Narrative:

I was pilot flying on aircraft X; xx passengers; the first flight of our day. While hand flying the departure on a 320 heading vector to 7;000 feet; past 5;000 feet and approaching 6;000 feet we received a traffic advisory from ZZZ departure control. Approaching 6;000 feet (approximately) on the way to 7;000 feet we received a TCAS annunciation for the aircraft that ATC reported; which was immediately followed with a TCAS resolution advisory ('level off' commanded). I remember seeing the aircraft on the mfd when first reported at 11 o'clock and 1;400 feet above our altitude; which the captain and I later discussed as likely being at 7;500 feet. The time that it took from receiving the first traffic advisory from ATC to complying with the TCAS RA and receiving 'clear of conflict' from memory appeared to be approximately less than 10 seconds. The captain copied the next instructions from ATC and reported that we received a TCAS RA.there were multiple errors that I failed to mitigate. I should have briefed that with a reduced passenger and cargo load; and a lower temperature than recent flights; performance would be substantially greater. I could have opted to engage the autopilot above 600 feet and allow myself more visibility to achieve a greater situational awareness. Looking back; I was fixated on airspeed to conform with the company profile of accelerating to 250 knots and I omitted the vsi which indicated an excessive rate of climb for that altitude and within the terminal area. Having a proper scan would have allowed me to recognize the rate of climb and reduce thrust out of climb detent appropriately since I was using the speed mode (climb) of the autopilot per company profile. The threat of reduced loads was already highlighted multiple times in company documentation and safety publications specifically related to the environment created by the covid-19 pandemic and should have been trapped. Loads have been solid at yy passengers for the last month and all flights today were xx or less passengers; equivalent to march lows when the bulk of similar events were highlighted.during debrief with the captain (pilot monitoring); he said that he intended to call out the excessive rate of climb; but the traffic advisory; TCAS alert; altitude chime (1;000 feet prior to altitudes); and TCAS RA all came in at nearly the same time and didn't allow space to talk.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: First Officer reported receiving an RA and overshooting the assigned altitude by 500 feet due to a light load.

Narrative: I was pilot flying on Aircraft X; XX passengers; the first flight of our day. While hand flying the departure on a 320 heading vector to 7;000 feet; past 5;000 feet and approaching 6;000 feet we received a traffic advisory from ZZZ departure control. Approaching 6;000 feet (approximately) on the way to 7;000 feet we received a TCAS annunciation for the aircraft that ATC reported; which was immediately followed with a TCAS resolution advisory ('Level OFF' commanded). I remember seeing the aircraft on the MFD when first reported at 11 o'clock and 1;400 feet above our altitude; which the Captain and I later discussed as likely being at 7;500 feet. The time that it took from receiving the first traffic advisory from ATC to complying with the TCAS RA and receiving 'clear of conflict' from memory appeared to be approximately less than 10 seconds. The Captain copied the next instructions from ATC and reported that we received a TCAS RA.There were multiple errors that I failed to mitigate. I should have briefed that with a reduced passenger and cargo load; and a lower temperature than recent flights; performance would be substantially greater. I could have opted to engage the autopilot above 600 feet and allow myself more visibility to achieve a greater situational awareness. Looking back; I was fixated on airspeed to conform with the company profile of accelerating to 250 knots and I omitted the VSI which indicated an excessive rate of climb for that altitude and within the terminal area. Having a proper scan would have allowed me to recognize the rate of climb and reduce thrust out of climb detent appropriately since I was using the speed mode (climb) of the autopilot per company profile. The threat of reduced loads was already highlighted multiple times in company documentation and safety publications specifically related to the environment created by the COVID-19 pandemic and should have been trapped. Loads have been solid at YY passengers for the last month and all flights today were XX or less passengers; equivalent to March lows when the bulk of similar events were highlighted.During debrief with the Captain (pilot monitoring); he said that he intended to call out the excessive rate of climb; but the traffic advisory; TCAS alert; altitude chime (1;000 feet prior to ALTS); and TCAS RA all came in at nearly the same time and didn't allow space to talk.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.