Narrative:

I am a full performance level (fpl) ATC specialist at kennedy tower, jfk airport, jamaica, ny. We are presently in the 'test phase' of a stopbar control system, designed to prevent runway incursions by taxiing aircraft. The system consists of a set of ctlable green and red lights which coincide with the hold lines of each taxiway which crosses (or leads onto) a runway. When a runway is 'active', the stopbar lights at taxiway intxns along that runway are 'red'. When an aircraft is instructed by a controller to taxi across the runway, or to taxi onto the runway in the case of a departure, a switch is activated within the tower for that intersection, changing the stopbars 'green'. Thus, the pilot receives a visibility confirmation that he or she may cross or proceed onto the runway. After 20 seconds, the lights automatically change back to 'red'. In the past several months, I have observed 3 runway incursions which were not prevented by the stopbar system. The first occurred as an aircraft was 'rolling out' on runway 22L after landing. Air carrier X turned off at taxiway 'J'. After this turn, there are several directions in which an aircraft could possibly proceed, one of those directions (almost straight ahead after turning off 22L) leads onto runway 31L/13R (red/green ctlable stopbar lights, as described above, are in place short of runway 31L/13R on this taxiway also). As the local controller, I instructed the aircraft to proceed via taxiway 'J' (which turns to parallel runway 13R) and contact ground control. The aircraft acknowledged the instruction. Instead of taxiing via 'J' however, I observed the aircraft taxi past the 'red' stopbar lights (which were on intensity 'step 4' out of a possible '5') and onto runway 31L/13R. The significance of this event is that many days, during periods of heavy arrs, aircraft will be arriving and departing on runway 13R while at the same time, arrs are landing and taxiing off runway 22L at the above cited taxiway; runway 13R was not being used at the moment, but the stopbar lights had failed to prevent a potential runway incursion/collision, had there been an arrival or departure on runway 13R. Several weeks later, the same thing happened, only this time it was air carrier Y. WX conditions at the time of both incidents were good VFR, in early afternoon daytime conditions. I reported the air carrier X incident to my facility (anonymously) through the use of a 'stopbar questionnaire' which, in my opinion, is not being used correctly by management (ie, they use it to evaluate impact on controller workload, instead of to evaluate the effectiveness or noneffectiveness of the system, and thus I doubt the incident received much attention). I did not report the incidents to my facility using any other method since I felt I might have been disciplined for not taking action to prevent the potential incursion (both times I could see the aircraft about to proceed onto runway 13R and, to see how effective or ineffective the stopbar lights would be, I allowed the aircraft to continue west/O my intervening, knowing runway 13R was not in use). Most recently, I witnessed a third incident in which runway 31L (same intersection as discussed above) was in use for arrs and departures. I was the local control coordinator, assisting the local controller. With an small aircraft on final, I observed air carrier Z taxi past the red stopbar lights and part way onto runway 31L, west/O any instruction from the local controller (31L the assigned departure runway). The incursion was confirmed by simultaneously observing the aircraft's asde 'target' move part way onto the runway. I pointed out the incursion to the local controller, who instructed the small aircraft to go-around. Many times over, in addition to the above incidents (which were contrary to, or in the absence of, an ATC clearance), I have observed aircraft taxi through 'red' stopbar lights when issued crossing instructions by ATC (ie, the controller instructed the aircraft to cross and for one reason or another, the lights were not changed; rarely does the pilot question that the lights are still 'red'). Perhaps the lights stayed 'red' because a second controller, operating the stopbar control system and observing a hazardous condition (maybe traffic landing or taking off, unbeknownst to the controller issuing the verbal crossing instruction), kept the lights 'red' in anattempt to prevent the aircraft from crossing. This last example is only hypothetical, but it points out another flaw in a system which is supposed to 'confirm' or 'override' the verbal instruction my point is this: the above mentioned system is ineffective in preventing potential runway incursions/collisions, but I believe the FAA is pressured internally and externally to come up with a viable solution to the runway incursion problem and thus is 'determined' to make the 'red/green' ctlable stopbar system permanent, and perhaps the nationwide standard, no matter what evidence is presented to the contrary. Besides developing an asde system that will observe a potential runway incursion/collision automatically and sound an 'alert', I believe that an amber hold bar system is more effective than the stopbar system and should become the nationwide standard. This system has already been in place for yrs (and in accordance with ICAO standards, I believe) at other taxiway/runway intxns at jfk. These nonctlable amber hold bar lights, coinciding with the 'yellow hold line' at each runway/taxiway intersection in the same manner as the stopbar system, should be installed at all tower controled airports and when a runway is 'active', the lights for the affected intxns should be illuminated. It should be a regulatory requirement that an aircraft must hold short of these amber lights unless ATC instructions are received that allow the crossing of those lights (ie, 'cross runway xx' or 'taxi into position and hold', etc).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X, Y, AND Z UNAUTHORIZED RWY ENTRY. PLTDEV. SITUATION: STOPBAR LIGHT SYSTEM AT JFK IS INEFFECTIVE.

