Narrative:

The #2 fuel gauge froze at 33.6M# fuel and too much fuel was used from the #2 tank trying to equalize all 3 tanks. Engineer finally decided he had a gauge problem an went tank to engine on all 3 tanks. Not long after this #2 engine flamed out. We originally thought we had been shorted on our fuel load, but later realized we had proper fuel load at takeoff. After we decided the #2 tank must be empty, we followed the checklist for a restart using x-feed system and engine started and we continued to chicago and landed. We had the #2 tank checked after landing and it was empty. The refueling panel #2 gauge on outside of aircraft was indicating 33.6M# also. Conclusions: engineer failed to detect the stuck gauge until it was too late. First officer was keeping a fuel log and he failed to notify cart that his readings were becoming a great deal above flight plan fuel figures. Captain failed to monitor fuel log and fuel panel and therefore must accept the responsibility for this incident. Corrective actions: any crew member noticing anything varying from a normal situation should alert the crew. Captain should monitor all aspects of his flight and crew performance and incidents like this would never happen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB RAN THE #2 TANK DRY AND THE #2 ENGINE QUIT. GAUGE FAILURE WAS NOT DETECTED UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE THE TANK WENT DRY.

Narrative: THE #2 FUEL GAUGE FROZE AT 33.6M# FUEL AND TOO MUCH FUEL WAS USED FROM THE #2 TANK TRYING TO EQUALIZE ALL 3 TANKS. ENGINEER FINALLY DECIDED HE HAD A GAUGE PROB AN WENT TANK TO ENG ON ALL 3 TANKS. NOT LONG AFTER THIS #2 ENG FLAMED OUT. WE ORIGINALLY THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN SHORTED ON OUR FUEL LOAD, BUT LATER REALIZED WE HAD PROPER FUEL LOAD AT TKOF. AFTER WE DECIDED THE #2 TANK MUST BE EMPTY, WE FOLLOWED THE CHKLIST FOR A RESTART USING X-FEED SYS AND ENG STARTED AND WE CONTINUED TO CHICAGO AND LANDED. WE HAD THE #2 TANK CHKED AFTER LNDG AND IT WAS EMPTY. THE REFUELING PANEL #2 GAUGE ON OUTSIDE OF ACFT WAS INDICATING 33.6M# ALSO. CONCLUSIONS: ENGINEER FAILED TO DETECT THE STUCK GAUGE UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE. F/O WAS KEEPING A FUEL LOG AND HE FAILED TO NOTIFY CART THAT HIS READINGS WERE BECOMING A GREAT DEAL ABOVE FLT PLAN FUEL FIGURES. CAPT FAILED TO MONITOR FUEL LOG AND FUEL PANEL AND THEREFORE MUST ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS INCIDENT. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: ANY CREW MEMBER NOTICING ANYTHING VARYING FROM A NORMAL SITUATION SHOULD ALERT THE CREW. CAPT SHOULD MONITOR ALL ASPECTS OF HIS FLT AND CREW PERFORMANCE AND INCIDENTS LIKE THIS WOULD NEVER HAPPEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.