Narrative:

This is an example of a transparent computer error to the releasing dispatcher. The computer system does not in fact display the same file it uses to create the flight plan. It was filed with ATC correctly via 49N 150W as 0PER the pac OTS NOTAM. All the dispatcher sees is the cpv record. The computer uses the cpx record (file) to process the flight plan (computer flight plan) not ATC flight plan. These problems arise when computer programmers who do not know the regulations and do not understand safety issues are give authority over licensed personnel. The FAA being incompetent to troubleshoot the problem does not help. Ultmiately dispatcher and pilots who are legally responsible should be allowed to refuse a computer system which is inadequate. Systems like these should be structured in such a way that a simple human data entry error is visible and flagable during the flight planning process. Rather than encrypted and transparent as this one is. The FAA should be capable of spotting and demanding a remedy for such problems. Proper automation always displays the exact result to the user (dispatcher). It should also provide to the extent possible the implications of those results. This error could have led to a midair collision.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIRLINE DISPATCHER'S COMPLAINT ABOUT ERRORS BEING MADE BY COMPUTER DATA ENTRY PROGRAMMERS.

Narrative: THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF A TRANSPARENT COMPUTER ERROR TO THE RELEASING DISPATCHER. THE COMPUTER SYSTEM DOES NOT IN FACT DISPLAY THE SAME FILE IT USES TO CREATE THE FLT PLAN. IT WAS FILED WITH ATC CORRECTLY VIA 49N 150W AS 0PER THE PAC OTS NOTAM. ALL THE DISPATCHER SEES IS THE CPV RECORD. THE COMPUTER USES THE CPX RECORD (FILE) TO PROCESS THE FLT PLAN (COMPUTER FLT PLAN) NOT ATC FLT PLAN. THESE PROBS ARISE WHEN COMPUTER PROGRAMMERS WHO DO NOT KNOW THE REGS AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND SAFETY ISSUES ARE GIVE AUTHORITY OVER LICENSED PERSONNEL. THE FAA BEING INCOMPETENT TO TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB DOES NOT HELP. ULTMIATELY DISPATCHER AND PLTS WHO ARE LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO REFUSE A COMPUTER SYSTEM WHICH IS INADEQUATE. SYSTEMS LIKE THESE SHOULD BE STRUCTURED IN SUCH A WAY THAT A SIMPLE HUMAN DATA ENTRY ERROR IS VISIBLE AND FLAGABLE DURING THE FLT PLANNING PROCESS. RATHER THAN ENCRYPTED AND TRANSPARENT AS THIS ONE IS. THE FAA SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF SPOTTING AND DEMANDING A REMEDY FOR SUCH PROBS. PROPER AUTOMATION ALWAYS DISPLAYS THE EXACT RESULT TO THE USER (DISPATCHER). IT SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THOSE RESULTS. THIS ERROR COULD HAVE LED TO A MIDAIR COLLISION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.