Narrative:

Prior to top of descent for landing at lax, on route clearance of direct pgs direct las, second officer got ATIS and passed landing data card forward. I briefed the card (WX, wind, landing weight, etc). We noted the NOTAMS from the ATIS (multiple taxiway closures and runway 19L closed). Briefed a visibility approach backed up with the ILS to what I recall runway 25L and noted that I planned to fly at or above the electronic G/south all the way down to stay above the crossing restrictions and above the floor of the TCA. Had the approach lights in sight but made a comment to the first officer that I don't like to call the airport in sight on a visibility until inside of 20 mi. Although we were still slightly outside my 20 DME window, I asked the first officer if he also had it in sight. He said he did so I said to go ahead and call it. The controller then cleared us for the visibility, but I don't remember if a specific runway was mentioned. I was apparently fixated on the approach lights that I saw and don't remember looking down at the localizer raw data inside of about 12 DME at which point it was still full scale deflection to the right. We had done the approach checklist shortly after having called the airport in sight, ie along way out. In addition to the approach lights, I remember seeing the green highspd turn off lights at taxiway A-4/B-5 illuminated on runway 25R. The cockpit was quite noisy since we had both a/C packs on longer than normal due to a pressurization leak during the previous landing at lbb. The second officer was occupied with the pressurization panel management during the approach and I don't believe he had time to look outside until well down the G/south. I started to configure at about 1800' AGL. Somewhere in this area, the second officer asked something about where the right runway was. I said something about that they had just recently opened the new runway. I thought that he had probably been to las with his prior company before the new parallel was opened and was just confused about the airport layout. I didn't pick up on what turned out to be his concern about which runway we were shooting the approach to. We were configured and stabilized at 5-600' with the landing checklist completed and made a normal landing on runway 25R. As we rolled out, I asked the first officer to check with the tower to see if we could roll to the end to make the taxi to the ramp more expeditious due to all the taxiway closures as we had discussed in the descent. The response from the tower was that we were cleared to land on runway 25L and that we had landed on runway 25R which was a closed runway. At that point, I noticed that the runway edge lights were not on. We taxied clear at the lit highspd and to the ramp. I asked the first officer to get a telephone number for the tower but they called and gave us one first. Causal factors. Runway 25R closure was not on the ATIS but runway 19L closure was even though it has been closed for a long time (at least all month that I had been flying to las). This led me to think that runway 25R was open. Runway 25R closure was not mentioned by the controllers. Subconscious feeling that NOTAMS are good for flight planning but are not necessarily current at time of arrival. Operational information is received off ATIS and/or from controllers in real time. Familiarity, I had been going into las all month and had landed and taken off only on the primary jet runway, 25R. I saw and heard what I wanted to and what I was used to. Cleared for the visibility and cleared to land a long way out. Broken habit patterns, I usually verbally confirm the landing runway during the landing checklist. I did not this time. I also usually have the approach plate on the yoke clipboard, this time it was still in my binder by the left side of my seat. Extreme fatigue compounded all of the above. I usually take a 2-3 hour nap before coming to work. This night I could not sleep and only got a 20-30 min nap. I felt quite tired and was not as alert as usual. Supplemental information from acn 182092. I still do not remember the tower clearing us to land on runway 25L. No mention on the ATIS was made of runway 25R being closed. The tower never stated to us that runway 25R was closed. As we taxiied on, we heard the tower give another aircraft a clearance as follows: 'cleared to land runway 25L, runway 25R closed, cleared to land runway 25L.' there are many things that could have precluded us landing on runway 25R, but if he had used the same terminology with us I'm sure this incident would not have happened. The approach lights and high speed turn-off for runway 25R were on, with no approach lights on for runway 25L. Fatigue was a major factor in this incident. I didn't have my radio turned to the ILS; I had the approach plate out for runway 25L and it didn't trigger a more definitive response from me, ie, calling and verifying landing clearance with the tower. These are all routine and normal actions/procedures I know I would have performed had I not been so incredibly tired. Supplemental information from acn 182081. It was a long night for the 3 of us and the aircraft was very noisey due to a 2 pack operation. I have never been into las before and the runways blended in very well with the airport surroundings. The runway 25R approach light system and runway turnoff lights were on. We were tired and very drawn to the approach light system like moths to a flame. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Callback conducted in conjunction with a structured callback study on runway incursions. Reporter said that fatigue was the primary element at work here. He admitted that there were numerous clues that any one of the flight crew members could have picked up on, but none were recognized. At the same time, he said he didn't understand why the runway 25R approach lights were on. Conditions were dawn, and the fact that the runway lights were not on was not easily recognized because it was getting lighter. He feels that ATC should have notified him of runway 25R closure and should have included that information on the ATIS. He also wonders why ATC couldn't tell that he was approaching the wrong runway and called it to his attention.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OVERNIGHT FRT CARRIER LGT ARRIVES LAS WITH EXTREMELY TIRED FLT CREW. LANDS ON RWY 25R INSTEAD OF RWY 25L AFTER VISUAL APCH. RWY 25R WAS CLOSED, BUT APCH LIGHTS WERE ON.