Narrative: I AM A FULL PERFORMANCE LEVEL (FPL) ATC SPECIALIST AT KENNEDY TWR, JFK ARPT, JAMAICA, NY. WE ARE PRESENTLY IN THE 'TEST PHASE' OF A STOPBAR CTL SYS, DESIGNED TO PREVENT RWY INCURSIONS BY TAXIING ACFT. THE SYS CONSISTS OF A SET OF CTLABLE GREEN AND RED LIGHTS WHICH COINCIDE WITH THE HOLD LINES OF EACH TXWY WHICH CROSSES (OR LEADS ONTO) A RWY. WHEN A RWY IS 'ACTIVE', THE STOPBAR LIGHTS AT TXWY INTXNS ALONG THAT RWY ARE 'RED'. WHEN AN ACFT IS INSTRUCTED BY A CTLR TO TAXI ACROSS THE RWY, OR TO TAXI ONTO THE RWY IN THE CASE OF A DEP, A SWITCH IS ACTIVATED WITHIN THE TWR FOR THAT INTXN, CHANGING THE STOPBARS 'GREEN'. THUS, THE PLT RECEIVES A VIS CONFIRMATION THAT HE OR SHE MAY CROSS OR PROCEED ONTO THE RWY. AFTER 20 SECS, THE LIGHTS AUTOMATICALLY CHANGE BACK TO 'RED'. IN THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, I HAVE OBSERVED 3 RWY INCURSIONS WHICH WERE NOT PREVENTED BY THE STOPBAR SYS. THE FIRST OCCURRED AS AN ACFT WAS 'ROLLING OUT' ON RWY 22L AFTER LNDG. ACR X TURNED OFF AT TXWY 'J'. AFTER THIS TURN, THERE ARE SEVERAL DIRECTIONS IN WHICH AN ACFT COULD POSSIBLY PROCEED, ONE OF THOSE DIRECTIONS (ALMOST STRAIGHT AHEAD AFTER TURNING OFF 22L) LEADS ONTO RWY 31L/13R (RED/GREEN CTLABLE STOPBAR LIGHTS, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, ARE IN PLACE SHORT OF RWY 31L/13R ON THIS TXWY ALSO). AS THE LCL CTLR, I INSTRUCTED THE ACFT TO PROCEED VIA TXWY 'J' (WHICH TURNS TO PARALLEL RWY 13R) AND CONTACT GND CTL. THE ACFT ACKNOWLEDGED THE INSTRUCTION. INSTEAD OF TAXIING VIA 'J' HOWEVER, I OBSERVED THE ACFT TAXI PAST THE 'RED' STOPBAR LIGHTS (WHICH WERE ON INTENSITY 'STEP 4' OUT OF A POSSIBLE '5') AND ONTO RWY 31L/13R. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IS THAT MANY DAYS, DURING PERIODS OF HVY ARRS, ACFT WILL BE ARRIVING AND DEPARTING ON RWY 13R WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, ARRS ARE LNDG AND TAXIING OFF RWY 22L AT THE ABOVE CITED TXWY; RWY 13R WAS NOT BEING USED AT THE MOMENT, BUT THE STOPBAR LIGHTS HAD FAILED TO PREVENT A POTENTIAL RWY INCURSION/COLLISION, HAD THERE BEEN AN ARR OR DEP ON RWY 13R. SEVERAL WKS LATER, THE SAME THING HAPPENED, ONLY THIS TIME IT WAS ACR Y. WX CONDITIONS AT THE TIME OF BOTH INCIDENTS WERE GOOD VFR, IN EARLY AFTERNOON DAYTIME CONDITIONS. I RPTED THE ACR X INCIDENT TO MY FAC (ANONYMOUSLY) THROUGH THE USE OF A 'STOPBAR QUESTIONNAIRE' WHICH, IN MY OPINION, IS NOT BEING USED CORRECTLY BY MGMNT (IE, THEY USE IT TO EVALUATE IMPACT ON CTLR WORKLOAD, INSTEAD OF TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OR NONEFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYS, AND THUS I DOUBT THE INCIDENT RECEIVED MUCH ATTN). I DID NOT RPT THE INCIDENTS TO MY FAC USING ANY OTHER METHOD SINCE I FELT I MIGHT HAVE BEEN DISCIPLINED FOR NOT TAKING ACTION TO PREVENT THE POTENTIAL INCURSION (BOTH TIMES I COULD SEE THE ACFT ABOUT TO PROCEED ONTO RWY 13R AND, TO SEE HOW EFFECTIVE OR INEFFECTIVE THE STOPBAR LIGHTS WOULD BE, I ALLOWED THE ACFT TO CONTINUE W/O MY INTERVENING, KNOWING RWY 13R WAS NOT IN USE). MOST