUGH SLEEP PROBABLY COMPOUNDED MY SLEEPLESSNESS. I FIND THAT FATIGUE COMPROMISES MY ABILITY TO ACT AS A CREW MEMBER VERY NOTICEABLY, BOTH SUBJECTIVELY AND OBJECTIVELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.