Narrative: PRIOR TO TOP OF DSNT FOR LNDG AT LAX, ON RTE CLRNC OF DIRECT PGS DIRECT LAS, S/O GOT ATIS AND PASSED LNDG DATA CARD FORWARD. I BRIEFED THE CARD (WX, WIND, LNDG WT, ETC). WE NOTED THE NOTAMS FROM THE ATIS (MULTIPLE TXWY CLOSURES AND RWY 19L CLOSED). BRIEFED A VIS APCH BACKED UP WITH THE ILS TO WHAT I RECALL RWY 25L AND NOTED THAT I PLANNED TO FLY AT OR ABOVE THE ELECTRONIC G/S ALL THE WAY DOWN TO STAY ABOVE THE XING RESTRICTIONS AND ABOVE THE FLOOR OF THE TCA. HAD THE APCH LIGHTS IN SIGHT BUT MADE A COMMENT TO THE F/O THAT I DON'T LIKE TO CALL THE ARPT IN SIGHT ON A VIS UNTIL INSIDE OF 20 MI. ALTHOUGH WE WERE STILL SLIGHTLY OUTSIDE MY 20 DME WINDOW, I ASKED THE F/O IF HE ALSO HAD IT IN SIGHT. HE SAID HE DID SO I SAID TO GO AHEAD AND CALL IT. THE CTLR THEN CLRED US FOR THE VIS, BUT I DON'T REMEMBER IF A SPECIFIC RWY WAS MENTIONED. I WAS APPARENTLY FIXATED ON THE APCH LIGHTS THAT I SAW AND DON'T REMEMBER LOOKING DOWN AT THE LOC RAW DATA INSIDE OF ABOUT 12 DME AT WHICH POINT IT WAS STILL FULL SCALE DEFLECTION TO THE R. WE HAD DONE THE APCH CHKLIST SHORTLY AFTER HAVING CALLED THE ARPT IN SIGHT, IE ALONG WAY OUT. IN ADDITION TO THE APCH LIGHTS, I REMEMBER SEEING THE GREEN HIGHSPD TURN OFF LIGHTS AT TXWY A-4/B-5 ILLUMINATED ON RWY 25R. THE COCKPIT WAS QUITE NOISY SINCE WE HAD BOTH A/C PACKS ON LONGER THAN NORMAL DUE TO A PRESSURIZATION LEAK DURING THE PREVIOUS LNDG AT LBB. THE S/O WAS OCCUPIED WITH THE PRESSURIZATION PANEL MGMNT DURING THE APCH AND I DON'T BELIEVE HE HAD TIME TO LOOK OUTSIDE UNTIL WELL DOWN THE G/S. I STARTED TO CONFIGURE AT ABOUT 1800' AGL. SOMEWHERE IN THIS AREA, THE S/O ASKED SOMETHING ABOUT WHERE THE R RWY WAS. I SAID SOMETHING ABOUT THAT THEY HAD JUST RECENTLY OPENED THE NEW RWY. I THOUGHT THAT HE HAD PROBABLY BEEN TO LAS WITH HIS PRIOR COMPANY BEFORE THE NEW PARALLEL WAS OPENED AND WAS JUST CONFUSED ABOUT THE ARPT LAYOUT. I DIDN'T PICK UP ON WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE HIS CONCERN ABOUT WHICH RWY WE WERE SHOOTING THE APCH TO. WE WERE CONFIGURED AND STABILIZED AT 5-600' WITH THE LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETED AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 25R. AS WE ROLLED OUT, I ASKED THE F/O TO CHK WITH THE TWR TO SEE IF WE COULD ROLL TO THE END TO MAKE THE TAXI TO THE RAMP MORE EXPEDITIOUS DUE TO ALL THE TXWY CLOSURES AS WE HAD DISCUSSED IN THE DSNT. THE RESPONSE FROM THE TWR WAS THAT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 25L AND THAT WE HAD LANDED ON RWY 25R WHICH WAS A CLOSED RWY. AT THAT POINT, I NOTICED THAT THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS WERE NOT ON. WE TAXIED CLR AT THE LIT HIGHSPD AND TO THE RAMP. I ASKED THE F/O TO GET A TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR THE TWR BUT THEY CALLED AND GAVE US ONE FIRST. CAUSAL FACTORS. RWY 25R CLOSURE WAS NOT ON THE ATIS BUT RWY 19L CLOSURE WAS EVEN THOUGH IT HAS BEEN CLOSED FOR A LONG TIME (AT LEAST ALL MONTH THAT I HAD BEEN FLYING TO LAS). THIS LED ME TO THINK THAT RWY 25R WAS OPEN. RWY 25R CLOSURE WAS NOT MENTIONED BY THE CTLRS. SUBCONSCIOUS FEELING THAT NOTAMS ARE GOOD