RECENTLY, I WITNESSED A THIRD INCIDENT IN WHICH RWY 31L (SAME INTXN AS DISCUSSED ABOVE) WAS IN USE FOR ARRS AND DEPS. I WAS THE LCL CTL COORDINATOR, ASSISTING THE LCL CTLR. WITH AN SMA ON FINAL, I OBSERVED ACR Z TAXI PAST THE RED STOPBAR LIGHTS AND PART WAY ONTO RWY 31L, W/O ANY INSTRUCTION FROM THE LCL CTLR (31L THE ASSIGNED DEP RWY). THE INCURSION WAS CONFIRMED BY SIMULTANEOUSLY OBSERVING THE ACFT'S ASDE 'TARGET' MOVE PART WAY ONTO THE RWY. I POINTED OUT THE INCURSION TO THE LCL CTLR, WHO INSTRUCTED THE SMA TO GO-AROUND. MANY TIMES OVER, IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE INCIDENTS (WHICH WERE CONTRARY TO, OR IN THE ABSENCE OF, AN ATC CLRNC), I HAVE OBSERVED ACFT TAXI THROUGH 'RED' STOPBAR LIGHTS WHEN ISSUED XING INSTRUCTIONS BY ATC (IE, THE CTLR INSTRUCTED THE ACFT TO CROSS AND FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER, THE LIGHTS WERE NOT CHANGED; RARELY DOES THE PLT QUESTION THAT THE LIGHTS ARE STILL 'RED'). PERHAPS THE LIGHTS STAYED 'RED' BECAUSE A SEC CTLR, OPERATING THE STOPBAR CTL SYS AND OBSERVING A HAZARDOUS CONDITION (MAYBE TFC LNDG OR TAKING OFF, UNBEKNOWNST TO THE CTLR ISSUING THE VERBAL XING INSTRUCTION), KEPT THE LIGHTS 'RED' IN ANATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE ACFT FROM XING. THIS LAST EXAMPLE IS ONLY HYPOTHETICAL, BUT IT POINTS OUT ANOTHER FLAW IN A SYS WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO 'CONFIRM' OR 'OVERRIDE' THE VERBAL INSTRUCTION MY POINT IS THIS: THE ABOVE MENTIONED SYS IS INEFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING POTENTIAL RWY INCURSIONS/COLLISIONS, BUT I BELIEVE THE FAA IS PRESSURED INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY TO COME UP WITH A VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE RWY INCURSION PROB AND THUS IS 'DETERMINED' TO MAKE THE 'RED/GREEN' CTLABLE STOPBAR SYS PERMANENT, AND PERHAPS THE NATIONWIDE STANDARD, NO MATTER WHAT EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED TO THE CONTRARY. BESIDES DEVELOPING AN ASDE SYS THAT WILL OBSERVE A POTENTIAL RWY INCURSION/COLLISION AUTOMATICALLY AND SOUND AN 'ALERT', I BELIEVE THAT AN AMBER HOLD BAR SYS IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE STOPBAR SYS AND SHOULD BECOME THE NATIONWIDE STANDARD. THIS SYS HAS ALREADY BEEN IN PLACE FOR YRS (AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH ICAO STANDARDS, I BELIEVE) AT OTHER TXWY/RWY INTXNS AT JFK. THESE NONCTLABLE AMBER HOLD BAR LIGHTS, COINCIDING WITH THE 'YELLOW HOLD LINE' AT EACH RWY/TXWY INTXN IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE STOPBAR SYS, SHOULD BE INSTALLED AT ALL TWR CTLED ARPTS AND WHEN A RWY IS 'ACTIVE', THE LIGHTS FOR THE AFFECTED INTXNS SHOULD BE ILLUMINATED. IT SHOULD BE A REGULATORY REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACFT MUST HOLD SHORT OF THESE AMBER LIGHTS UNLESS ATC INSTRUCTIONS ARE RECEIVED THAT ALLOW THE XING OF THOSE LIGHTS (IE, 'CROSS RWY XX' OR 'TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD', ETC).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.