Narrative:

I returned from a break at XA54 and at least 1 min (possibly 2 or more) later was assigned by my supervisor to the tracker position at the states/hunter sector (67). The radar controller was mr. C, a supervisor, who was busy and consequently did not have time to brief me. There were several situations which needed attention, particularly sequencing some mco, mlb arrs. Mr C and I discussed what to do about a mco arrival and a mlb arrival and implemented a plan to turn the mco arrival to the west for spacing. My intent was to turn the aircraft back to the airway, in trail of the mlb traffic. Later when talking to mr. C I found out his intent was to descend the mco traffic below the mlb. Apparently we had not communicated thoroughly. In any case, it was necessary to coordinate with the sector to the south and I was frustrated because they didn't hear me call them. Meanwhile a new situation had arisen, sequencing 2 mco arrs. We discussed how to handle this situation and slowed 1 of the aircraft (air carrier X). A couple mins later when we realized the speed restriction wasn't enough, we agreed to turn air carrier X 30 degree to the right for spacing. We overlooked air carrier Y which was climbing slowly to FL330 and separation was lost. Both mr. C and I feel that the initial problem with the mco and the mlb aircraft contributed to being distracted. In addition, the difficulty in coordinating with the sector to the south distracted me enough to prevent me from fully assessing the traffic situation. I don't know the exact time I arrived at the sector but it couldn't have been before XA55. It could have been as late as XA58. I simply did not 'have the picture' yet. I was on the interphone line when the conflict alert was activated at XB02. Separation was already lost. Mr. C was having difficulty assessing the situation, so I terminated the interphone conversation and issued a 30 degree turn to air carrier Y.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LTSS BTWN 2 ACR ACFT. OPAL ERROR.

Narrative: I RETURNED FROM A BREAK AT XA54 AND AT LEAST 1 MIN (POSSIBLY 2 OR MORE) LATER WAS ASSIGNED BY MY SUPVR TO THE TRACKER POS AT THE STATES/HUNTER SECTOR (67). THE RADAR CTLR WAS MR. C, A SUPVR, WHO WAS BUSY AND CONSEQUENTLY DID NOT HAVE TIME TO BRIEF ME. THERE WERE SEVERAL SITUATIONS WHICH NEEDED ATTN, PARTICULARLY SEQUENCING SOME MCO, MLB ARRS. MR C AND I DISCUSSED WHAT TO DO ABOUT A MCO ARR AND A MLB ARR AND IMPLEMENTED A PLAN TO TURN THE MCO ARR TO THE W FOR SPACING. MY INTENT WAS TO TURN THE ACFT BACK TO THE AIRWAY, IN TRAIL OF THE MLB TFC. LATER WHEN TALKING TO MR. C I FOUND OUT HIS INTENT WAS TO DSND THE MCO TFC BELOW THE MLB. APPARENTLY WE HAD NOT COMMUNICATED THOROUGHLY. IN ANY CASE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO COORDINATE WITH THE SECTOR TO THE S AND I WAS FRUSTRATED BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T HEAR ME CALL THEM. MEANWHILE A NEW SITUATION HAD ARISEN, SEQUENCING 2 MCO ARRS. WE DISCUSSED HOW TO HANDLE THIS SITUATION AND SLOWED 1 OF THE ACFT (ACR X). A COUPLE MINS LATER WHEN WE REALIZED THE SPD RESTRICTION WASN'T ENOUGH, WE AGREED TO TURN ACR X 30 DEG TO THE R FOR SPACING. WE OVERLOOKED ACR Y WHICH WAS CLBING SLOWLY TO FL330 AND SEPARATION WAS LOST. BOTH MR. C AND I FEEL THAT THE INITIAL PROBLEM WITH THE MCO AND THE MLB ACFT CONTRIBUTED TO BEING DISTRACTED. IN ADDITION, THE DIFFICULTY IN COORDINATING WITH THE SECTOR TO THE S DISTRACTED ME ENOUGH TO PREVENT ME FROM FULLY ASSESSING THE TFC SITUATION. I DON'T KNOW THE EXACT TIME I ARRIVED AT THE SECTOR BUT IT COULDN'T HAVE BEEN BEFORE XA55. IT COULD HAVE BEEN AS LATE AS XA58. I SIMPLY DID NOT 'HAVE THE PICTURE' YET. I WAS ON THE INTERPHONE LINE WHEN THE CONFLICT ALERT WAS ACTIVATED AT XB02. SEPARATION WAS ALREADY LOST. MR. C WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY ASSESSING THE SITUATION, SO I TERMINATED THE INTERPHONE CONVERSATION AND ISSUED A 30 DEG TURN TO ACR Y.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.