FOR FLT PLANNING BUT ARE NOT NECESSARILY CURRENT AT TIME OF ARR. OPERATIONAL INFO IS RECEIVED OFF ATIS AND/OR FROM CTLRS IN REAL TIME. FAMILIARITY, I HAD BEEN GOING INTO LAS ALL MONTH AND HAD LANDED AND TAKEN OFF ONLY ON THE PRIMARY JET RWY, 25R. I SAW AND HEARD WHAT I WANTED TO AND WHAT I WAS USED TO. CLRED FOR THE VIS AND CLRED TO LAND A LONG WAY OUT. BROKEN HABIT PATTERNS, I USUALLY VERBALLY CONFIRM THE LNDG RWY DURING THE LNDG CHKLIST. I DID NOT THIS TIME. I ALSO USUALLY HAVE THE APCH PLATE ON THE YOKE CLIPBOARD, THIS TIME IT WAS STILL IN MY BINDER BY THE L SIDE OF MY SEAT. EXTREME FATIGUE COMPOUNDED ALL OF THE ABOVE. I USUALLY TAKE A 2-3 HR NAP BEFORE COMING TO WORK. THIS NIGHT I COULD NOT SLEEP AND ONLY GOT A 20-30 MIN NAP. I FELT QUITE TIRED AND WAS NOT AS ALERT AS USUAL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 182092. I STILL DO NOT REMEMBER THE TWR CLRING US TO LAND ON RWY 25L. NO MENTION ON THE ATIS WAS MADE OF RWY 25R BEING CLOSED. THE TWR NEVER STATED TO US THAT RWY 25R WAS CLOSED. AS WE TAXIIED ON, WE HEARD THE TWR GIVE ANOTHER ACFT A CLRNC AS FOLLOWS: 'CLRED TO LAND RWY 25L, RWY 25R CLOSED, CLRED TO LAND RWY 25L.' THERE ARE MANY THINGS THAT COULD HAVE PRECLUDED US LNDG ON RWY 25R, BUT IF HE HAD USED THE SAME TERMINOLOGY WITH US I'M SURE THIS INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. THE APCH LIGHTS AND HIGH SPD TURN-OFF FOR RWY 25R WERE ON, WITH NO APCH LIGHTS ON FOR RWY 25L. FATIGUE WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT. I DIDN'T HAVE MY RADIO TURNED TO THE ILS; I HAD THE APCH PLATE OUT FOR RWY 25L AND IT DIDN'T TRIGGER A MORE DEFINITIVE RESPONSE FROM ME, IE, CALLING AND VERIFYING LNDG CLRNC WITH THE TWR. THESE ARE ALL ROUTINE AND NORMAL ACTIONS/PROCS I KNOW I WOULD HAVE PERFORMED HAD I NOT BEEN SO INCREDIBLY TIRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 182081. IT WAS A LONG NIGHT FOR THE 3 OF US AND THE ACFT WAS VERY NOISEY DUE TO A 2 PACK OPERATION. I HAVE NEVER BEEN INTO LAS BEFORE AND THE RWYS BLENDED IN VERY WELL WITH THE ARPT SURROUNDINGS. THE RWY 25R APCH LIGHT SYS AND RWY TURNOFF LIGHTS WERE ON. WE WERE TIRED AND VERY DRAWN TO THE APCH LIGHT SYS LIKE MOTHS TO A FLAME. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. CALLBACK CONDUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A STRUCTURED CALLBACK STUDY ON RWY INCURSIONS. RPTR SAID THAT FATIGUE WAS THE PRIMARY ELEMENT AT WORK HERE. HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE NUMEROUS CLUES THAT ANY ONE OF THE FLT CREW MEMBERS COULD HAVE PICKED UP ON, BUT NONE WERE RECOGNIZED. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY THE RWY 25R APCH LIGHTS WERE ON. CONDITIONS WERE DAWN, AND THE FACT THAT THE RWY LIGHTS WERE NOT ON WAS NOT EASILY RECOGNIZED BECAUSE IT WAS GETTING LIGHTER. HE FEELS THAT ATC SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED HIM OF RWY 25R CLOSURE AND SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED THAT INFO ON THE ATIS. HE ALSO WONDERS WHY ATC COULDN'T TELL THAT HE WAS APCHING THE WRONG RWY AND CALLED IT TO HIS ATTN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.